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Abstract 
 
 
The fast paced work environment that exists today requires organizations to adapt 
quickly in order to sustain high performance.  Research suggests that the use of high-
performance work practices (HPWPs) in human resource management is a possible way 
to increase performance.  As the United States Air Force continues to face decreasing 
budgets, possible fixes such as the use of HPWPs may be considered.  This research used 
a phenomenological approach to collect data from civil engineer controllers throughout 
the Air Force about their experiences and perceptions.  The purpose of the study was to 
investigate whether current human resource practices are potentially contributing to the 
perceptions of controllers.  The results were analyzed and coded into overall themes.  
These collected data were compared to models of HPWPs to identify which practices 
could be altered to possibly increase performance.  There were five key findings from 
this research.  Controllers felt that there were too few senior leaders in the career field, 
there was an unawareness of their role by other squadron members, there was 
inconsistent employment and recognition of controllers, they needed advanced training, 
and there was a lack of standardized guidance. 
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HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES:  
 
A CASE STUDY USING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The accelerated pace of the modern work environment demands that 
organizations maximize their outputs by developing robust, flexible work structures.  
Employee management is just one of the many factors that can contribute to such a 
structure.  In the recent past, organizations have shifted their focus to human resource 
management (HRM) in search of changes that could boost performance.  It can be easily 
surmised that in order for an organization to realize its full potential, it is necessary for all 
members of the organization to operate at their highest efficiency.  Numerous studies 
have suggested that the extra efficiency organizations seek can be found in the 
implementation of high-performance work practices.  Though every organization must 
manage employees in some manner, research suggests that the use of these more involved 
practices may provide the increase in performance for which organizations are searching. 
   
Background 
HRM has been thoroughly investigated in search of ideas that organizations can 
use to increase performance.  There is a common belief among both researchers and 
practitioners that individual performance can be positively affected by HRM practices.  
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By focusing on the management of individuals, gains in overall organizational 
performance are expected.  Research suggests that the use of strategic, involved practices, 
know as high-performance work practices (HPWPs), do in fact lead to increases in 
organizational performance.  Specifically, studies have shown a positive relationship 
between HPWPs and various performance measures.  For example, HPWPs can be used 
to lower employee turnover (Sheridan, 1992).  Additionally, productivity was increased 
by the use of HPWPs that emphasized training (Russell et al., 1985).   Finally, Cascio 
(1991) and Paul and Anantharaman (2003) demonstrated the connection between HPWPs 
and the overall financial performance of organizations.   
In other work, Huselid (1995) suggested that three processes of employee 
behavior were affected by different HPWPs.  The three processes are: increasing the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of the worker, motivating workers to use KSAs, 
and empowering them to do so.  A later study gathered data from prior HRM research 
and isolated 10 HPWPs that most affected organizational performance (Liu et al., 2007).  
These practices were found to affect overall performance more when implemented as a 
system rather than as individual initiatives (Combs et al., 2006).  Practices included 
training, selection, grievance procedures, employment security, and others.  From this 
information, it can be assumed that an organization should at least consider the use of 
HPWPs to increase overall performance and maximize efficiency. 
The United States Air Force is in a position where it too is looking for possible 
ideas that can enhance performance.  The sustained war efforts of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom have taken a significant toll on the United 
States military forces.  These two engagements have been costly in terms of both money 
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and manpower (Belasco, 2011).  In addition to the ongoing conflicts, the Department of 
Defense is facing severe budget cuts.  These cuts are a result of the government’s desire 
to reduce the national debt accumulation.  In response, the Air Force is expected to cut 
$33 billion in annual costs (Byers, 2011). 
Along with funding, reductions in manpower have been proposed to address the 
budget pressures.  In doing so, the Air Force aims to “right size” the force so that only 
essential personnel are retained (Byers, 2011).  Each career field in the Air Force has 
subsequently been prompted to evaluate its current practices and provide leaders with 
possible solutions to save money and manpower.  In 2007, Civil Engineer (CE) leaders 
responded to the increasing budget crisis by releasing a plan, termed “CE 
Transformation,” to meet the “20/20 by 2020” goal of offsetting the 20% reduction in 
funds available for installation support activities and reducing the amount spent on the 
current physical plant by 20% by the year 2020 (Moriarty, 2007).  The belief was that the 
Air Force could save money if it used better business processes to manage its physical 
infrastructure, learned best practices from industry, and utilized off-the-shelf technology 
for its databases (Culver, 2007).  There were also manpower reviews conducted to ensure 
that personnel levels were adequate for the missions they were charged with carrying out. 
One of the main points of the CE Transformation plan is the adoption of an asset 
management approach.  Asset management is the term coined for the process of using all 
available resources in the most efficient way possible.  Major General (retired) Del 
Eulberg (2007), former Civil Engineer of the Air Force, defined asset management as 
using systematic and integrated processes to manage natural and built assets and their 
associated performance, risk, and expenditures over their life cycles to support missions 
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and organizational goals.  In an address to the CE community, he stated, “We’ve initiated 
one of the most significant paradigm shifts in civil engineering’s recent history.”  Other 
Air Force leadership has agreed that a more “business-minded” approach must be used.  
This approach requires a deliberate assessment of risks, costs, and benefits to provide a 
common level of service across the Air Force (Lawrence, 2007).   
Since the asset management model is a data dependent system, the quality of the 
data used, on which these “business-minded” decisions are based, may be a source of 
concern.  Data must be collected on what is owned, what it is worth, and what is the 
expected life-cycle.  Vanier (2001) suggested that answering these questions was 
essential to implementing asset management.  In addition, he looked at what decisions 
can be made with the existing data, but failed to look at the data collection itself and the 
problems associated with it.  Errant or incomplete data hinders the decision-making 
process, regardless of the number of creative and innovative decision tools that are 
created.  Furthermore, the implementation of asset management is a socio-technical 
process.  As part of a study of the British coal industry, the Tavistock Institute found that 
during a landmark change in processes, “the goal must always be the joint optimization 
of the social and technical systems” (Mumford, 1994).    
The underlying assumption in the initiatives enacted to meet budget pressures is 
that the personnel employed are performing their jobs as intended.  It is assumed that they 
are properly trained and can accomplish the work necessary to support the initiatives.  
This implies strong career field management along with leadership support regarding 
inputs into the decision-making process and resources for training and development.  If 
performance is not at the level desired, one could argue that the implementation of 
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HPWPs would be an appropriate endeavor.  This could address any shortcomings in 
training, motivation, and other areas.   
The personnel responsible for a large amount of the data that asset management 
depends on are known as controllers. Their jobs include communicating with the 
customers, planning work, and maintaining the systems that document work, inventory, 
and schedules.  Upon closer examination of the controller functions though, many issues 
that HPWPs claim to address are present and may be causing unforeseen performance 
problems.  For example, senior members of the controller, or operations management, 
career field attending a CE Superintendent’s course voiced concerns about the void of 
advanced training, feelings of not being part of the team, retention, deployments, and 
manning (McDowell, 2011).  These issues hint at systemic failures, or perceptions of 
failure, in HRM within the controller career field. 
   
Problem Statement 
Initial indications from leaders in operations management suggest that there is a 
perception that the career field may have systemic problems that directly affect its ability 
to conduct its assigned mission.  These problems relate to the three processes that 
HPWPs claim to aid:  increasing the KSAs of the worker, motivating workers to use the 
KSAs, and empowering them to do so.  The operations management career field may 
benefit from an investigation to determine which HPWPs are used and which could be 
implemented to address the observed problems.  If these problems are not corrected, they 
may result in a loss of performance.   
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Research Question 
Based on the concerns expressed about HRM practices within the controller 
career field, the primary objective of this research was to answer the following question:  
Are current human resource practices potentially contributing to the perceptions of 
controllers?  To address this question, the following investigative questions were 
explored to focus on specific areas: 
• Do controllers feel they possess the KSAs needed to perform their jobs well? 
• Are controllers motivated to perform? 
• How are interpersonal relationships between controllers and other engineers 
affecting job performance? 
• Do controllers believe they have the necessary representation among decision-
makers? 
• Do controllers perceive the product they produce is reliable? 
 
Methodology 
A qualitative approach, based on the phenomenological method, was used to 
examine the controllers’ perceived reality.  The desired information was collected 
through semi-structured interviews.  The exploratory nature of these interviews allowed 
the subjects to answer however they desired and allowed them to introduce additional 
topics.  After each interview, the questions for the next interview were altered by constant 
comparison to further explore areas identified in prior sessions.  Interviews ceased once 
the collected data reached a point where no new information was produced known as 
theoretical saturation.  Interviews were transcribed semi-verbatim and analyzed by 
coding.  Once the data were distilled into a small number of theoretical codes, they were 
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summarized and presented; secondary data sources were sometimes used to further 
clarify results.   
 
Assumptions and Limitations 
Two main assumptions impacted this research.  First, it was assumed that there 
was truth to the perceptions described.  Although some of the results are reinforced by 
secondary sources, a majority of the issues that were uncovered are based solely on the 
recurring perceptions of the subjects interviewed.  These perceptions were viewed as 
likely realities since they were confirmed by multiple interviews.  The second assumption 
was that increased performance of operations managers will translate into successful 
performance of asset management as it applies to overall CE and Air Force goals. 
This study is limited to responses from controllers.  Although a few non-
controller members of CE were contacted as secondary sources, the study focuses on the 
perceptions of controllers alone.  Similar problems may exist in the production control 
elements of other groups such as communications or maintenance, though the 
consequences of mismanaging a specific group of workers may not have the same effect 
in different industries.   
 
Implications 
Problems identified in this study can be communicated to leaders in the career 
field and the CE community as a whole.  The awareness of these problems may prompt 
leadership to focus on investigating relevant areas more closely and introduce changes 
that may increase performance.  Although the issues revealed may apply specifically to 
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controllers, the underlying HRM relationships and the results of this study may bring to 
light the challenges that many small groups within larger organizations face when the use 
of HPWPs is marginal or absent.  It may also prompt leaders to closely examine groups 
within their organizations that they are not as familiar with to see if similar issues are 
present. 
 
Overview 
The next chapter contains relevant literature that details the use of HPWPs and 
explains the career field studied.  Chapter III contains an explanation for the methodology 
selected as well as a description of how the data was collected and analyzed.  Chapter IV 
is a hybrid of results and additional literature.  At times, a topic is framed using relevant 
literature so that the comments of the interviewees are displayed in the proper context.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion on how the results relate to a previously 
established HRM models.  The final chapter contains conclusions from the study. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
The following literature review provides further information about two areas 
pertinent to this research.  The first section looks at high-performance work practices 
(HPWPs) and explains the beginning of their use, what they include, and how they affect 
performance. The next section provides a needed explanation of the career field that this 
study focuses on.  The job description, as described by the United States Air Force is 
included as well as a comparison to a similar civilian job.  These two areas are critical to 
understanding the context of this study. 
 
High-Performance Work Practices 
This section consolidates the work of numerous researchers in the field of human 
resource management (HRM).  Specifically, it looks at a number of practices that have 
been termed “high-performance” to show the utility of such practices in an organization.  
The section concludes with one of many models that neatly organizes the most effective 
HPWPs. 
 
 Human resource management refers to the actions of an organization that focus 
on the employee rather than the product or service they provide.  The growing literature 
base includes many different studies that look at the relationships between the 
characteristics of employees and the performance of the organization (Guthrie, 2001).  
These studies hope to provide justification for the necessity of HRM.  The goal of HRM 
Genesis of HPWPs 
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is to remove any roadblocks being faced by an employee to facilitate their productivity 
(Liu et al., 2007). 
Near the beginning of the 20th century, management leaders such as Frederick 
Taylor championed the idea that managers should hold all the power in a company and 
treat workers as interchangeable parts.  When this philosophy met fierce criticism, the 
idea of HRM was born (Cappelli & Neumark, 1999).  It took many years for 
organizations to fully embrace the concept of HRM.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a 
shift was seen by organizations to focus more on HRM.  Many companies renamed their 
“personnel” departments to “human resource” departments, emphasizing the fact that 
workers were viewed as assets as opposed to pieces of a machine (Liu et al., 2007). 
In the 1990s, management researchers began to identify certain HRM practices 
that they believed organizations should implement to provide a competitive advantage.  
The thought was that a system of practices providing workers with skills, information, 
and motivation would become invaluable to an organization’s success (Guthrie, 2001).  
These practices have been referred to in a number of ways, from “high performance” 
(Huselid, 1995) to “high involvement” (Lawler, 1992) to “high commitment” (Arthur, 
1994).  Pil and MacDuffie (1996) believe that referring to these practices as “high 
performance” is a mistake because it implies that the practices undoubtedly translate to 
increased performance, a belief that they do not support.  Although there are debates 
about the appropriateness of such titles, the concept behind each term is similar.  The 
phrase “high performance work practices” (or HPWPs) is used throughout this document 
because the focus is on the model developed from Huselid’s (1995) work. 
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The growing intensity of international competition has forced many organizations 
to explore HPWPs in search of an edge over their challengers (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996).  
The question that they want answered is whether or not implementing HPWPs will 
actually increase performance at some level.  The majority of the literature indicates that 
there is a connection between HPWPs and performance. 
Benefits of HPWPs 
A study conducted by Huselid (1995) found that there was consistent evidence 
that effective use of HPWPs directly contributed to organizational performance.  Some of 
the practices linked with performance were extensive recruitment, selection, training, 
information sharing, attitude assessment, job design, grievance procedures, participation 
programs, appraisals, promotions, and incentives.  The study crossed several industries 
and organizations of different sizes.  Repeatedly, he showed a connection between these 
practices and performance measures such as lower employee turnover, greater 
productivity, and corporate financial performance.   
Another study found that the key to the effectiveness of such practices is that the 
ideas and motivations of employees must be tapped into to increase productivity.   
Without the use of HPWPs, employees might withhold effort and compliance either due 
to an inability or indifference to act (Cappelli & Neumark, 1999).  Research by Russell et 
al. (1985) showed that an emphasis on training was key to overall success.  Others also 
demonstrated the connection between effective HRM and performance (Liu et al., 2007). 
Vandenberg et al (1999) studied the path from HPWPs to performance by way of 
morale.  By increasing employee involvement, increases in organizational performance 
were shown as well as an indirect influence though employee morale.  The study 
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measured levels of morale within multiple organizations and saw increases in connection 
with HPWPs.  It was expected that the increased morale would lead to overall increases 
in organizational performance.  This assumption was supported by performance 
measures.  Stronger morale resulted in improved organizational-level performance 
evidenced by lower turnover, higher productivity, and higher financial performance 
(Vandenberg et al., 1999). 
The positive results often result in opponents suggesting various sources of bias, 
thereby dismissing their impact.  Cautious of the wide applicability of such studies, 
Cappelli and Neumark (1999) agree that studies within a single industry may yield usable 
results.  They believe that performance measures within industries are “less contaminated 
by extraneous factors, hence more accurately measure true performance differences 
across firms.”  In contrast, others have shown evidence that the HPWP-performance 
relationship is not affected by the researcher’s choice of organizational performance 
measures (Combs et al., 2006).  Instead, there is a meaningful relationship between the 
use of HPWPs and a variety of performance measures (Liu et al., 2007). 
 
Though HPWPs have been shown to increase organizational performance, some 
groups may not find it advantageous to implement such practices due to the initial 
implementation costs.  To effectively use HPWPs, the group must embrace the 
philosophy of commitment and involvement of the employees.  Vandenberg et al. (1999) 
state that an abundance of corporate policies and good intentions from the company 
leadership means nothing if the employees do not feel they are a crucial piece of the 
Costs of Implementation 
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overall success.  The perception among employees must be one of significance of the 
individual.  Therefore, the necessary steps to develop a culture of involvement must be 
taken, which is not without cost.   
To start using HPWPs, an organization must transform into an employee-centered 
group.  This investment is risky because it places power at lower levels than traditionally 
done.  The decision-making authority must be dispersed to the necessary levels (Guthrie, 
2001).  The company must then manage this stretch of power though a robust HR 
department (Lawler, 1992).  Rather than separating thought processes from work 
processes, the company must rely on the tacit knowledge of the employees (Guthrie, 
2001). 
Pil and MacDuffie (1996) noted the possible levels of performance that may be 
observed once HPWPs are implemented.  By introducing practices that require more out 
of employees, change areas of emphasis, and stray from familiar procedures, performance 
will likely fall at first, costing the organization the productivity it had before the changes 
were implemented.  Once the practices take hold, it is implied that performance will 
reach higher levels than if no practices were introduced or if some HPWPs were slowly 
introduced.  This relationship is shown in Figure 1. 
The initial effects may discourage some managers due to the loss in efficiency 
that initially occurs.  For managers who are judged on short-term financial gains, HPWPs 
hurt their immediate bottom lines.  Another reason that HPWPs may not be adopted is if 
the organization does not have time to realize the benefits.  For these reasons, introducing 
a bundle of HPWPs may not be feasible (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996).  Conversely, in the 
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wake of a large operational disruption, some companies may find it easier to start a new 
HPWP campaign. 
 
 
Figure 1: Effect of Practice Changes in Performance over Time (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996) 
 
On the other hand, there are ample arguments that an organization cannot afford 
not to implement HPWPs.  As mentioned earlier, performance measures for most of the 
research on this topic included turnover, productivity, and financial gains; in fact, a 
majority of the studies used turnover as the main indicator of performance.  Therefore, an 
HRM strategy that strives to improve performance must minimize turnover (Sheridan, 
1992). This assumption was made because of its apparent connection to productivity and 
finances. 
Guthrie (2001) proposes that there is a high investment in employees for 
companies that use HPWPs.  By using these practices, the uniqueness of the employee 
grows.  They become more productive the longer they stay employed.  Therefore, when 
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an employee does leave, the impact of their departure is stronger in organizations that use 
HPWPs.  On the contrary, turnover affects companies less when HPWP usage is low. 
The connection between HPWPs, turnover, and realized costs was made by 
Sheridan (1992).  He demonstrated that companies focusing on HPWPs retain employees 
longer.  His study showed that professionals hired by firms emphasizing interpersonal 
relationships (a core tenet of the HPWP philosophy) stayed with their original employers 
14 months longer than those at firms emphasizing work task values.  The cost to replace 
an employee is significant.  Total costs include separation costs, replacement costs, and 
training costs for the new employee (Cascio, 1991).  Considering the extra 14 months of 
employment that were lost, it was estimated that $6-9 million dollars were spent on 
turnover by the companies not using HPWPs. 
There are arguments that the performance increases realized by using HPWPs are 
offset by the cost of implementing them.  The increased productivity of workers is not 
seen because labor costs increase simultaneously in order to pay for HRM (Cappelli & 
Neumark, 1999).  However, individual improvement was noted in many of the studies.  It 
could be concluded that HPWPs are worth implementing as it poses no direct costs to 
employers while possibly elevating individual well-being. 
 
The overwhelming takeaway from most of the research on HPWPs is that they are 
best used as a system rather than individually.  This idea was supported by two different 
views.  First, no single practice had enough power to significantly contribute to 
organizational performance (Lawler, 1992).  However, there was clear evidence that 
System versus Individual 
 
16 
 
HPWP systems have a greater effect than individual practices (Combs et al., 2006).  The 
interactions of the different practices seemed to provide a sort of synergy when 
implemented simultaneously (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996).  Secondly, the research could not 
pinpoint a singular practice as the most useful (Vandenberg et al., 1999).  Some practices 
were seen as ideal, yet yielded poor returns when applied alone or complemented with 
the wrong combination of other practices such as information sharing (Combs et al., 
2006).   
Paul and Anantharaman (2003) could not find a single practice that was linked 
directly to performance and demonstrated the means by which HPWPs act directly and 
indirectly as a system.  They first hypothesized that some HPWPs would directly affect 
financial performance, while others would indirectly affect it through intervening 
variables and operating performance measures.  Their hypothesized model is shown in 
Figure 2. 
After conducting their study, they presented a second model showing the 
observed relationships shown in Figure 3.  The numbers in the figure represent the 
correlation between each item.  The most significant finding was that none of the HPWPs 
had a direct affect on financial performance.  This supported many similar claims made 
by other researchers.  The results also showed that the combination of the different 
practices did indeed lead to increases in overall financial performance.  It was noted that 
even in the absence of a direct relationship, some practices were considered significant 
players in performance and should not be mistakenly overlooked (Paul & Anantharaman, 
2003). 
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Figure 2: Hypothesized Model of HRM-Performance Relationships (Paul & 
Anantharaman, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 3: Observed HRM-Performance Relationships (Paul & Anantharaman, 2003) 
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Similar conclusions were presented by Combs et al. (2006), who suggested a 
conceptual model showing the relationships between individual HPWPs, HPWP systems, 
and organizational performance.  They believed that the system would have a greater 
influence on performance as opposed to individual practices.  They also hypothesized 
that the degree of influence would be moderated by the organizational strategy that the 
HPWPs were a part of, the industrial context of the organization, and the design of the 
research, specifically the measures used to describe performance.  Their results 
confirmed that a systems approach was the most effective.  They also found that the type 
of industry impacted effectiveness and that the results were consistent regardless of the 
measure used to determine performance. 
 
Research on HPWPs often include models that explain how individual practices, 
moderating factors, and organizational performance measures are related.  Two models 
resulting from one particular study stood out as inclusive of the main ideas shared 
throughout the literature.  The first model was developed by Liu et al. (2007) based on 
the research of Huselid (1995).  The model categorizes prevalent individual practices into 
three groups based on the process they enhance.  These three processes are increasing 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs); motivating employees to leverage their KSAs for 
organizational benefit; and empowering them to do so (Combs et al., 2006).  Along with 
contributions to the three processes described, HPWPs improve the social environment 
by promoting communication and aligning employees towards common goals.  Each 
process is described in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
Effective HPWP Model  
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The first process is increasing the KSAs of workers.  Although this is 
accomplished by a number of practices, it starts with recruiting.  Certain skills or 
attributes can be sought when hiring employees (Huselid, 1995).  Personality traits may 
be considered in order to get employees that fit well within the company.  Once hired, 
robust training programs are employed to provide workers with any needed skills.  
Training may take the form of classes, on-the-job training, or focused mentorship. 
The second process is motivating employees to use their KSAs.  Such motivation 
may be derived from incentive programs linked to performance appraisals.  Incentives 
can range from monetary bonuses to priority in job selection.  Promotions are also used to 
motivate employees by promising more responsibility and greater compensation.  These 
practices are necessary because employees must desire to use their KSAs (Combs et al., 
2006).  If they do not, the company stands to lose money in the investments they make in 
training. 
The last process is empowering employees to use their KSAs.  Even if an 
employee wants to do well and has the ability to do so, he or she still must be supported 
by management and allowed to perform.  The HRM practices in place must facilitate 
such actions (Vandenberg et al., 1999).  Practices that can aid in this process are 
participation programs where employees play a role in decision-making and flex-time 
options so workers can decide how to best use their time (Huselid, 1995).  By pushing 
decision-making to lower levels, the needs of employees for responsibility, 
independence, and autonomy may be met (Vandenberg et al., 1999). 
The three processes described above resemble ideas suggested by other 
researchers.  Likert once listed training, motivation, decision making, communication, 
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and control as causal variables of organizational performance (Russell et al., 1985).  
Vandenberg et al. (1999) refer to these processes as the PIRK attributes.  The first is the 
power to act and make decisions.  The next is information, which can range from reviews 
to feedback to performance reports.  The third attribute is rewards which may be related 
to individual or team performance.  The last attribute is knowledge which encompasses 
the KSAs described earlier.  If these four attributes are present throughout an 
organization, HPWPs have been successfully implemented. 
After considering the three processes suggested by Huselid (1995),  Liu et al. 
(2007) sought to determine which HPWPs significantly affected organizational 
performance and which process they enhanced.  HPWPs prevalent in the literature were 
compared and the top practices were presented.  The resulting model is shown in Figure 
4.  The top 10 HPWPs are (in order of greatest impact):  HRM planning, compensation 
level, incentive compensation, training, internal promotion, employment security, 
participation, selectivity, grievance procedures, and flex-time (Liu et al., 2007).  Teams, 
information sharing, and appraisals were also considered but were eventually left out of 
the model because of weak connections to performance.  As stated previously, each 
HPWP is grouped with the process that it most enhances. 
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Figure 4: Top HPWPs Organized by Process Enhanced (Liu et al., 2007) 
 
The second model developed by Liu et al. (2007) shows three factors that impact 
the effectiveness of the HPWPs, as shown in Figure 5.  They include vertical alignment, 
horizontal alignment, and work context.  Vertical alignment refers to the integration of 
selected HPWPs with the strategy of the organization.  This is where the HRM planning 
shown in the middle of Figure 4 is applied.  Careful planning from leaders must be 
present to align the appropriate HPWPs with the goals of the organization.  Horizontal 
alignment refers to the care that must be taken to ensure that each HPWP complements 
the others.  If HPWPs are implemented without considering the interactions, poor 
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performance may result.  One example of this could be individual incentives used within 
a team structure.  These contradicting practices may hurt each other.  Finally, the third 
factor is work context.  This factor acknowledges that not all HPWPs are suited for every 
industry.  Certain HPWPs benefit the manufacturing industry while others may better fit 
service industries.  The important takeaway is that HPWPs must be carefully considered 
before blind implementation. 
 
 
Figure 5: Factors that Impact Effectiveness of HPWPs (Liu et al., 2007) 
 
The literature shows an increasing amount of research on human resource 
management.  This indicates that organizations are interested in the benefits that may be 
possible if HRM tools are used.  Numerous studies have demonstrated that there is a 
positive connection between HPWPs and organizational performance.  Although no 
single practice is effective in isolation, a system of HPWPs can increase overall 
performance.  Finally, a model is suggested that summarizes these conclusions and offers 
the top HPWPs that should be considered. 
HPWP Summary 
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What is the Job of a Controller? 
Before any discussion of issues facing the operations management career field, it 
is important to understand the job that controllers are assigned to accomplish.  Further 
discussions are easier to understand when referenced from this baseline.  Operations 
managers, Air Force Specialty Code 3E6, are members of the Operations Flight within a 
civil engineer (CE) squadron.  They are referred to as “ops managers,” “controllers,” 
“triple nickels” as a tribute to their previous career field code of 555, or simply just 
“ops.”  From this point forward, the term controllers will be used.  Controllers are a 
unique group to study because of the fundamental difference between them and the other 
members of the Operations Flight.  Whereas most members in the flight work outside 
with their hands, controllers’ jobs are primarily indoors and clerical in nature. 
The intended career path for controllers is outlined in the 3E6 Career Field 
Education and Training Plan (CFETP).  The plan is developed by the career field 
manager at the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency along with inputs from the 
3E6 Major Command program managers and the Air Education and Training Command 
staff of the technical school at Sheppard Air Force Base.  The CFETP serves as a 
guideline for frontline supervisors, enlisted personnel supervisors, and program managers 
to ensure that the career paths of their airmen are correct and equitable.  It also serves as 
reference for training expenditures (Department of the Air Force, 2011b). 
 
The operations management career field is unique in many ways.  It is one of the 
few career fields in a CE squadron where planning, funding, and execution converge.  
Job Description 
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Because of this, controllers must be aware of how each of these areas operates.  The 
career field is also unique because it positions a clerical job within a “blue collar” flight.  
Even authorized positions are assigned differently.  While most manning is based on 
assets such as total square feet of floor space or number of facilities, squadrons are 
assigned four controller positions regardless of the size of the organization (Department 
of the Air Force, 2000).   
The operations management shop is where work starts and finishes.  Whether it is 
a request from a customer on base or an internal request from another flight, the request 
is formalized by the controllers so that all work can be accounted for.  From there, the 
work request is passed to the proper shop for completion.  All along the way, controllers 
track the job’s progress, provide materials, and ensure that the right work is completed.  
The following sections outline the three major areas of responsibility for the 3E6 career 
field.  
 
Work Management 
The largest part of a controller’s job is to manage the work of the Operations 
Flight.  “Management” does not imply that the controller is making decisions on what 
work to accomplish.  This decision resides at the flight level and in the respective shops.  
What it means is that the controllers know the work being done, the shop doing the work, 
the schedule and required materials, and the plan for completion.   
At the initiation of a work request, a controller enters the data into the Interim 
Work Information Management System (IWIMS).  The data entered include request 
description, shop assigned, date of request, and requesting party.  Each shop then 
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accesses IWIMS to see the requests they have been assigned.  At times, the request will 
not be immediately scheduled to the shops.  Instead, the controllers will gather such 
requests and present them to the Work Request Review Board (WRRB), a meeting 
chaired by the Operations Flight Chief but conducted by controllers, for filtering and 
prioritization. 
The controllers are responsible for conducting sanity checks during each step of 
the process.  First, they must make sure that the proper money codes correspond to the 
correct type of work accomplished.  They must also monitor the progress of the work to 
identify any irregularities.  From the vantage point of their office, they are perfectly 
situated to observe trends in work and areas that may present problems.  These concerns 
can then be forwarded to the flight chief.  As a final task, controllers manage the priority 
list as dictated by flight and squadron leaders so that all efforts are focused on the proper 
jobs. 
A second important meeting often conducted by controllers is the weekly 
scheduler’s meeting.  This is not prescribed in the CFETP but has become a regular 
activity at most bases.  This meeting includes all shop leads, superintendents, and flight 
leaders.  At this meeting, controllers present reports that show where the work of last 
week was performed and what the plan is for the near future.  Other reports include 
percentage of hours dedicated to different activities and special interest jobs that need the 
attention of the flight chief.  Information on costs, reimbursements, and materials may 
also be presented in this forum. 
Because the controllers are trained on a data management system in their 
introductory school, they become the flight experts by default.  They can provide 
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assistance to shop representatives in order to help them enter their work plans and 
progress.  Controllers should be proficient in IWIMS and Automated Civil Engineer 
System usage and able to train other members of the squadron.  Additionally, controllers 
are expected to work as supply officers, a job previously performed by airmen from the 
Logistics Readiness Squadron who were assigned to the CE squadron.  This duty requires 
competency using the Civil Engineer Material Acquisition System to order construction 
materials.  Job tasks include ordering, tracking shipments, receiving product, and 
inventorying material stocks.   
 
Customer Interface 
An important and often overlooked aspect of a controller’s job is interaction with 
customers.  A controller is the face of CE for many people on base.  A controller’s core 
task is receiving work requests.  Request reception is completed both in person and over 
the phone.  It is for this reason that communication skills, language, and interpersonal 
skills are valued qualities for a controller.  Controllers must be able to respond 
professionally to any customer, regardless of whether the requestor is confrontational or 
not.  Due to the inconveniences possible when a system malfunctions, such as a broken 
air conditioner in the summer, requestors may often be in an agitated state when making 
contact.  Controllers are also responsible for conducting customer satisfaction surveys. 
A controller must maintain a level of technical competency in order to recognize 
and interpret information pertaining to construction and maintenance projects.   Upon 
request, a controller must determine if the work fits the criteria to be directly scheduled or 
whether it should be presented at the WRRB.  Familiarity with the capabilities of each 
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shop will allow the controller to forward only requests that can completed and table those 
that need further investigation.   
As representatives of the squadron, controllers also manage the facility manager 
program.  Each building on base is assigned a facility manager.  This person belongs to 
the organization that occupies the building.  Whenever there is a problem, members of 
that organization contact the facility manager and then the facility manager forwards the 
request to the CE squadron.  In most cases, this person is not a civil engineer.  Controllers 
are responsible for training the facility managers on the work request process and 
maintaining the database of facility managers assigned to each building.   
 
Emergency Operations 
The final aspect of a controller’s job is their role during emergencies and 
deployments.  Controllers maintain and operate the Unit Control Center (UCC) during 
contingency operations.  Duties in the UCC include maintaining team statuses and 
accountability for the flight.  Additionally, maps of damage, unexploded ordinances 
locations, and alternate airfield location options are displayed and updated.  Members 
may also serve as representatives of the squadron in the Emergency Operation Center if 
so appointed by the squadron commander.   
While deployed, a controller should expect to do similar tasks as performed at 
home station.  One noticeable addition is performing quality assurance on contracts.  This 
job includes writing statements of work, performing inspections, and determining job 
completion.  A controller may be the interface between the Air Force and the host nation 
while discussing requirements, purchase agreements, and contracts.   
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The civilian job that most closely resembles that of a controller is a Production 
Control or Planning and Expediting Clerk.  According to an online job database (O*NET, 
2010), the clerk is responsible for reviewing and distributing schedules, working with 
shop supervisors to determine progress of work and completion dates, and compiling 
reports on progress, inventory, associated costs, and problems.  For entry into this career 
field, a high school diploma is usually sufficient.  Most clerks learn their trade by doing 
routine tasks under direct supervision (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010).  Of the traits 
required, the most important are oral and written communication, computer skills, and 
knowledge of production processes. 
Civilian Job Comparison 
There are many reasons why their jobs are important.  One of the key benefits of 
employing a production clerk is the ability they possess to identify problem areas through 
the reports produced (Kelchner, 2011).  The clerk also helps the craftsmen work more 
smoothly by managing inventories and schedules in order to maximize efficiency.  These 
are the same benefits that are desired in a civil engineer squadron.  A key point of interest 
is that the civilian job descriptions all contain the requirement that the clerk be able to 
manage inventories.  This is a new job for controllers in the Air Force, but it essentially 
aligns their career field with that of their civilian counterparts. 
 
Summary of Literature 
The information provided in this chapter helps frame the problem by providing a 
background on HPWPs, including two models that this research uses as reference points.  
It also includes a job description for controllers as prescribed by the Air Force.  The 
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results that follow can be compared against the details explained.  The following chapter 
explains the choice of methodology used and explains how the research was conducted. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
This research used phenomenological life interviews along with numerous 
secondary sources to gather the desired information.  Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) define 
phenomenology as “a term that points to interest in understanding social phenomenon 
from the actor’s perspective and describing the world as experienced by the subjects, with 
the assumption that the important reality is what people perceive it to be.”  By using an 
exploratory structure, the interviewees determine the path of questioning.  This chapter 
first explains the decision to use interviews.  It is then followed by the structure used to 
perform the interviews.  Last, an explanation of how the data were analyzed is provided. 
 
Why Use Interviews? 
The method chosen in any research must align with the desired outcome.  Locke 
(1989) asserts that the adequacy of a method depends on what the question is.    A 
qualitative approach was chosen because of the emphasis on relationships as opposed to 
well-defined problems.  Supporters of qualitative methods believe that there are 
fundamental differences between the two problem types.  The main difference between 
social and natural sciences is that the subjects in social sciences can talk and think 
(Seidman, 2006). 
  In the case of this research, there are obvious issues within a target group, 
though the details of each problem are not necessarily apparent.  From the initial Air 
Force Institute of Technology study, the identified problems center around the absence of 
many high-performance work practices (HPWPs).  Having preconceptions before 
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interviewing subjects is incongruent with the stance of phenomenological purists who 
believe there should be no hypotheses present initially (Husserl, 1962).  It is suggested 
that some situations can only be studied through understanding the events experienced 
which undoubtedly relies on prior assumptions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  Therefore, 
the interviewer must keep the discussions focused without excessively influencing the 
conversations (Lester, 1999).  
Interviews have been used for a long time.  Socrates used them often, though 
using them as research is a relatively new occurrence (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2009) note that Feyeraband argues in Against Method that the rules of 
research were meant to be broken and that if they were not, many past discoveries may 
not have been made.  This suggests that lesser known methods should not be immediately 
discarded, but rather judged on their own merit.  The aim of a qualitative interview is to 
discover the interviewee’s framework of meanings (Britten, 1995).  Life interviews are 
intended to understand the lived experience of others rather than testing hypotheses 
(Seidman, 2006).  Interviewing goes beyond back and forth conversation.  Rather, it 
becomes an approach to obtaining knowledge through careful questioning and listening 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
At times, there are methods that are more appropriate than interviews.  If the 
questions do not need explanations and a hypothesis is already developed, a survey may 
be a better fit.  Likewise, a period of personal observation may be more appropriate for 
certain studies.  As with any method, certain limitations exist.  Not all institutions 
consider qualitative research as valuable as quantitative.  Other common hindrances 
include the time it takes to conduct and transcribe numerous interviews as well as finding 
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and making contact with the right subjects.  Lastly, phenomenological interviews allow 
deep issues to rise to the surface and provide an avenue for lesser voices to be heard.  
Though this may be viewed as a strength, some organizations may reject this method 
because of the issues that it would prefer to keep hidden (Lester, 1999). 
 
Interview Procedures 
The research approach resembled a modified version of the seven-step model 
developed by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009): thematizing, designing, interview situation, 
transcription, analysis, verification, and reporting (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  This 
section jumps ahead to designing the interview since the question was framed, or 
“thematized” in the previous chapters. 
The most important aspect of setting up an interview is understanding the desired 
outcome.  This allows the questions to elicit the right information and allows for proper 
selection of interviewees (Seidman, 2006).  This study included responses from members 
of the operations management community including career field leaders, instructors, and 
airmen currently working within the career field.  A list of possible candidates for 
participation was provided by the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA).  
The choice of participants was decided by the researcher to cover a wide variety of 
positions.  Four ranks were questioned.  Eight of the ten major commands of the Air 
Force were represented by current or previous assignments of the interviewees.  Along 
with the experiences for a variety of base-level subjects, Rapid Engineer Deployable 
Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (RED HORSE) squadrons, AFCESA, 
Major Command (MAJCOM) staffs, and the Pentagon were represented also.  Subjects 
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also brought experience from deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, Egypt, Kosovo, Oman, and Singapore. 
None of the participants were personally or professionally known by the 
researcher prior to the study.  The number of participants was decided along the way as 
determined by the absence of new information during the interview.  At that point, the 
interviews were stopped because the topic had been considered exhausted or saturated 
(Charmaz, 2006).  Saturation appeared to occur after eight interviews in this study.  The 
number of interviews was also guided by a common theme among interview studies that 
suggested that it is optimal to have fewer interviews analyzed more closely than an 
abundance of interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  Other researchers agree that eight 
to ten subjects are sufficient to reach saturation which supports the number used in this 
study (Creswell et al., 2007). 
Each participant was initially contacted by phone by the researcher.  At this time, 
a description of the research questions and the research objective were explained.  Each 
interviewee agreed to participate based on an understanding that identifying information 
would not be used in the final product.  Before proceeding further, permission was 
requested and received from each subject’s commanding officer.  Consent forms were 
also distributed and collected with signatures of both the researcher and participant.  The 
consent forms provided an agreement between the researcher and subjects.  The 
agreement included statements of voluntary participation, the purpose and procedures of 
the research, the risks and possible outcomes from participation, and the channels of 
reconciliation for any problems along the way.  It also stated that participation could be 
terminated by the interviewee at any time and that their comments could be withdrawn. 
 
34 
 
The contact information of subjects was kept in a spreadsheet that included phone 
numbers of participants and commanders, current duty stations and MAJCOMs, and 
interview status: contacted, scheduled, or completed.  This spreadsheet also matched 
subjects with a single letter identifier that was used through the remainder of the research.  
This information was kept on a portable hard drive separate from the computer where the 
remainder of the files was stored.  These files included transcripts, memos, digital 
recordings, and manuscripts.  Hard copies of the consent forms were kept in a file at the 
researchers’ office.  All digital and hard copies were secured at all times.   
The interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes; each was recorded digitally for 
transcription at a later time.  Each interview started with generic questions about the rank, 
experience, deployment history, and current job of the interviewee to provide the 
interviewer with a frame of reference.  The questions followed a semi-structured outline 
based on previously identified problem areas from the Civil Engineer Superintendent 
course at the Air Force Institute of Technology.  General questions were developed to 
further inquire about areas of concern.  Using an open-ended approach, the interviewee 
recreated the experience of being a controller in the Air Force.  By using an exploratory 
approach, the interviewees were able to indentify topics of interest that may not have 
been initially recognized as relevant (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).   
The interview returned to the outline when necessary to assure timely completion.  
Leading questions were deliberately avoided.  Each interview ended with an explanation 
of the next steps in the research.  After each interview, the questions for the next 
interview were altered to further explore areas identified in the prior session.  This 
technique is described in the following analysis section.  The process of altering 
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questions was aided by taking notes during the interviews, also explained later in the 
chapter.  
 
Analysis 
The analysis of the interview data began during the first interview rather than 
after all interviews had been completed.  The first step was writing memos during the 
interviews.  Because memos involve some interpretation, they are the beginning of 
analysis rather than data collection (Groenewald, 2004).  Memos, or field notes, allowed 
the researcher to capture initial impressions and ideas which are often forgotten in the 
midst of data collection (Miles & Huberman, 1984).  An outline of the questions was 
printed out before each interview and used for taking notes.  Groenewald (2004) suggests 
that four types of notes should be used.  The first are observational notes that emphasize 
what happened.  These were made in line with the text of the outline and underlined to 
remind the researcher of the importance of the statement.  The next types are theoretical 
notes that attempt to explain why things happened.  These comments were made in the 
right hand margin of the outline as possible ideas to consider later.  Caution was 
exercised to keep these comments separate from comments provided directly from the 
subjects.  The third type is methodological notes which are reminders to the researcher.  
These comments were recorded in the left hand margin of the outline often noting 
possible follow-up questions.  The last type is analytical memos that were written later in 
the analysis.  
The next step was transcription of the interviews from a digital audio file.  The 
recording was played back at half speed and transcribed semi-verbatim.  Semi-verbatim 
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implies that exact words were recorded, though pauses, mutters, and fillers were not 
captured since speech patterns and linguistics were not the focus of this research.  When 
dramatic responses occurred, observational memos were made.  Each transcript was 
reformatted into a chart so that future coding could be clearly organized with each 
question and response (Hycner, 1985).  The complete transcriptions and codes are 
included in the appendices. 
After a transcription was completed, the interview was listened to again and 
analytical memos were written.  These notes contained mostly ideas and theories of the 
researcher that were developed from listening to the interview as a whole.  Listening to 
the interview was an important step at this point as the researcher was preoccupied with 
asking questions during the first iteration and typing during the second (Bailey, 2007; 
Hycner, 1985).  After this step, the questions for the next interview were edited and the 
following interview was conducted. 
After an interview was transcribed, it was coded.  This process has been described 
differently by past researchers using varying terminology.  Essentially, coding refers to 
the grouping of ideas based on similar themes (Seidman, 2006).  The first iteration 
produced open, or initial, codes which are initial summaries of a response with few 
details (Charmaz, 2006).  These codes are similar to “units of general meaning” as 
described by Hycner (1985) without placing as much emphasis on the original language 
used.  After providing open codes for a few of the interviews, some main themes began to 
emerge.  In conjunction with memos developed earlier, selective, or focused, codes were 
created to capture the main issues (Charmaz, 2006).  This is similar to the “clustering of 
meanings” prescribed by Hycner (1985).  These ideas were then reinforced by each 
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subsequent interview by using a “constant comparison” of themes (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967).  An example of these codes is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Example Coding 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
You touched on this a little earlier but 
we’ll touch on it now a little more in 
detail.  What are your typical roles while 
deployed?  
Quality assurance evaluation.  Looking at 
repair maintenance and sustainability for 
facilities on a base.  Tactical ops support, 
communications, setting up data links 
between one point wherever we’re at such 
that we’re going forward operating.  Some of 
things we’ve also been tasked with have been 
convoy duties and then damage control. 
Duties include: 
QAE 
tactical support 
computers 
convoys and 
damage control 
Mostly extra 
duties outside of 
primary job while 
deployed 
 
 
After all interviews were completed and coded, the selective codes were arranged 
in a mind-map to show causes, effects, and relationships (Lester, 1999).  This map began 
on a PowerPoint presentation but grew to the point that it required a large dry-erase board 
and multiple post-it notes.  As the relationships were mapped, a few groupings emerged, 
each with a central theme, or theoretical code.  Once the data were distilled into a small 
number of theoretical codes, they were summarized in concert with secondary data 
sources that provides context for the reader. 
The final step was verification.  Due to the nature of the method, this step was 
actually a part of all the other steps.  The most important standard of validity related to 
the research was whether or not the research answered the questions it was intended to 
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answer.  Since this effort was exploratory, all results were considered valid.  Ideas from 
previous interviews were sometimes offered to other subjects to concur or reject.  The 
strength of the argument increased as multiple responses centered on the same themes 
(Lester, 1999).  During the entire process, efforts were made to remain unbiased.  Though 
reliability was a worthy goal, it could not be sought in exchange for creativity in the 
questioning.  The prior experience of the researcher also served as a source of reliability.  
Some follow-up contacts were made with subjects by telephone and email to clarify 
comments and/or validate themes.  Lastly, the details of the entire process were described 
to provide transparency of the process. 
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IV.  Results 
 
This chapter describes the insights gained during this research.  Using the analysis 
explained in Chapter III, the interview results were developed into five broad themes 
related to high-performance work practices (HPWPs).  A summary of the results is 
presented first before describing in more detail each of the themes in separate sections.  
At the end of each section, the key insights from within the theme are compared to the 
models presented in Chapter II.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
challenges the military faces in implementing HPWPs. 
 
Summary of Insights 
The research question for this study aimed to identify the areas of human resource 
management (HRM) that are problematic as seen by controllers.  From the many 
selective codes that were identified, five theoretical codes or themes emerged as 
discussed in Chapter III.  Figure 6 displays these top five themes in HRM affecting job 
performance.  Many of the themes were interrelated in some fashion.  The themes are 
arranged in no particular order.  Problems associated with each theme are listed under 
each heading.  As previously stated, not all problems stem from one main theme.  
However, each problem is arranged under the theme with which it is most closely 
associated.  The sections that follow look at each theme and the resulting consequences 
individually. 
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Figure 6: Top Five Themes 
 
 
Theme #1: Few Senior Leaders in the Career Field 
The problem that was often discussed first was the void of senior leadership 
within the career field.  All interviewees were asked if they believed there were enough 
senior leaders in their career field to mentor them and the airmen below them.  One 
respondent emphatically stated, “No.  To say it bluntly, no.”  This void of senior 
leadership has led to imbalances in manpower and experience.   
Different events over the last 20 years and changes in the career field all have had 
an effect on this problem; yet one event stands out as a likely contributor to the lack of 
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experienced controllers in the top ranks.  After the Gulf War in 1992, the Air Force drew 
down its forces as part of a “peace dividend.”  Many commands faced extreme 
reorganizations in order to reduce manpower.  For example, Strategic Air Command and 
Tactical Air Command were combined into Air Combat Command while Military Airlift 
Command transformed into Air Mobility Command.  Reorganizations in personnel 
followed, and the current nomenclature scheme for career fields emerged.  For instance, 
the operations management career field went from the designation of 555 to Air Force 
Specialty Code (AFSC) 3E6. 
 Many of the civil engineer (CE) career fields combined in order to reduce 
manpower requirements.  For instance, exterior and interior electricians were combined 
into the same career field.  Plumbing, water, and waste water personnel were combined to 
form “utilities.”  There was a reduction in force across the entire service along with 
voluntary separation incentives.  For a time, the school pipeline for controllers was 
frozen.  No new controllers entered the Air Force for a full year.  These events were 
described by an older controller: 
“When they had the early out, they drew down the career field and a lot of 
smart 3E6s got out and the knowledge went with them.  It was ’95 or ’96 
when they basically turned off the pipeline for the career field.  You had to 
be a prior CE staff sergeant to cross-train into it.  So they were bringing 
in craftsmen into the lower management levels that had no experience…all 
the people that would have been around to teach them were gone…you 
had a this void of knowledge.” 
Figure 7 shows the number of authorizations each year broken out by skill level (Corpuz, 
2011).  Each skill level of upgrade requires certain demonstrations of proficiency and 
serves as a standardized indicator of an individual’s career progression.  Along the way, 
the tasks that each level is required to perform increase in complexity and responsibility.  
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Airmen enter as a 1-level and quickly move to a 3-level after receiving their initial career 
field training.  Levels increase until airmen become 9-levels.  
 Overall, the authorizations were reduced from 1994 to 1996 as described by the 
interviewees.  To do this, the pipeline of incoming controllers was frozen.  Also, 
controllers that were 3-levels were cross-trained into other career fields because there 
were no authorizations for 5-levels.  In 2000, 5-level authorizations were reinstated.  To 
maintain the achieved levels, the authorizations for incoming airmen were reduced.  
Levels continued to shrink until 2008 when the career field reached an all-time low in 
manning.  It is important to note that the values shown are authorizations and not actual 
manpower levels.  Critical imbalances in experience emerged due to the changes in 
authorizations over this time span.  This imbalance is apparent in the manpower numbers 
published by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC).  The following section looks at the 
current manpower levels for the career field and offers insight into possible problems. 
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Figure 7: Total Authorizations by Skill Level from 1994-2010 (Corpuz, 2011) 
 
 
As previously mentioned, manning levels for controllers present a number of 
problems.  At first glance, the overall percentage of authorizations filled looks as healthy 
as any other group.  Recent personnel levels show the entire career field manning at 99% 
(Department of the Air Force, 2011a).  After close examination of the individual rank 
breakouts, a few problem areas become apparent.  Table 2 shows the percentage of filled 
positions of authorized billets by rank. 
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Table 2: Percent 3E6 Manning by Rank in 2011 (Department of the Air Force, 2011a) 
Rank 
Senior 
Master 
Sergeant 
Master 
Sergeant 
Technical 
Sergeant 
Staff 
Sergeant 
Senior 
Airman 
Airman 
First 
Class 
Grade 
Manning  75% 55% 91% 71% 132% 222% 
Effective 
Grade 
Manning 
67% 50% 85% 66% 121% 210% 
 
 
The breakout by ranks shows that every rank is undermanned with the exception 
of the lower ranks.  The most alarming shortages are at the grade of Master Sergeant 
(MSgt), with Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt) and Staff Sergeant (SSgt) grades at low 
levels as well.  To compound problems, the lowest rank is more than double the required 
size.  Essentially, there are far more young airmen that need to be supervised than there 
are supervisors available.  Three undermanned groups in combination with an 
overmanned group cancel each other out in terms of overall manning and provide the 
perception that manning is not an issue.   
The second set of data shows the “effective” grade manning when deployments 
are considered.  The first set of data assumes that all filled positions actually have a 
person at their home base.  The effective manning show the percentage of personnel left 
at home while members are deployed.  This unavailability of personnel to work at home 
further exacerbates the problems present due to low manning.  Deployments are 
discussed in more detail in a later section. 
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The numbers shown in Table 2 show overall manning distribution across the 
entire Air Force.  However, some bases have one MSgt while others do not.  Depending 
on the size and mission of a particular unit, two MSgts may even be assigned.  This 
uneven distribution is a source of irritation to controllers.  One interviewee told of how he 
got where he was when asked about fairness in distribution:  
“Nope, I don’t think they’re distributed around out there where the young 
guys can pick their minds.  There’s not actually a master sergeant slot 
here.  I got here on my wife’s orders.  There was only a tech sergeant slot 
here.  There weren’t any 3E6s above staff sergeant when I came, so there 
was quite a bit of knowledge gap to be made up.” 
Though this snapshot of the current manning levels clearly identifies problems, the 
undermanned ranks also affect the future state of the career field.  If the number of MSgts 
are low, within the next few years, the rank of SMSgt may also be undermanned, since 
there will be a reduced pool of members to promote.  This same issue may be seen in the 
middle ranks as the number of SSgts remains lower than the required level.  An opposite 
problem may arise when the Airmen First Class (A1C) are due for promotion.  There may 
not be a need for the number of existing airmen in the next rank.  As a result, younger, 
inexperienced airmen may likely be placed in jobs left vacant by SSgts.  This 
repositioning of A1Cs may even out manning levels somewhat, but may potentially 
damage the progression of airmen through the prescribed career development.  The 
essential tasks that SSgts are expected to perform may not be correctly performed by 
Senior Airmen (SrA) who are prematurely promoted. 
This ripple effect of retention is shown in Figure 8.  This information is compiled 
by the AFPC staff to demonstrate the effect that current manning levels will have on 
future manning.  The continuous line represents the number of personnel desired at each 
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year of service in order to sustain current requirements.  That level decreases naturally 
over time as the number of airmen needed at the higher ranks decreases.  The problem 
areas are those where the current personnel levels are far below the sustainment line.  
These shortages may shift to the right each year, growing worse as time continues.  
Members may be lost along the way for a number of reasons.  Because of this natural 
decay in personnel levels, shortfalls already identified will increase as more members 
leave.  In addition, the members that are accounted for are not always working within the 
career field.  By employing controllers outside of their core areas of responsibility, the 
gap between the number of personnel required to sustain and the actual members 
available is larger than depicted. 
 
 
Figure 8: Current Personnel and Projected Needs (Department of the Air Force, 2011a) 
 
A few attempts have been made to curb these problems.  Retention bonuses have 
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“signing” bonuses, the Air Force gains the commitment of an airman for four or six 
years.  Another effort to increase manning levels is to deny special duty opportunities to 
specific ranks.  Special duties include the jobs to which all Air Force members contribute, 
such as recruiting and instructing.  By denying 3E6 SSgts and MSgts the option to work 
outside of their primary career field, more personnel will be available to fulfill core CE 
duties.  Lastly, greater numbers of new accessions are redirected toward the career field 
in an effort to resupply the shortages.  This practice of increasing entries into the career 
field has been successful as seen by the over population of the early ranks.  The efforts to 
keep mid-level members in the career field are yet to be shown successful. 
 
A second problem that stems from the lack of senior controllers is that the 
experience usually held by the older ranks has diminished.  Table 3 shows problems 
similar to those in Table 2.  The lower skill levels are more than adequately manned.  As 
the skill level increases, the number of airmen with the necessary knowledge decreases.  
Lack of Experience 
 
Table 3: 3E6 Manning by Skill Level (Department of the Air Force, 2011a) 
Skill Level 1-Level 3-Level 5-Level 7-Level 9-Level 
Manning  N/A 290% 71% 68% 58% 
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Younger and often inexperienced airmen have been promoted prematurely to fill 
the gaps at the top of the rank structure.  One controller remembered: 
“When I came in, it took forever to make staff and tech.  Nowadays it’s 
like boom, boom.  You can be a staff or tech in a leadership position, but 
how much experience did you really get because you got there so quick?  
You can be a master with only a few years actually being in charge of 
people.  What kind of leader are you going to be?” 
In response to the undeniable holes in the higher positions, the Air Force decided to 
cross-train members of other overmanned AFSCs into operations management.  This 
decision carries strong concern from senior controllers.  An interviewee recalled:  
“Right now, tech to master is really hurting as far as manning numbers, 
so within a squadron there’s not enough of that leadership.  A lot are 
being filled by cross-trained tech sergeants from AGE [aerospace ground 
equipment] or other career fields…we’re trying to recover since they cut 
too much, trying to rebuild those positions.” 
Regardless of the competency of a cross-trainee, they must still be certified by a 
controller with the necessary qualifications.  Since they themselves are serving in the 
position normally held by a certifier, some bases’ upgrade programs are at a standstill.  
Until an outside certifier is brought in, there is no way for anyone to advance.  The 
sentiment is best captured by this response:  
“Well, only 60% [of bases] will have a master in the shop.  It’s just gonna 
take a lot of time to grow master sergeants.  You can’t just cross-train 
them in.  You can’t cross-train experience.  You gotta let it grow up.” 
The cross-training solution has also met problems as manning fluctuates after repeated 
“knee jerk” reactions.  One supervisor remembered a time where his airman was forced 
to cross-train because the airman’s particular year group was too crowded.  Once the 
paperwork was filed, the airman was given a list of possible career fields into which they 
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could cross-train.  Operations management was on the list.  The airman administratively 
cross-trained from being a 3E6 to a 3E6.  He recounts, “It made no sense at all.”   
The point that held consistent among interviewees was that experience was the 
ultimate indicator of success.  A respondent surmised that without experience, controllers 
were simply “robots rather than people that know their jobs.”  A second story of 
inexperience was told not of a cross-trainee, but of a controller who worked outside of the 
career field for her entire career.   
“From 2000 to 2008, she was in a medical logistics job…no access to 
IWIMS [interim work information management system], never fired an M-
16, never had radio training, never went to Silver Flag.  She’s currently a 
facility manager…Now they send her [here] with no real 3E6 
training…folks like that know the books, but don’t know the job.” 
Perhaps the most unfortunate impact of inexperience and sparse senior leadership is that 
the overall experience of instructors at tech school continues to decrease.  This is not the 
fault of the instructors.  Rather, it is simply a reality.  When fewer experienced controllers 
are available for duty, younger airmen must step into instructor roles.  The lack of 
experience is not always apparent.  If instructors are unaware of the reasoning behind a 
certain process, there is no way for them to pass it along to new trainees.  An older 
controller explained: 
“They’re showing them how to enter data, but they’re not giving them the 
fine intricacies of why you enter some things and what the correct data is.  
If a trainer explains that, then the airman knows why they’re doing 
stuff…Really, it’s left up to whoever is left to do the training.  Once we hit 
the 18 to 19 year mark, we have a big gap in experience.” 
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To combat the lack of leadership in base-level customer service shops, outside 
supervisors are often brought in to provide needed supervision.  It is not uncommon for a 
non-3E6 MSgt to be the Operations Support element chief, the element where controllers 
reside.   One controller recounts, “We’ve had three master sergeants in the ops support 
superintendent position so far and they keep changing out…a plumber, an electrician, 
and a utilities guy.”  For common military affairs, this substitution works fairly well.  
The issue arises when the outside supervisor is not able to offer any career specific 
mentorship.  In most cases, the younger airmen are serving in the role of trainer so their 
supervisor can understand his/her responsibilities.  The problem seems obvious to one 
controller who stated: 
Non-controller Supervision 
“With only 50% masters on the books, half of the bases are sitting with a 
waste water guy or someone else in control.  They’re not giving 3E6 
mentorship.  If anything, they’re asking the senior airman for a report they 
need for the boss.  Whether they’re trained or not, they can provide at 
least something to that master.” 
In a few cases, this creates an uneasy work environment for the most experienced 3E6 in 
the shop.  It is at times possible that the vision of an outside supervisor contradicts what 
their most senior controller believes.  When this happens, neither side wins and the 
overall productivity of the shop may suffer.  A technical sergeant (TSgt) controller 
thought: 
“You have a lot of tech sergeants put in a position that know their job, 
they want to do the right thing...but since we’re so light at master…they 
put a craftsman in as NCOIC [non-commissioned officer in charge].  
While some can do it, a majority of them don’t know what they’re doing 
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and they butt heads with the tech sergeant that knows what needs to be 
done but can’t do it.” 
 
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al. 
(2007) models provided in Chapter II.  Both the major processes and the individual 
HPWPs that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted 
oval in Figure 9.  The main process that this theme reflects is the enhancement of 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs).  First, due to the reorganization described at the 
beginning of the section, a large portion of the personnel who possessed the necessary 
KSAs were let go by the career field.  That decision immediately decreased the level of 
experience in the career field.  After that point, KSAs had to be added back as described 
in later sections.  The void of senior experience created when the career field was 
downsized had a ripple affect.  Younger and less experienced airmen were promoted 
prematurely without the KSAs that develop from years of experience.  The amount of 
knowledge that was passed down to each lower level decreased as a result.  As shown by 
studies discussed in Chapter II, retaining qualified workers directly relates to 
performance. 
Model Comparison 
Two of the three HPWPs that affect KSA enhancement were specifically 
mentioned by the interviewees: compensation and selection.  Compensation was 
increased in the form of retention bonuses.  Though compensation was not directly 
increased, the bonus allowed the Air Force to retain more airmen which is normally the 
goal of compensation increases.  Additionally, the interviewees mentioned the cross-
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training of other career field members into operations management.  By simply leveling 
manpower across career fields, the operations management career field lost what ability it 
had to select the proper people into the career field. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #1 
 
 
The lack of senior leaders also affected the process of enhancing empowerment.  
Particularly, the grievance procedures that controllers have for career-specific issues are 
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diminished by not having enough representation at the highest levels.  This weak 
representation plays a part in a number of problems discussed in later sections.  This has 
created a number of issues, including the ability to perform well.  The following section 
looks at the lack of awareness from personnel outside of the career field regarding 
operations management. 
 
Theme #2: Unawareness of Role 
The second main theme deals with unawareness of the operations management 
career field role.  This unawareness was observed by interviewees throughout the flight 
and the squadron.  The degree that interviewees felt it affected “feeling like a team” 
varied widely.  Some saw it as a hindrance while others felt it provided an opportunity to 
educate others.  The following sections show different views of the problem. 
 
Many respondents agreed, “…people don’t take us seriously.”  They felt that it 
was ignorance rather than harsh feelings from the other shops.  Subjects were asked if 
they felt like part of the team.  One replied, “Not really.  We’re just there to run the 
programs, mostly just off to the side.”  Another thought, “I don’t think the career field is 
respected in the squadron.”  The most shocking comment was from a controller that felt 
leadership had pushed him aside and essentially told him, “Just sit behind the glass and 
whenever we need to set up the UCC [unit control center], we’ll break the glass and let 
you out.” 
Not Part of the Team 
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Feeling like a part of the team is not only about respect.  It is closely related with 
how important others appear to view your job.  A controller responded: 
“With some senior NCOs [non-commissioned officers], and in the shop 
level, you get that feeling that you’re not [part of the team].  You’re more 
looked at as CSS [commander’s support staff] or administrative red tape 
that they have to deal with.  They don’t understand what’s required or why 
it’s really necessary.  You’re more of a hindrance than a help.” 
Subjects felt that the shops knew very little about what they did.  “Do they know what we 
do?  Absolutely not.  They think they do.  They know about the piece they see every day: 
customer service, taking service calls, putting in labor.  Outside of that, their view is 
pretty limited,” one controller recalled.  Another echoed the same: “No they don’t.  Most 
of the people you talk to think all you do is answer the telephone.  That’s your whole 
job.”   
One controller felt that others assumed they were slackers, a view that he felt 
could lead to poor performance.  “Folks keep saying, ‘You’re just playing video games 
during the day or just zooming YouTube.’  People look at us sitting behind computers not 
doing anything.  [Controllers] start to think, ‘If that’s all you think I’m doing, then that’s 
all I’m going to do.’”  While controllers see themselves as civil engineers, not all non-
3E6 supervisors agree.  A controller remembered an instance where this was displayed: 
“People look at us like admin troops.  I had a master sergeant say, 
‘Here’s a deployment for admin.  Would you like to go?’  I said, ‘I’m not 
admin.’  He replied, ‘Then what are you?’  I answered, ‘I’m a 3E6 in the 
CE career field.’  That pretty much spoke to my whole career.  We’re 
more or less treated like admin troops than actual civil engineers.” 
Are the operations chiefs any better?  The answer was consistent: “It depends.”  One 
controller felt that it depended on their prior experience.  “It helps if you have a seasoned 
ops chief.  A lot of times you get a guy that came from either readiness or engineering.  
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They don’t really get 3E6s.”  Another found the operations chief’s training insufficient.  
“I don’t think they get taught much about us at the ops chiefs’ course.  I saw the 
curriculum once and it didn’t really mention us.”  Still, there are some very motivated 
operations chiefs that give controllers the necessary attention.  One controller fondly 
remembers: 
“…I had one.  She was fully engaged in ops management.  She used us 
fully, asked us for information, allowed us to give out input on how to 
build the work order priority program.  That was great.  At other bases, 
they didn’t deal with us at all, other than telling us, ‘run this report, run 
that report.’  That’s all they used us for.” 
Another controller claimed, “The ops chief is behind us 100%.  He gives us the support 
we need…Everywhere I’ve been, I’ve had good ops chiefs.” 
Interviewees were asked about their relationships with the other flights, 
particularly Programs and Asset Management.  Alarmingly, many responded that they 
did not have any relationships with them.  When asked about the Programs flight, one 
controller answered, “Naa, we don’t work with them.”  This creates quite a problem in 
the asset management philosophy of each section working together to capture an accurate 
picture of all assets.  Others felt that the other flights were yet other groups in CE that did 
not appreciate what they did.  Rather, they inserted operations management whenever it 
was convenient.  One respondent said,  
“It didn’t seem like we had a good relationship.  A lot of times we would 
get a [form] back saying, ‘Hey, we need a job for this.’  Kind of seems like 
we were working backwards.  Just seemed like we were a second thought 
when we should be a first thought to make sure everything was going 
right.”   
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The level at which leadership remains uninformed of the operations management 
role contributes to a number of problems.  The first problem is increased workload for 
controllers who are already stressed.  If a shop ignores a request from the controllers to 
update their records, it creates more work.  When incomplete information is entered, the 
resulting time lost later can be significant.  One controller recalled: 
Increased Workload and Inter-shop Friction 
“Remarks aren’t being put in, so there’s a lot of research needed.  If 
someone calls me about a work order, I should be able to look into IWIMS 
and find out everything I need to know about that order, but I can’t.  I 
have to research, find out who was on the job, all the craftsmen, talk to 
other people.  What should take five minutes takes me a few hours.” 
Another problem is the friction between shops.  During weekly meetings, a lack of 
communication during the week comes to the forefront.  A controller recalled a common 
occurrence at scheduler’s meetings, “We’d call people out on the table because their 
work orders were delinquent and they would say, ‘We did this and that.’  We’d say, ‘well 
you didn’t tell us.’”  A second respondent agreed, “Naturally, whenever a shop gets 
called out, they respond, ‘Oh, we had an issue closing that out.’  No one identified it to 
us, so how could we help?  We can’t know what’s wrong if they don’t tell us.”  The lack 
of experience discussed earlier is known throughout the flight.  Because of this, a 
controller realized, “There’s distrust at the perceived lack of [our] training.  Certain 
sections will question the data no matter what.” 
Retention is yet another effect of the discord in the flight.  One controller 
believes, “If people don’t take us seriously, people aren’t going to stay in the career 
field.”  Another controller saw it affecting the newest airmen: “As new guys in CE, 
they’re going to see us as pretty much the stepchildren of CE.”   
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Half of the respondents reported that they had seen possible points of tension 
between shops, but through communication and leadership, some problems could be 
resolved.  One controller, when asked if others understood what controllers did, said, 
“They do.  They come and ask us and we’re more than willing to help them.  Since I’ve 
been here, all the shop leads have come over.  I think I’ve had a personal touch with 
them.”  Others saw improvements when tense moments were approached differently.  An 
interviewee suggested: 
Mishandled Opportunities for Teamwork 
“Some of the 3E6s have the wrong approach.  Instead of trying to help the 
shops, they get focused on pointing out the problems, finger pointing at all 
the shops.  You just can’t do that.  When you see a problem, you have to 
see it as a flight problem instead of an individual shop’s…You got to find 
out why [it’s a problem] so you can help.” 
A second respondent proposed, “…the 3E6 needs to explain himself…educate them.  It’s 
all about networking and communicating.  If you actually bring something to the fight 
and show what you can do for them or how it impacts them, you get that respect.” 
Two events from the past may provide explanations for these increasing 
problems: the elimination of the 7-level course and the elimination of zones.  There was 
once a 7-level class that all enlisted engineers attended.  The course provided a 
management level view of the operations flight.  Controllers who attended this class felt 
that it did not teach them much since it basically outlined their job.  On the other hand, it 
provided craftsmen the opportunity to learn how work orders moved through the flight.  
This training relayed the importance of operations management to the other career fields.  
With budget cuts such as Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720 looming, the class was 
 
58 
 
cancelled in 2005.  The course was seen as too managerial rather than technical.   This 
required each CE career field to create a job specific 7-level technical course.  Some 
career fields were successful, but operations management was not due to lack of funding.  
One controller stated, “Maybe [the other shops] didn’t understand us because the 7-level 
school went away and the craftsmen weren’t learning that anymore.”  He recalled their 
response.  “It was up to us as NCOs to offer that course to CE, to other craftsmen since 
we knew it was lacking.  We as senior NCOs realized that it had been dropped.  Are other 
bases doing that?  Perhaps not.” 
The second possible explanation for role unawareness is the elimination of zones.  
This topic could be studied to determine if reinstating it could improve the situation.  
Older controllers reminisced about working in zones.  In the recent past, bases were 
divided into zones.  This allowed a blend of craftsmen to focus on one area of base which 
provided continuity and familiarity with facilities and customers.  Often, controllers were 
in the shops.  The opportunity to work side by side with the craftsmen allowed both sides 
to see the other in action.  The spirit of this method is still used at some bases to expose 
controllers to the other shops.  This idea is discussed in a later section. 
 
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al. 
(2007) models provided in Chapter II.  The major processes and the individual HPWP 
that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted oval in 
Figure 10.  The factor of vertical alignment which contributes to the effectiveness of 
HPWP implementation in emphasized in Figure 11. The first area of the model discussed 
Model Comparison 
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is the knowledge and training of engineers not in operations management.   It seems that 
a great number of the problems between controllers and the other CE shops are a result of 
the training on how controllers fit into the mission that other shops never received.   This 
shows that the maintenance of KSAs for other groups that controllers work with may be 
equally important to their success.   
This point illustrates the need for HPWPs to vertically align with the strategic 
plan of the larger organization, which is the second area of the models discussed.  In 
order for an organization to succeed using HPWPs, they must make sure that the 
practices align with the overall mission of the organization.  It is safe to assume that the 
implementation of this idea has failed if members feel that they are not part of the team.  
This is further shown by other groups not realizing how the outcast group contributes to 
the mission.  Feeling like outsiders may possibly contribute to the motivation of 
controllers and may impact retention. 
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Figure 10: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #2 
 
 
Figure 11: Factors that Impacts HPWP Effectiveness Discussed in Theme #2 
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Theme #3: Inconsistent Employment and Recognition 
A third theme that emerged was inconsistency in the manner in which controllers 
were utilized.  Because non-controller leaders did not fully understand controllers’ roles, 
the controllers were often misused.  When there are few senior leaders in the career field, 
there is no one to educate other leaders about operations management.  Likewise, if no 
one realizes the importance of operations management, efforts to retain and promote 
controllers suffer.  One controller said it best: 
“It’s a challenge to compete with the blue collar work force for chief slots.  
What you wind up having are very few 3E6 chiefs who are able to 
[influence] the future of the career field and have enough clout to make 
sure that things are progressing in the career field, guidance being 
published, CFETPs [career field education and training plan], training in 
place…you just don’t have a lot of 3E6 chiefs out there.” 
In the current system, SMSgt controllers compete for Chief positions against SMSgts in 
four other elements rather than solely competing against other controllers.  While these 
other SMSgts are likely the superintendents of their elements, a controller’s element is 
often led by an officer or civilian.  This hinders their ability to promote by limiting the 
leadership positions they can have.  This section discusses problems that are caused 
misusing controllers and failing to recognize their importance. 
 
Subjects of this research resoundingly commented on the disproportionate amount 
of time they spent on extra duties.  Although all Air Force members perform additional 
duties, the controllers thought that they attract an unfair amount of these duties.  One 
responded,  
Extra Duties 
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“Of course we do a lot of things that are outside of our career field since a 
lot of folks don’t know exactly what we’re supposed to do, I guess.  And 
that’s been a sore spot of 3E6s over the years.  ‘Why do we have to do it 
when it’s not our job?’  So you kinda gotta nip it in the bud you know, 
suck it up and do it, I guess.” 
The different jobs that operations managers have done are considerable.  Among the 
interviewees, extra duties included: emergency management, unit deployment 
management, radios, base details, janitorial jobs, urinalysis, orderly room, commander’s 
calls, vehicle NCO, safety NCO, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) logistics, 
computers, housing, real property, and fiber optic installation.  It is true that many other 
career fields can complain about being tasked with these same duties.  However, 
controllers argue that the disproportional burden from additional duties comes from the 
convenience of being located in the same building as the command section.  They feel the 
leadership thinks:  
“You’re in the office, so you can just pick these things up.”  One 
controller shared, “We do a little more because of where our office is.  We 
get tagged for a lot of the stuff that our higher ups kind of need.  They 
can’t really get the guys in the shops to do it, so they come to us.  We have 
most of the additional duties.”   
A second controller echoed the same feelings: 
“Since we’re up in the head shed, we get tasked with the odds and 
ends…all the additional duty stuff that comes down to the ops center 
because we’re right there.  The commander, the first sergeant can look at 
us and say, ‘the 3E6s can do it.’  I think that’s the biggest thing over the 
years.  We’re just so close that we get stuck with the extra duties.” 
Two examples were provided that demonstrate the perceived mismanagement of 
controllers.  The first example was about a new airman who had just graduated from tech 
school.  Immediately, she was assigned to honor guard.  She stayed there for four months.  
When she went to the squadron for the first time, a deployment tasking was waiting for 
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her.  She was sent down range with no operations management experience at all.  Her 
supervisor remembers, “That was a huge factor for her decision to separate.  She’s on 
her way out.”   
Another example is the unit deployment manager (UDM) position.  According to 
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-403, each squadron has a UDM who is the primary liaison 
to the unit training manager, squadron superintendent, and wing training functions 
regarding deployment related issues.  They are responsible for readiness reporting, 
monitoring, force posturing activities, and deployment execution actions (Department of 
the Air Force, 2008).  Due to the clerical nature of this particular job, many units feel that 
a controller is the logical choice for that position.  One controller epitomized this.  He 
served as the UDM at three of the four base-level assignments in his career.  However, 
the AFI never states that the job requires one career field over another. 
 The onslaught of extra duties becomes a real problem as manning levels remain 
low.  A respondent surmised,  
“Leadership still asks the same things from us in the career field, but they 
just don’t have the manning to accomplish it all.  Work order area 
programs, doing in-depth analysis of RWP [reoccurring work program].  
Guys aren’t there to do it.  Simple things like customer feedback and 
survey programs.  No time for that either.”   
The problem of extraneous duties goes beyond base-level instances.  Some 3E6 
assignments consist solely of extra duties with no duties similar to operations 
management work.  One such assignment was with a Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy 
Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (RED HORSE) unit, which is organized to be an 
agile heavy construction arm.  As opposed to a traditional squadron responsible for the 
infrastructure and facilities of their home base, RED HORSE units spend their time at 
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home station training and preparing for the next deployment.  A controller’s primary 
duties do not fit into that mission.  Still, controllers are assigned to RED HORSE units.  
One controller said: 
“We don’t do any traditional 3E6 stuff.  We do a bit of tracking projects, 
but not much.  We don’t have access to IWIMS…We do a little facility 
management stuff…Other than that, everything else we do is not 3E6 stuff.  
We have huge radio accounts that we manage even though we have 
comm.. folks…not a real need for 3E6s in REDHORSE in my mind.” 
Another trend observed was assigning controllers as facility managers.  A facility 
manager is an appointed member within an organization who is responsible for inspecting 
the condition of the building, upholding security directives, and establishing procedures 
to notify the CE squadron of any needed maintenance.  Controllers are responsible for 
managing the facility manager program, not performing facility manager duties 
themselves.  Their proximity to the program does not make them better candidates for the 
position than anyone else.  The only requirement to be a facility manager is that you are 
at least an E-4 or higher (Department of the Air Force, 2004). 
Unfortunately, other career fields do not agree.  Controllers serve as facility 
managers at a number of locations throughout the world, many of which are not 
controlled by the Air Force.  The consensus feeling is that these extra positions should be 
scrutinized to determine if they are absolutely necessary.  Perhaps they can be filled by a 
career field without as large of a manning problem.  One supervisor thought back to his 
previous airmen and the assignments that many of them have since occupied: 
“I had one that’s at Fort Meade, Maryland, now that works as facility 
manager.  Not in a CE unit, works for the Army. Really, anyone can do a 
facility management job.  It doesn’t have to be a 3E6.  We have one in 
Belgium, a couple other spread out, one in Maui.  All these folks could be 
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brought into units that area really stressed.  We gotta beef up the units 
that only have two or three people when they’re authorized seven.” 
Many of these positions are seen as “useless” in the operations management community.  
A respondent noted that he was assigned to an undesirable job position.  Before he 
accepted the job at Base X, three other MSgts were notified that they were headed to 
Base X for their next assignment and decided to retire rather than take it.  He admits that 
he accepted it only because it is near his wife’s family.   
A sore spot with controllers concerning these “useless” positions is that the 
positions often receive priority with available 7-level controllers.  Because they are 
positions for only one person, if it is not filled, it shows up as 0% manned.  Conversely, if 
a TSgt is removed from a squadron, manning may only drop from 100% to 80%.  Areas 
that are 0% manned appear far more critical than those at 80%, so they receive the 
requested personnel.  This further depletes the squadrons of 7-level controllers. 
It is possible to see this issue from the outside and question the job analysis 
originally performed.  If it is a common practice for controllers to fill these extraneous 
positions, perhaps their job description should be reviewed.  There is obviously a 
disparity between the current job classification of controllers and the job they are actually 
performing.  In order to employ personnel in the most efficient way possible, an accurate 
job analysis is desired.  This analysis is the backbone on which many other management 
systems are built to include recruiting, performance appraisals, and workforce planning 
(Butler & Harvey, 1988).  As seen by the lack of research in the area of job analysis 
inaccuracies, it appears that job analyses are based almost completely on human 
judgment (Goldstein et al., 1993).  Because many systems are based on the initial job 
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analysis, and the validity of the analysis is rarely questioned, the inaccuracies of an initial 
job analysis can result in many effects (Harvey, 1991).  Possible problem areas include 
pay, promotions, and recruiting (Morgeson & Campion, 1997).  Though these are all of 
interest to the military, perhaps the largest area of concern is in misidentified training 
needs that lead to an inadequate workforce or wasted dollars in unnecessary training. 
 
Average deployment lengths have increased consistently since the beginning of 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (AFPC, 2004; 
Hanson, 2010).  Each career field of each branch of the military has its own unique set of 
challenges which include increasing levels of stress due to increased deployment tempos, 
additional missions at home and abroad, and constant funding concerns.  Operations 
management is no exception. 
Problems with Deployments 
Because of the multiple engagements of the United States military, the Air Force 
CE community is at an unprecedented level of stress.  Controllers score a “3” for the Ops 
Demand metric, which is the highest score given (Department of the Air Force, 2011a).  
The quantified “stress” considers manning levels compared to deployment taskings.  The 
accelerated deployment cycles not only add to the number of taskings, but also add to 
difficulties in retaining airmen (Williams, 2005).   
The manner in which civil engineers deploy has changed significantly over the 
last ten years.  Engineers have been increasingly deployed to locations around the world.  
As OIF and OEF have evolved, engineers now fill positions traditionally manned by 
other services (Goodfellow, 2008).  Although these new deployment taskings are now 
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commonplace, operations flight civil engineers must continue to fill traditional roles to 
maintain airfields.  It is for this reason that each assignment, whether deployed or at 
home, must be filled with the right person doing the right job.   
This is a huge source of frustration for controllers.  One controller explained it 
like this: 
“The deployments are extremely aggravating.  It’s a toss-up of whether 
you’re going to do your job or be bored for six months…I see a lot of 
underutilization in the AOR [area of responsibility] for the 3E6s.  They 
ask, ‘Why am I here?’  We’re sitting over there in the AOR and people 
look as us like, ‘Why are you even here?  Someone else is doing your job.’  
They have two or three of us at one location where there’s only enough 
work for one.” 
Another argued, “They really need to pay attention to the manning over there.  [Look at] 
what’s actually needed versus what they’d like to have to do all their admin and extra 
duties.”  This sentiment was repeated by another: 
“We had guys that deployed and did nothing.  Just across the board they 
need to get a grasp on what they actually need down range.  The problem 
is that most positions, once they’re one the books, they never come off.  
Even if the function goes away, the slot doesn’t get turned off.” 
A reoccurring theme was that any career field could fill the jobs that the Air Force 
believes are specific to operations management.  One controller remembered, “The job I 
did could have been done by any 3EX.  A dirt boy could have done that job.”  This, like 
everything else, has retention implications.  “From what I’ve seen, a lot of tech sergeants 
and staff sergeants were deployed to jobs that anybody could have done.  As a result, we 
are losing a lot of tech sergeants,” another controller stated.  Despite the frustration, 
some see it as a compliment. “Word on the street is that we’re pretty good at 
multitasking.  We can do a lot, so we’ve been picked up for a lot of JET [joint 
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expeditionary tasking] taskings.  Because we’re willing to do the job, we’ve been tasked 
quite a bit.”  Regardless of the view, the truth remains that excessive deployments of 
MSgts only adds to mentoring problems previously discussed.  One controller realized, 
“Airmen don’t get feedback while their NCO is deployed.  They’re by themselves and 
they go on about their business.  When the NCO gets home, then it’s the airman’s turn to 
go.” 
There is also a problem with the distribution of deployments similar to the 
unbalanced distribution of MSgts.  While some controllers are deploying at unsustainable 
rates, others are watching and waiting for their turn to contribute.  A newly cross-trained 
TSgt discussed her frustration with not being deployed: 
“When my bucket came around, we didn’t get any taskings.  They sent the 
jobs somewhere else.  I’m just frustrated because I came into this career 
field and one of the biggest draws was to deploy.  Now, I’m not getting the 
opportunity…I’ve been here a year and three months with no taskings.” 
Stories about too many deployments were equally passionate.  One controller recalled: 
“I knew a guy that was deployed when I was and returned in April of this 
year.  In August, they tried to tag him to go to Afghanistan again.  Really?  
We have 60 master sergeants in the career field and you’re gonna tag 
someone that got back six months ago?  He was gone for seven, home for 
six, and you’re gonna send him for another seven?  He dropped his 
paperwork.  He’s one of the guys that know the career field, a triple nickel 
like me.  The Air Force lost a good one there.” 
A second story echoed similar feelings and also resulted with the airman getting out: 
“There was one airman that was a single mom.  She went to Korea, came 
back and did a year deployment and in six months, deployed again.  She 
was told, ‘By the way, when you get back, you’re going to Korea again.’  
She got out at 15 years because over a five year period, she’d only see her 
kid one year.” 
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The unawareness leaders have of what a controller can do leaves them feeling 
underutilized.  One controller stated, “I think it’s the mind frame of civil engineers.  I 
don’t think that most understand what we have the capability to do and what we could do 
for them.”  Many of the respondents felt that they were not part of the decision-making 
process.  Not only were they upset at being removed, but they also believed that they had 
the best vantage point in the flight to make such decisions.  “We’re willing to do things 
that they’re not interested in.  We could bring so much more to the fight and make sure 
that we’re doing things proactively.  It just seems like their interest is into HVAC 
[heating, ventilations, and air conditioning], structures, or dirt boys,” one controller 
said.  Another agreed, “We have the ability to give them the information, give them the 
best guess based on what we see.  We’re never asked those questions.  We’re never given 
the opportunity to give our input.  We’re just data entry and data collection for CE.”  
Many capabilities were offered as useful products that are not fully used:  internal work 
programs, Top Ten programs, project programming, sorting data, life cycle analysis, 
trend analysis, and other management tools. 
Underutilized by Leadership 
As demonstrated throughout the interviews, controllers were not willing to sit 
back and let their career field slowly decline.  Some senior controllers took it upon 
themselves to affect change.  One controller recalled a program that was started at a 
previous assignment: 
“I went to my captain and said, ‘I can run reports for your guys for EPRs 
[enlisted performance reports] or what you’ve done.  We have stuff we 
can do for your shops to show or prioritize your requests.’  We even gave 
classes, built our own enhancement classes where the 3E6s showed the 
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craftsmen that they can do these things yourselves or we can do it as 
well.” 
Two of the interviewees went as far as applying for leadership positions within the career 
field so they could help address issues that they felt were affecting their career field the 
most.  Another has even brainstormed a completely different view of operations 
management.  With efficiency as the main goal, he suggested that all the offices in the 
operations support element should be collocated and supervised by a 3E6.  This could 
help by combining duplicate efforts and gaining from other shops’ strengths.  Recent 
consolidations of utilities and electrical career fields were provided as case studies. 
This area of questioning, like many previously, was linked to retention.  Many 
younger controllers have questioned the importance of their role. One controller 
remembered a story he had heard from a subordinate: 
“An airman said, ‘A monkey could do our job,’ and that he’s not staying 
in.  We’ve had discussions with him to help him see the bigger picture, but 
we don’t have leadership telling us the capabilities that we have are 
important to the squadron.  Therefore, you have this sense of not 
belonging, not being understood.  What’s the point of staying if I could 
make more of a difference somewhere else?” 
Unfortunately, this view is shared by older controllers as well.  One respondent replied: 
“I even thought of changing [career fields] myself.  I love my career field, 
but as I said earlier, there’s no room for growth.  I know a lot of things I 
can do, but I’m not getting utilized and I wanted to get out.  I can’t do 
anything.  I can’t even apply for a special duty even though I’m not even 
doing my [ops management] job.” 
 
Promotions are an important aspect of any career path.  The military definitely has 
a different model than most industries, yet the emphasis placed on promotions is equally 
Trouble Competing 
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heavy.  Interviewees were asked if they felt that promotions were fair.  Although the 
resounding response was “yes,” the topic of promotions still had an effect on 
performance.  The truth is that smaller career fields have a tougher time getting 
promotion simply because of size.  One controller framed it objectively: 
“At senior airman, staff, and tech, percentagewise, we’re as good as 
anyone else.  Once you meet master, if you’re [another career field], you 
have better numbers to get promoted.  Even if you’re a super troop, we 
only usually get two slots for senior master sergeant.  Are the 3E6 
candidates better than those that get promoted in other career fields? 
Perhaps.  Heck, there are more seniors and chiefs in the 2S0X1 [supply 
management] career field than there are in all of ops management.  We 
only have around 430 total on active duty.” 
Another controller concurred, “I think we have a fair chance at lower levels, but once we 
get to senior and chief, I don’t think we’re fair.”  Yet another agreed, “Of course it’s 
tough.  Our career field is the smallest in CE, so historically the career field is the 
toughest to get promoted in considering EOD, fire, and readiness.  Still, over the years, if 
you look at promotion rates, we get what we deserve.”  One respondent’s story stood out 
among the rest as the perfect example of the frustrations.  He recalled: 
“It took me seven years to make staff sergeant.  I had a 324 [promotion 
score] the last year that I didn’t get selected.  My friend in another shop 
only needed a 200 to get promoted.  That’s the disparity we have between 
small and large career fields because they work off of percentages.  That 
year—this is no lie—I was the highest scoring non-selectee in the Air 
Force.” 
One respondent felt that the low promotion rate further exacerbated the lack of 
mentorship available to young controllers.  Since the available slots at the top are limited, 
he felt that it forced the most experienced guys to take their focus off of mentoring their 
subordinates and instead, focus on extra activities to ensure promotion.   One controller 
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actually felt that low promotion rates were just due to the limited experience discussed 
earlier.  He argued: 
“The young techs and masters get promoted now, but haven’t had the 
mentorship and training.  Do they have the knowledge and leadership 
experience to fill those positions?  We complain we’re always stuck as a 
section chief, but if the people we’re promoting don’t know that much, 
they won’t be able to advance themselves.” 
Opinions about awards were split down the middle.  Some respondents felt that they were 
completely unfair while others voiced that they were the highest competitors in their 
squadron.  A controller complained,  
“All the glory is in the shops.  Typically, the 3E6s have a hard time 
writing packages on administrative accomplishments that can be 
comparable to the shops ‘responded to in-flight emergencies’ or ‘mission 
critical facility.’  It’s like apples and oranges.  How do you compare two 
totally different functions?” 
A second controller agreed,  
“Our justifications on things aren’t adequately captured or they’re not big 
enough as the dirt boys working in REDHORSE or the fire department or 
EOD.  Sure, fire and EOD are big things, but it seems like they look at us 
like we’re just paper pushers unless we’re saving someone.” 
Conversely, some subjects bragged about the accomplishments they had been a part of.  
One controller emphatically stated,  
“Yeah we’re competitive.  One of our staff sergeants made it to the group 
for quarterly awards.  Not quite the wing yet, but we’re working on it.  We 
just had one airman below the zone and we’re putting in another.  We’ve 
had the opportunity to compete.”   
Another added, “I would put in guys [for awards] all the time.  We were a section that 
when it came time for awards or below the zone, others were hesitant to put anybody in if 
they knew they’d have to compete against us.”  One respondent presented an idea that 
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refers back to educating leadership.  She suggested, “I try to sit on boards so that I can 
make them understand just how important the work we do is.” 
 
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al. 
(2007) models provided in Chapter II.  The major processes and the individual HPWPs 
that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted oval in 
Figure 12.  The factor of vertical alignment which contributes to the effectiveness of 
HPWP implementation in emphasized in Figure 13. 
Model Comparison 
The problems discussed refer to many different areas of the models.  Perhaps the 
most prevalent is the vertical alignment of the HPWPs used and the mission of the 
organization.  The number of extra duties and assignments outside of the career field 
show that controllers are not being utilized in the manner intended.  However, if the jobs 
they are performing are in fact the jobs they should be doing, one might consider that 
their training in operations management was a waste and that they should instead be 
trained on administrative tasks.  As with the issues previously stated, these problems may 
also affect retention.   
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Figure 12: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #3 
 
 
Figure 13: Factors that Impacts HPWP Effectiveness Discussed in Theme #3 
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Theme #4: No Advanced Training 
A robust training program is important to build the knowledge needed to 
appropriately accomplish the operations management mission.  The existence of a solid 
training program relates significantly to overall organizational performance (Russell et 
al., 1985).  Although experience may be low, the proper training program can correct the 
problem by producing competent controllers over time. However, the sentiment among 
controllers is that “there is no real course to teach us what you should know as a 7-
level.”  This section looks at the Air Force’s view of training for operations management.  
It then discusses the existing training situation and what is being done to correct it. 
The Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP) outlines five types of 
training required: initial skills, upgrade, qualification, advanced, and proficiency 
(Department of the Air Force, 2011b).  Although the CFETP addresses the different types 
of training possible, all types are not necessarily available.  There is an absence of 
advanced formal training opportunities in the career field.  Similarly, there is no clear 
guidance dictating the tasks included in qualification or proficiency training. 
 
The operations management tech school is a controller’s first exposure to the 
career field.   Some of the problems that the school house experiences are common to 
training programs in other organizations.  The procedures that are taught are often based 
on out-of-date job analyses or those of workers with slightly different jobs (Oriel, 1973).  
One example in operations management is the different situations that airmen deal with 
that were formerly handled by NCOs.  One controller explained, “[The school house] 
Problems with Initial Training 
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doesn’t touch on work orders because most won’t deal with them until the NCO level, but 
since we don’t have that many NCOs, many airmen are dealing with them as soon as they 
get to a base.  There’s no real training on work orders.”  If a job changes enough, it may 
be necessary to totally rewrite curriculum rather than just update it.  One controller 
believed that this is the position that the school house is in.  He stated, “Our tech school 
should be completely rebuilt from the ground up.  It’s not doing anything for the airmen 
going to base.”   
When the material is correct, there are instances where the content is written or 
taught at a level above or below the comprehension of the workers (Wilson et al., 1980).  
There may also be a misalignment between classroom training and situations observed on 
the job.  This point was mentioned by a few respondents.  One controller said, “I don’t 
think that tech school prepares people for what they will be doing.  It gives you a 
background, but everything you’re going to learn is going to be on the job.”  Finally, 
completion of a training program is often based on whether or not a trainee was exposed 
to an idea rather than if they demonstrated an understanding of the idea taught (Wilson et 
al., 1980).  The origin of the problems again stems from the lack of experience of the 
instructors since there are few senior controllers available to teach. 
Another source of training is the Community College of the Air Force.  There is 
an associate’s degree offered for each career field.  Controllers receive a degree in 
Maintenance Production Control which is shared by three other career fields.  The 
usefulness of the coursework required by the degree is debatable.  Most respondents 
agreed that the degree did not help them with operations management specific tasks.  One 
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bluntly stated, “I don’t believe it was helpful at all.”  Others felt that there were some 
benefits.  One added: 
“It didn’t really [help].  Most of it you get from your military training or 
tech school.  Then you just take your core classes like math and English.  
Maybe speech and English might have helped me a little bit.  But the other 
classes didn’t.”   
Considering the lack of mentorship, one controller thought that some courses had merit.  
He argued, “Leadership and management I thought were pretty useful.  Without taking 
those classes, I’m not sure how effective a leader or mentor I’d be without those skills.” 
Further education is not limited to what the Air Force provides.  Most of the 
interviewees had a bachelor’s degree.  The fields of study included medical, education 
and development, legal, public health, computers, and networks.  Along with academic 
degrees, many controllers sought other training in Microsoft Office applications, database 
management, and management certifications. 
 
Regardless of inadequate training or mentorship, a controller can at the very least 
survive by mimicking what the other controllers do.  This becomes an issue, however, 
when the career field is given new responsibilities.  Operations management has two 
recent additions to their job description.  The first is quality assurance (QA), which has 
only recently become a part of the CFETP.  Many of the subjects noted that they had 
performed QA duties at one point or another, many before the task was actually added 
officially.  Most airmen were responsible for QA while deployed.  This task is not 
specific to controllers.  It was added to many of the CE career fields’ CFETPs, although 
New Responsibilities 
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controllers and engineering assistants are used in this capacity a majority of the time.  
This incongruence contributes to an overall void of training in this area.  One controller 
noted that “It’d be nice for people to know what they were doing when they got 
[downrange] rather than trying to figure it out once they got there.” 
A second additional responsibility is managing material supply.  This job was 
previously accomplished by airmen in the logistics readiness career field.  Logisticians 
were traditionally assigned to CE squadrons to manage the ordering, delivery, and storage 
of materials for engineering work.  In 2006, PBD 720 required all career fields to limit 
their budgets and only focus on their core responsibilities.  Each career field used 
different avenues to restrict spending and manpower.  Logisticians decided to retrieve the 
personnel assigned to CE squadrons in an attempt to reduce their required manpower.  
Though the airmen responsible for material supply were removed, the job they did 
remained.  Controllers were chosen to adopt the mission in their place.   
The obvious issue with this is that any additional mission will likely stress a 
career field that is already suffering from low manning.  A second issue is that there is no 
way to train airmen on these new duties.  The mission was added before a formal training 
plan was made.  One controller explained it like this: 
“They updated the CFETP but didn’t offer any type of training.  It would 
have been good if they said, ‘Here’s 15 new tasks on your plan, but here’s 
a course where you can send your folks.  It’ll be funded by your command 
or the Air Force and not your unit because it’s not your fault that it got 
added.’  But they didn’t…It would have been nice to have something 
established before they dropped that bomb on us.” 
In cases where there is not a senior controller qualified in material supply, airmen must 
simply learn on their own and wait until they move to a different base to get certified.  
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Efforts have been made to add 15 days of supply training to tech school for new 3E6 
airmen. 
 
Due to the lack of advanced formal training, the operations management career 
field relies heavily on on-the-job training (OJT), which is the most frequently used 
training method in industry (Utgaard & Dawis, 1970).  OJT received the highest rating 
compared to other training methods in usefulness and acceptance (Walker, 1965).  Larger 
companies were found to have more structured OJT programs than smaller companies 
(Wilson et al., 1980).  It is of little surprise that the Air Force has one of the most robust 
OJT programs.  It is estimated that 10% of the enlisted workforce man-hours are spent on 
some sort of OJT each year (Stephenson & Burkett, 1975).  In fact, many years ago, the 
Air Force depended solely on OJT to train airmen.  An older controller recalled, “I came 
in in’89 back when they had what they called ‘direct duty airmen.’  I didn’t go to tech 
school.  I graduated basic, went on leave, and then reported straight to my unit…I had to 
kind of learn it from my supervisors.” 
Emphasis on “On-the-Job Training” 
OJT is implemented by many companies because of its assumed advantages: low 
costs, hands-on style, and acceptance by trainees that do not like to be in a classroom 
(Wilson et al., 1980).  Unfortunately, the cost may not be as low as expected.  In an 
unstructured program, costs are lower than bringing in an instructor or sending trainees 
away to school (Gant, 1977).  But to properly start an OJT program, a great deal of effort 
must be applied to planning, evaluating, and administrating.  There are also hidden costs 
due to the lack of production normally accomplished by the trainer and the possibility of 
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damage by unskilled trainees (Gant, 1977).  Although the Air Force values training, 
funding for schools usually determine whether or not certain specialties are taught in 
classes or by OJT (Stephenson & Burkett, 1975).   
The most significant disadvantage of OJT is that it is most often carried out in an 
unstructured manner.  The military has one of the most structured OJT programs 
compared to those found in industry (Wilson et al., 1980).  Unfortunately, the operations 
management career field does not have an OJT program that is as structured as other 
career fields.  In a study conducted by the University of Wisconsin, Perlman (1969) 
found that of 150 companies, all used OJT as the main training method but only four 
percent had a structured program.   
This presents two issues, each of great concern.  First, the worker charged with 
training new workers may have little to no experience as an instructor.  Educating another 
is a large task that has been levied on workers who may lack skills themselves (Oriel, 
1973).  One controller related this fact to premature promotions: “They’re giving them 
rank…but they’re still learning the job and whatnot.  It’s hard to train and understand 
what to do in that position if you don’t know what to do in the first place.”  This gap in 
knowledge is apparent to both the trainer and trainee.   
The second issue is that it is seldom possible to conduct legitimate training while 
keeping production maximized.  One of the two will suffer for the sake of the other.  In 
most companies, the decision is made to keep production as the priority.  One respondent 
was frustrated at his current position.  He said, “Here I’m just a trainer.  My main goal is 
just to train.  I know that’s where we’re lacking, but still I feel I could be utilized in other 
programs our section is responsible for.”  
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In reality, on-the-job training is often replaced with as-you-work training 
(Perlman, 1969).  One controller recollected, “All the stuff I’ve learned about ops 
management has been from being thrown in the fire, figuring it out and asking 
questions.”  Another agrees: “Unfortunately, most troops will just learn on their own by 
sending them to a shop to figure it out on their own.”  Rather than following a prepared 
plan for training, new workers are told to just go and learn what they can by watching.  
Rather than having designated instructors, instruction is provided by just another worker 
(Wenig & Wolansky, 1972).  
 
Controllers have tried to fill the void of training in the operations management 
career field.  There have been a few attempts to get young controllers exposed to the 
different aspects of the job.  These efforts include contract courses, in-house courses, and 
shop exposure programs. 
Reliance on Outside Courses and Workarounds 
Every subject questioned during this research had heard of Alice Anderson 
courses and most had attended at least one course.  Alice Anderson is one of the pioneers 
of IWIMS.  As a consultant, she travels throughout the Air Force offering classes in 
report writing, RWP, in-service work program (IWP), work control, and cost 
management.  She has a monopoly on the market because the few controllers, military 
and civilian, that actually understand all the details of IWIMS have retired. Her business 
is quite successful since bases around the world are willing to pay top dollar to host one 
of her classes. 
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Her praises were voiced by the MSgts that had taken one of her classes.  One 
controller proclaimed, “Alice Anderson kind of brought the light bulb on.  [She] tied 
everything together, all those little tidbits you learn over time.”  Another believed that 
her classes were a necessity.  He declared, “All ops managers should go to the Alice 
Anderson course because a lot of people only know the basics of how to get the basic 
information in.”  Yet another controller added,  
“All we get is how to input stuff into the database and we get good at it.  
But if you don’t take the Alice Anderson class, you don’t know how to set 
up an RWP cycle or adjust the whole RWP to make sure the database is 
running right.” 
Other courses have been arranged by controllers at all levels.  One controller spoke of a 
course hosted at his base for all the controllers stationed there.  Rather than sending 25 
people across the country, an expert from Gunter Air Force Base was brought in to teach 
them about the Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES).  Some bases reached out to 
others to develop joint program management courses.  Leaders in the career field are 
working on developing a 7-level course to replace the course that was canceled in 2005.  
The idea is to use the material offered in the Alice Anderson courses as a template to 
develop an in-house replacement.   
One possible roadblock in developing such a course is funding.  Proponents of 
reinstating a 7-level course have a hard time providing a strong connection between the 
course and the war effort.  It has been discussed amongst career field leaders over the last 
few years, but it has not been reinstated.  It is possible that the low level of support is due 
to the unawareness of upper management of the need for such a course.  With no high 
ranking controllers, there are fewer advocates available for its creation.  At the Air Force 
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Civil Engineering Support Agency, the Career Field Manager (CFM) position is filled by 
a MSgt while the other CFMs from the Operations Flight are SMSgts.  This disparity in 
rank may also limit advocacy for controller training.  One controller thought, “With TDYs 
[temporary duties] getting cut and money being tighter for courses, everyone is fighting 
to justify their own…I look at it and our course has no ownership because we can’t 
clearly explain the costs and consequences.”  At the least, it is desired that controllers 
attend the Alice Anderson courses.  Some Major Commands have made this a priority by 
securing funding ahead of time and allowing two controllers from each base to attend so 
that the knowledge is distributed as equally as possible. 
A final effort mentioned was moving controllers into the different shops for a few 
weeks to learn the intricacies of the different crafts.  One shop has a standard “floater” 
that moves from shop to shop.  Another shop expressed desires to instate such a program 
once the youngest airmen catch up on their training.  The exposure to the various crafts 
ideally helps the controller do a better job.  A new controller explained her situation: 
“One thing we’re missing is going out into the shops and learning, especially us females.  
Like, ‘Who does hot water?’  I didn’t realize that HVAC did that until I talked to them.  
Things like that, getting hands on experience with what they really do.”  Not only can 
exposure help them understand who does what, but it can help them ask more meaningful 
questions that make everyone’s job easier.  One controller clarified:  
“When I was managing customer service, I tried to get us engaged in the 
unit.  I moved guys around to the shops so they got HVAC calls and 
plumbing calls.  Then, when they came back to customer service, they 
asked better questions.  They knew a little more.”   
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The lack of advanced training is apparent in the operations management career field.  
Though many efforts have been made to fix this problem, money and manning stand in 
the way of reaching success.  Through ingenuity on the part of the senior controllers, the 
effects of this problem are lessened.  However, the missed training adds to the last theme 
of lack of guidance. 
 
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al. 
(2007) models provided in Chapter II.  Both the major processes and the individual 
HPWPs that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted 
oval in Figure 14.  This theme pertains mostly to training, which enhances KSAs.  The 
amount of times that training was mentioned in the interviews bolsters the fact that 
training is one of the most studied HPWPs.  Problems with training are not isolated.  
Instead, they are horizontally integrated with other areas.  As described earlier, a lack of 
training creates senior controllers that may not be as competitive for promotion.  If they 
cannot demonstrate that they have mastered their primary job, they may be less likely to 
be chosen for top positions.  Training is also aligned with participation.  If controllers 
want more participation in decision-making, they must first demonstrate that they have 
mastered their controller duties and possess the needed skills to legitimately contribute to 
decisions. 
Model Comparison 
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Figure 14: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #4 
 
 
Theme #5: Lack of Guidance 
This section examines problems resulting from a lack in guidance for the career 
field.  Traditionally, the military provides guidelines for every action and a plan for every 
possible contingency.  However, the operations management career field has limited 
guidance.  As a result, many bases have developed their own standards of operation.  The 
lack of standardization may be affecting the quality of data entry and retrieval.  There 
also seems to be a gap in the guidance provided to operations managers for the 
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implementation of asset management.  The details of these problems are discussed 
further. 
In the mid 1990s, the Air Force moved from regulations to instructions.  The 
reason widely given was to gain cost efficiencies by allowing individuals the freedom to 
vary some processes. Air Force Regulation 85-2 provided controllers with a standardized 
“how to” guide.  It was replaced with a more generic Air Force Instruction (AFI) 32-
1001.  Since then, multiple updated versions have been created, yet the detail of the old 
regulations remains unmatched.  One controller explained, “It goes back to AFIs 
dictating what you do.  When the regs changed to AFIs, Regulation 85-2 went from 200 
to 10 pages as AFI 32-1001.  It lets you do whatever you want since you’re not getting 
measured by any standard.”  By eliminating specific guidance, younger airmen are left 
with no way of learning the intricacies of the job without the guidance of a senior 
controller.  Another controller made the connection: 
“A lot of the processes that apply to doing work in IWIMS, they were 
outlined in those publications.  Then in the AFIs, they were just so thin.  
For reference for future generations to develop training using AFIs or if 
they were trying to pick up extra skills with no one to help them, it was 
impossible.  Plain and simple, [they need] good, old-fashioned guidance—
standardized guidance.” 
It is difficult for younger airman to learn on their own when there is no material to learn 
from.  A ten-page document can be read and “mastered” in a day.  Without a clearly 
defined performance guide, the end-product can vary significantly based on 
interpretation.  One subject responded, “The quality goes back to the lack of standardized 
guidance on the procedures on how to directly input the data.”  He went on to say, “The 
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thing is you won’t find the answers written down anywhere, you just have to know it.  I’m 
not talking about a playbook, I’m talking about good old instruction manuals.” 
 
Due to the lack of guidance, each base can interpret many aspects of the job 
differently.  Without a standard dictating exactly what information must be entered, each 
base develops a culture of what is important to track and what is not necessary.  As one 
controller recalled, “The quality of the data depends on what the base emphasizes.”  This 
frustration was shared by another controller who realized that someone had to step in and 
provide some guidance.  He recounted, “There’s no specific guidance.  That’s why I said 
if I were ever in a position to change it, I would.  I would volunteer for a chance to 
develop the needed documents.”   
Local Variations 
There are many examples of operations management programs that could greatly 
benefit a squadron.  Unfortunately, they are deemed “optional” for controllers.  These 
programs include: Top Ten, internal work, reoccurring work, and customer feedback.  
When asked what he was capable of doing but did not, one respondent suggested, “IWP.  
Some bases I’ve seen do it, some don’t, and some do it halfway.  It’s a good tool if used 
to its full potential.”  As is the case with most of these problems, the cure is a strong 
presence by a senior controller.  A MSgt recalled his method of refocusing a new shop: 
“You get good data if you have a customer service department that makes 
it a priority.  When I get to a base, I immediately go into IWIMS and look 
at a few obscure places to see if they were keeping stuff updated.  If I went 
to those places and they didn’t have data, I knew that we were going to 
have a problem.  I’d sit them down and say, ‘I don’t know what you did 
beforehand, but this is how we’re going to do it now.’” 
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Each respondent was asked specifically whether or not the data entered by 
controllers could be confidently used to make good asset management decisions.  The 
majority of answers were negative.  The data was generally viewed to be wrong, 
incomplete, or out of context.  Said one respondent when asked about data quality: “I’d 
say not very good—garbage in, garbage out.” 
Errant Data Entry 
A caveat was added for the few neutral responses received in that it was all 
dependent on the location and personnel responsible.  One controller replied: 
“IWIMS alone?  It could be OK.  I guess it would matter what base I’m at, 
how much training the airman has had…Is my airman trained enough to 
know what to put into the system?  Am I getting the whole picture?  
There’s a lot of places in the process that can get fouled up.” 
Another asserted: “[The system] is only as good as the people who are using it.” 
From these responses, it appears that there were legitimate doubts in the accuracy 
of the data stored in the CE systems.  One of the largest challenges to proper asset 
management is the lack of useful data or data in a useful form.  This weakness is due to 
information systems that lack flexibility and the low rate of data gathering and entering.  
When a system is implemented, it is important that it not create more work and drive the 
process, but instead become a tool to help the process (Jones, 1994).  Most information 
systems fail due to lack of training, insufficient commitment, and lack of a demonstrable 
use of the system output (Jones, 1994).  Another problem is duplication of data rather 
than sharing.   
Currently, the Air Force uses two primary systems for civil engineering tracking: 
the Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES) and the Interim Work Information 
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Management System (IWIMS).  ACES contains information on real property, readiness, 
construction processes, and project management.  IWIMS is a smaller system that 
communicates with ACES and focuses on work order, materials, and job management.  
Reviews of these two systems have been mixed.  Most problems mentioned concerning 
ACES centered on its tendency to get overloaded.  One controller stated, “I don’t like 
ACES.  It decides when it wants to work and when it doesn’t.  If you go too quickly, it just 
locks up.”  Problems with IWIMS were due to its outdated interface and the fact that it 
sometimes “dumps” information.  Many controllers preferred a web-based system to 
allow ease of access and use. 
The proposed solution to these complaints lies in a CE initiative called NexGen 
IT.  The purpose of this transformation is to use commercial off-the-shelf software to 
provide engineers with an updated information management system (Thomas, 2009).  
The system will replace and consolidate multiple CE systems (including ACES and 
IWIMS) into one web-based interface.  However, this idea has been discussed for many 
years.  Although CE leaders have aggressively pushed this initiative recently, the timeline 
remains uncertain.  
The absence of a simple user interface has caused two main problems.  The first is 
the quality of data entered by the other shops.  Controllers understand IWIMS and have 
little trouble entering data because it is a fundamental lesson taught in tech school.  On 
the other hand, the other shops do not have the training.  Without training, IWIMS is 
extremely difficult to navigate.  This problem stems from issues with manning and 
experience previously discussed.  A respondent noted: 
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“It should be a good tool to use.  Because of the shortage of manning and 
the loss of knowledge, we kind of lean on the shops to input labor and 
sometimes work order stuff.  We’ve turned it into a junk in, junk out 
problem.  It’s not the most reliable stuff out there.” 
Another added, “The labor reporting has been farmed out to the shops, so I know there 
are gigantic holes in that.”  One controller thought that having the shop foreman enter 
the data may be beneficial since they were closest to the job.  Still, he admitted that he 
would rather be responsible for making sure the data was entered correctly.  The problem 
was summed up by an interviewee: “The craftsmen don’t use [IWIMS] because they 
don’t like it.  Therefore, the data is not being input correctly.” 
The quality of the data is also compromised when it is incomplete.  The dislike of 
the system leads many to simply ignore it.  One subject explained, “IWIMS isn’t a 
horrible system…Unfortunately, 90% of civil engineers don’t understand it, therefore 
they don’t use it.  There’s not a lot of data input.”  A few others offered that the quality 
of the data was dependent on the integrity of the individual entering it and the local 
emphasis placed on it.  Lastly, it was suggested that it is a classic case of blue versus 
white collar workers.  Blue collar workers simply do not feel comfortable in an 
administrative role nor do they understand the importance of it.  This was noticed in 
deployment settings as well.  The tendency was use spreadsheets and other systems since 
IWIMS usage was not mandated.   
 
Another problem with data in CE systems is the manner in which it is retrieved.  
IWIMS data entry, as challenging as it may be, was not seen half as difficult as data 
Questionable Results 
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retrieval.  Once controller saw it like this: “IWIMS is a good system because it will give 
you what you need…If you know how to run those reports, you can just about do 
miracles.  Unfortunately, it’s an archaic system from the 80s that doesn’t allow us to do 
the things we could.”  Another suggested, “If we had the familiarity with it, we could pull 
those reports out easy, just breeze through it.”   
When reports are generated, controllers still displayed distrust in what was 
produced.  Sometimes it was a case of knowing the intricacies of the system.  An 
interviewee suggested, “Sometimes the data can be wrong if it’s pulling the rejects or it’s 
not talking to the history.  There are parts that you have to know to check.”  Other times, 
there were problems with the interpretation of the data.  One controller remembered,  
“I’ve seen other people try to produce products out of IWIMS in order to 
develop asset management plans.  They’ll do some analysis and the stuff 
they’ve been getting is suspect…Being able to pull out info and change the 
context for what you’re trying to present, that’s really our role.” 
The final quote includes similar thoughts along with previous concerns about supervisors 
understanding the role of a controller and the ability that they bring to the table. 
“At my last base I was fortunate to work with a commander and ops chief 
that were willing to listen.  They understood when it came to getting info 
out of the computer, putting it into a format that meant something to them, 
they’d let me do that.  They weren’t just telling me what slides they wanted 
to see.  They left it up to me to gather info that meant something.  I was 
allowed to make decisions that would help them make good decisions.  At 
some bases, I’ve seen ops chiefs that tell them what they want to see 
without really understanding what they’re looking at.  It’s useless 
information.  I’ve also seen where there’s the tendency to misinterpret the 
data.  Luckily, the ops chiefs that I’ve worked for have been very willing to 
listen to the information and allow us to explain what it means rather than 
them drawing conclusions.” 
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As the Air Force moves towards a culture of asset management, it may be wise to 
ensure that controllers are educated on the principles of the philosophy and how they fit 
into it.  At this point, a majority of controllers are unaware of what asset management 
entails.  They also appear to be unsure of the role they play in it.  A few respondents 
humbly admitted that they did not know what asset management was.  Some of those 
who had a rough understanding of the concept did not believe that controllers were a part 
of it.  A common theme shared was that asset management is just another name for the 
environmental flight.  One controller thought, “Its money and materials.  I don’t see how 
we fit into it.  Maybe we do because we put work orders into IWIMS.” 
Poor Understanding of Asset Management 
A handful of interviewees understood parts of the idea.  One controller stated, “I 
see myself as the person that collects all the data that would go into the process.”  
Another shared opinion was that controllers are only responsible for RWP.  One 
controller hypothesized, “One way we might fit in is with a firm oversight of 
RWP…That’s a piece of it.  To go in and manage that program: how it should be and 
identify all the pieces that play into it, making sure the data is accurate so that life cycles 
can be analyzed.”  The best definition received was from the youngest interviewee.  He 
was not taught his definition.  Instead, he developed it on his own from the changes he 
observed around him.  He defined asset management as: 
“Managing all property on base whether a facility or real property 
installed equipment; making sure you have the correct date of installation; 
making sure you have the appropriate preventative maintenance program 
to keep the RPIE [real property installed equipment] meeting or exceeding 
the life expectancy; being able to capture and show all of that to higher 
headquarters.” 
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With the lack of guidance provided to controllers, it is hard to assume that many accurate 
asset management decisions can be made.  The instructions do not exist to explain to 
controllers how to perform their job.  Standards do not exist to regulate what information 
is required.  Finally, controllers are not educated on the concepts of asset management 
and how their job contributes to its success.  The following section looks at the training 
that controllers receive to address the shortages in guidance. 
 
This section compares the results associated with this theme to the Liu et al. 
(2007) models provided in Chapter II.  The major processes and the individual HPWPs 
that were discussed in the results are emphasized by bold lettering and a dotted oval in 
Figure 15.  The factor of vertical alignment which contributes to the effectiveness of 
HPWP implementation in emphasized in Figure 16. 
Model Comparison 
This theme touches on all of the processes.  First, it pertains to the process of 
enhancing KSAs.  The needed guidance to make sure that every controller is learning the 
same skills and performing to the same standards was discarded.  It also touches on 
training.  Rather than having controllers trained to the same level, local policies and 
emphases have become the only standard for training. It points to the need for other shops 
to be trained if they are expected to help maintain data.   
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Figure 15: HPWPs and Processes Discussed in Theme #5 
 
 
Figure 16: Factors that Impacts HPWP Effectiveness Discussed in Theme #5 
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If controllers are empowered to do their jobs, they can focus on maintaining the 
quality and completeness of the data.  When it comes time to use the data, controllers can 
be trusted to analyze it and provide supervisors with the desired information.  In addition, 
the quality of the data comes down to the individual motivation of the controller inputting 
it.  At that critical point, all the HPWPs employed must work together to ensure that the 
data is entered correctly and completely. 
Lastly, this theme once again highlights a lack of vertical integration.  Asset 
management was proposed as an idea that would help the CE community cut costs and 
increase efficiencies.  Though it appears to be an important topic, controllers are not 
educated on how they fit into the process.  They are not aligned with the overall CE asset 
management agenda. 
 
Further Model Discussion 
The HPWPs and their relationships shown in the Liu et al. (2007) models were 
gathered from studies of numerous organizational types.  Although each organization was 
unique, the same common truths emerged when observed together.  The military also 
presents a highly unique set of circumstances that makes the implementation of some 
HPWPs difficult and, at times, impossible.  In an effort to keep things standardized and 
consistent, many decisions regarding HPWPs are made at the highest levels and apply to 
everyone.  This discussion addresses the limitations of the military in implementation of 
HPWPs.   
The three HPWPs prescribed to enhance KSAs are training, selection, and 
compensation.  As discussed previously, each career field receives training specific to 
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their career field supplemented by experienced workers at the lowest levels.  In this 
regard, training can be tailored by each level of leadership in order to meet the mission 
intent.  On the other hand, selection and compensation cannot be varied as easily.  
Selection of airmen into the career field is done at the Air Force level based on needs, 
aptitude tests, and historical indicators.  Although this is more advanced than random 
assignment, local controllers are not allowed to conduct interviews to choose the best fit 
candidates for their organization.  The military actually operates from the perspective that 
if one airman is removed a second should be easily inserted in their place.  Compensation 
for performance is possible through creative channels such as day passes or preferred 
parking spots.  Other than that, few avenues for compensation are available.  Military pay 
is not decided by the Air Force and cannot be altered at the local level.  Retention 
bonuses are used, but again, they are offered at the service level. 
Internal promotion and incentive compensation are the two HPWPs listed as 
motivation enhancers.  These two areas are probably the most well known and well 
implemented by the military.  The promotion system is the backbone of many different 
human resource management (HRM) practices.  Often times, opportunities are framed as 
“promotion helpers” while punishments result in loss of rank and described as “career 
enders.”  These common views help motivate airmen to perform assuming that promotion 
is a goal of most members.  More famously, the military is known for its benefits such as 
healthcare and retirement.  These benefits are often regarded as good reasons to join and 
good reasons to stay.  Through these two HPWPs, the military is better able to retain 
members and increase performance. 
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The four HPWPs included in enhancing empowerment are grievance procedures, 
flex-time, participation programs, and employment security.  Two of these HPWPs were 
not discussed in the results of this research.  Flex-time refers to flexible schedules and 
work environments.  Employees can be allowed to work hours when they choose and/or 
work from home.  These practices are used by some military offices, although certain 
demands unique to the military lessen the effectiveness of such variable schedules.  
Employment security was also not presented, although it is significant.  For the military, 
job security is often wrapped up in the benefits previously mentioned. 
Grievance procedures are present in the military, although they may not be 
available at all levels.  For actions such as crimes or discriminations, grievance 
procedures are readily available for all members.  In less severe cases such as work ideas 
or displeasures, the means to make claims are dependent on the personality of the leader.  
Leaders may be highly receptive of the opinions of subordinates or they may not.  
Similarly, the participation that leaders allow subordinates to have in decisions is highly 
dependent on their personalities.  The rigid rank hierarchy of the military allows leaders 
to make decisions without the permission of the subordinates.  Most would argue that 
effective leaders listen to their people, yet this is not a requirement.  Therefore, the 
implementation of these two HPWPs is determined by the perceptions of the leader.  
The final HPWP mentioned is HRM planning.  This touches on each of the three 
processes and is further discussed in the second Liu et al. (2007) model.  The second 
model includes vertical and horizontal alignment as well as work context.  A large 
number of the problems described in the interviews resulted from poor vertical alignment 
between HRM practices and the Air Force mission.  At times, it seemed that controllers 
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were being managed one way while the mission required a different approach.  Some of 
these problems are a result of the fact that many HRM practices in the military are 
standardized.  While HRM planning may be more effective if implemented at a lower 
level, many decisions for controllers are made at the Air Force level and sometimes the 
Department of Defense level.  Rather than creating a unique management solution for 
controllers that places them perfectly in line with the strategic plan, controllers, like most 
others, are forced to work within a one-size-fits-all system. 
Horizontal alignment is also hindered by standardized procedures.  Proper 
alignment requires each HPWP to be fitted with complementary practices.  Instead, some 
practices are simply immovable and are not negotiable at lower levels.  By not allowing 
some practices to shift, it may be difficult to effectively integrate the HPWPs that are 
negotiable.  Lastly, the context of the work environment must be considered to properly 
implement a successful HPWP system.  This requires the HRM planner to create a unique 
system that will appeal to the needs of controllers specifically.  Unfortunately, this level 
of tailoring is not possible within the overall HRM structure of the military. 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the top five themes of HRM problems as perceived by 
controllers.  Each theme was supplemented with direct quotes from interview subjects as 
well as secondary sources.  Each theme was related to the models proposed by Liu et al. 
(2007).  The chapter was concluded with a discussion of the limitations that the military 
places on HPWP implementation.  The final chapter contains the conclusions reached by 
this research.  
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V.  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study was to see if current human resource practices are 
contributing to controllers’ perceptions.  A phenomenological approach was used to 
collect data from controllers throughout the Air Force about their experiences and 
perceptions.  The results were analyzed by coding them into overall themes.  These 
results were compared to models of high-performance work practices (HPWPs) to see 
what practices could be altered to possibly increase performance.  This chapter includes a 
further discussion of the results in relation to the investigative questions posed in the first 
chapter.  The discussion is followed by implications of the results and limitations of the 
research; it concludes with a discussion regarding future research topics. 
 
Discussion 
The key findings that emerged during this research were presented and discussed 
as five themes:  
• #1: Few senior leaders in the career field 
• #2: Unawareness of role 
• #3: Inconsistent employment and recognition 
• #4: No advanced training and 
• #5: Lack of guidance 
These broad themes included many resultant problems used to answer the investigative 
questions.  The first question was if controllers felt they possessed the knowledge, skills, 
and abilities (KSAs) needed to perform their jobs well.  Based mostly on the problems 
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addressed in the fourth theme, controllers perceived that they did not have the needed 
KSAs to perform their jobs well.  This problem was shown through shortcomings that 
occurred in initial tech school training and continued throughout their careers by the 
absence of advance training courses offered by the Air Force.  In response to that, the 
career field placed a heavy emphasis on on-the-job training (OJT).  Some controllers 
sought out contracted civilian courses while others developed in-house workarounds.  
While these fixes helped, the career field as a whole remained without a standard 
advanced course.  With such an emphasis on OJT, the lack of experience of some of the 
senior career field leaders discussed in the first theme also must be considered. 
 The second investigative question asked if controllers were motivated to perform.  
This question was indirectly addressed in the second and third themes.  First, controllers 
felt that they were not part of the team due to the fact that other members of the squadron 
did not understand the role they played in accomplishing the mission.  Along with not 
feeling like part of the team, controllers felt they were poorly managed based on the jobs 
they were given.  By employing them to do jobs they felt were meaningless or unrelated 
to their career field, controllers felt that leaders did not understand what they did.  They 
often felt underutilized both at home and while deployed.  Lastly, controllers perceived 
that the misuse and misunderstanding of what they did sometimes negatively affected 
their chances to win awards and get promoted.  Despite these issues though, the 
controllers still demonstrated pride in their jobs and a motivation to overcome whatever 
obstacles they met.  Considering these facts, the second investigative question was not 
definitively answered. 
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 The third question looked at how interpersonal relationships between controllers 
and other engineers affected job performance.  This question was addressed by the 
second theme.  The unawareness that other members of the squadron had of the 
controllers’ role left some controllers feeling that they were not part of the team.  This 
unawareness further manifested itself in an increased workload for controllers.  In some 
instances, there was also inter-shop friction.  The blame was not always placed on the 
other squadron members; some interviewees noted that they and fellow controllers had 
mishandled situations.  Moments of ignorance from other engineers could be used as 
teaching and teamwork building opportunities.  Additionally, changes in squadron 
practices may have made the circumstances worse.  While the interviews did not 
explicitly measure performance, it can be reasonably assumed that performance may be 
sub-optimal while conflict exists. 
 The fourth investigative question asked if controllers believed they had the 
necessary representation among decision-makers.  The answer was “no” based on 
problems described in the first theme.  Due to changes over 15 years ago, imbalances in 
manpower and experience developed in the career field.  The result is multiple 
undermanned ranks within operation management.  Since the higher ranks are not at full 
capacity, members of other career fields have been placed in controller supervisor 
positions.  Along with the manpower problems that continue to propagate, controllers feel 
that it is hard for them to get promoted for reasons described in the third theme.  Overall, 
controllers felt that they were not properly represented. 
The final question was whether or not controllers perceived that the product they 
produced was reliable.  This question was addressed in the fifth theme.  Because of a lack 
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of guidance, controllers believed that there were issues with the quality of the data being 
entered into databases.  When regulations were replaced by instructions, specific 
guidance on what programs were required and how data had to be entered all but 
disappeared.  This led to incomplete data files.  To compound the issue, data entry was 
farmed out to other shops, further increasing the chances of incorrect or incomplete data 
entry.  Assuming that the data were correct, some controllers identified issues with data 
retrieval.  There were perceptions that some data were errantly compiled or simply 
misinterpreted by decision-makers.  Lastly, no guidance on asset management strategies 
was provided to controllers despite the fact that they play a significant role in capturing 
the data necessary to implement asset management principles.  In general, controllers 
were not confident in the final product they created. 
 
Implications 
At the end of each theme discussion in Chapter IV, the human resource 
management practices identified were compared to a model of HPWPs to see which 
practices were used and which were absent.  At the end of Chapter IV, a further 
discussion showed the limitations the military faces in implementing all of the HPWPs 
described in the models.  It is implied in this research that if a HPWP can be used to 
manage controllers, it should not only be used, but also maximized to make up for the 
practices that are less negotiable.   
Enhancing KSAs is accomplished by training, selecting, and compensating.  
While selection into the career field is limited and compensation is decided by the 
Department of Defense, the training for controllers is the area that leaders should focus 
 
103 
 
on.  Throughout the results, controllers voiced a desire to have an advanced course.  
Though there are some contracted civilian courses available, the Air Force should be able 
to provide a standardized advanced course to the operations management career field.  
While controllers desperately need an advanced course, other members of the squadron 
also need more training.  Other members should be trained on how work flows through 
the squadron and what role controllers play in the process.  This training would not only 
shed light on the importance of controllers but could possibly help them complete their 
own jobs more efficiently.  Operations Flight chiefs could also benefit from a greater 
understanding of what controllers are trained to do and what skills they bring to the table.  
Lastly, if the civil engineer community is committed to implementing asset management 
processes in hopes of increasing performance, it should consider training all squadron 
members on the principles of asset management and how each shop plays a part in them. 
Promotion and incentives are the HPWPs used to enhance motivation.  While the 
incentives of being in the military are impressive, they are the same for everyone.  To 
specifically increase the performance of controllers, the manner in which members are 
promoted should be investigated.  The reality may be that smaller career fields simply do 
not get as many top ranked positions.  If this is the case, efforts must be made to put the 
few senior leaders in the best possible positions and enable the most senior controllers to 
represent their career field at the same level as other career fields. 
The third process of enhancing empowerment can be supported by grievance 
procedures, participation programs, the availability of flextime, and employment security.  
Grievance procedures are yet another way that controllers can represent the needs of their 
career field.  Regardless of rank, the most senior career leaders must be afforded the same 
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level of consideration for issues that affect their field.  This relates to participation 
programs.  Controllers must be given a chance to make decisions and be trusted to 
perform the jobs they have been trained to do.  If squadron leaders can make an effort to 
embrace controllers, they may empower them to perform their duties at the highest levels 
possible.  Finally, employment security as far as actual employment is high for military 
members.  However, controllers may suffer from not knowing how securely they will be 
accepted in a new job or while deployed.  For this reason, much attention should be 
placed on the fairness of the extra duties controllers are tasked with and the validity and 
necessity of the jobs they are asked to perform. 
Most of the problems reported show a lack of vertical alignment between the way 
controllers are managed and the mission that must be completed.  In order for HPWPs to 
be effectively implemented, the practices used must increase the overall performance of 
controllers and enable them to contribute to the mission.  When making decisions on how 
controllers will be managed, leaders must investigate how that decision will impact 
performance.  This could be accomplished by giving more authority to the senior 
controllers.  Increasing their abilities to lead the operations management career field may 
also help with horizontal alignment.  Career field leaders should be allowed to shape 
HPWPs in a way such that the practices complement each other.  This also allows them 
to place the HPWPs in the proper work context that would most benefit controllers. 
 
Limitations 
There were some limitations to this research that may reduce its applicability 
across other populations.  The first limitation was that not all of the HPWPs mentioned 
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are available to members of the military.  Due to this fact, those HPWPs were not 
discussed much.  The impact they may have on other organizations was not necessarily 
captured in this study.  HPWPs such as selection and flextime may be significant topics 
to investigate. 
The second limitation was that all of the results were self-reported.  This was 
inherent to the method used and accepted by the researcher from the beginning.  Still, no 
data showing quantitative levels of performance were used.  With the themes provided by 
this research, further studies can be conducted to provide such data. 
The third limitation was that not all external factors were presented or considered.  
The interviewee’s rank and past experience were gathered to provide some background 
while other factors were not investigated.  If each subject’s performance reports or 
conduct records had been examined, there may have been indicators of why they held 
certain opinions. 
The final limitation was that only controllers were interviewed.  The problems for 
other workers, either in the Air Force or the civilian sector, may not be the same.  Even if 
similarly small career fields or production control workers in civilian manufacturing are 
compared, the results may not apply equally.  The research would need to be expanded to 
other career fields in order to determine the factors that influenced the perceptions 
recorded. 
 
Future Research 
There are many areas that could be studied in the future to further examine the 
areas discussed in this research.  The first such topic would be the training available to 
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the other members of the squadron who are deeply involved in data collection similar to 
controllers.  Such areas should include the real property managers, the energy monitors in 
the Asset Management Flight, and the maintenance engineers.  Each one of these areas 
collects and enters equally important data as controllers that will then be the basis of asset 
management decisions.  Possible problems may be present in their jobs which could also 
affect the quality of the decisions made. 
A second possible study could analyze the cost differences between developing an 
internal advanced course versus sending every controller to a contracted civilian course.  
If it is agreed that an advanced course should be required, the price of simply sending 
everyone to existing courses should be compared to the cost of developing an Air Force 
course which would require a location, curriculum development, and instructors from an 
already stressed pool of qualified controllers. 
A third future study could look at a single theme identified and use quantitative 
methods to measure performance.  While leaders may not be able to address every issue 
reported in this research, they may decide to focus on fixing at least one area.  In such a 
case, a method that would produce hard data may be used to quantity the actual impact of 
a certain HPWP on controllers. 
The final idea for a future study would be to interview groups that are similar to 
controllers.  This could provide insight into which problems are unique and which are 
symptoms of certain circumstances.  Possible populations could include other small 
career fields in the Air Force, production control clerks in civilian industries, or career 
fields with a large number of cross-trained members. 
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Conclusion 
In a time when the Air Force is looking to increase performance and reduce costs, 
it is necessary to look at different areas that may produce the desired results.  One such 
area is the use of HPWPs to increase performance.  In this study, civil engineer 
controllers were interviewed to identify problems they perceived were keeping them from 
performing.  The identified issues were grouped into themes and compared against 
models provided by past studies in human resource management.  The results provided 
five areas that leaders may investigate in order to make changes.  By addressing these 
issues, the Air Force may gain the increased performance it requires. 
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Appendix A 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject A 
What is your current job and what is the scope 
of your responsibilities?  
My current job is [omitted] 
  
And what is the STS?  
The STS is the …I’ll have to get back to you on 
that acronym. 
  
What are your day to day tasks?  
Day to day is mainly, is really additional duties on 
my end, not really production.  Just dealing 
with…I’ve integrated myself into [omitted] talking 
with AFCESA [omitted] their supervisor is a tech 
sergeant and a lot of times they need a master to 
help 
Mostly does 
additional duties 
 
Helps provide 
higher rank 
Not working in ops 
management 
Ok cool.  What...how long have you been a 3e6?  
I’ve been a 3e6 for the last 12.5 years. 
12.5 years  
Ok, is that the only job you’ve done?  
No, I was a firefighter for 7.5 years. 
Previously fire 
fighter 
 
Alright cool.  What were your previous duty 
stations?  
Previous stations as an operations manager I was at 
the [omitted].  I was a unit deployment manager 
and a readiness person looking over the personnel, 
their folders, deployments coming in and out.  We 
overlooked the RWP for all the contingency assets. 
Served as UDM 
and readiness 
 
Looked at RWP of 
contingency assets 
 
Sounds good. 
From there I went to the [omitted].  While I there, 
my job title was CE NCOIC.  What we did was 
look over…we were quality assurance evaluators 
looking over BOS contracts, facilitation repair on 
houses and facilities in the area.  We looked over 
solid waste, custodial services.  Let’s see...we did 
pest management and we were the housing office 
and also we were the office tending to any of the 
projects.  Some of what I did…I helped plan 
program and implement some pavilions and then 
other projects that were going on.  I was more like 
an EA than a triple nickel. 
QAE 
BOS contracts 
Housing flight 
duties? 
Built pavilions 
 
More like an EA 
than a controller 
Spent a lot of time 
not working in 
primary job 
That’s what it sounds like. 
Then from there I went to the [omitted].  And I was 
With army, worked 
as supply, facility 
Not used as 
controller during 
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just doing regular CE customer service. From there 
I deployed to Iraq which was on an army base.  
While there, I did BOS contracting again, 
overseeing just so many different types of things 
from supplies to food and water. Also looked over 
facilities maintenance and also the CE exchange 
between the facility maintenance turnaround from 
when our basic trainees left, what needed cleaning 
and fixed and then we gave it to the BOS contractor 
to fix.  I worked for MNSTCI.  That was the group 
I worked for.  They were in charge.  Then after 
that, I went to the [omittied] and I was the NCOIC 
of ops management.  While there, I was the 
emergency manager until our 3E9s rolled in.  I 
created a data base for project management. It’s 
kinda like you guys’ blue book but in a different 
form.  I also helped the supply personnel track all 
the equipment.  And then I was CE CSA after they 
pulled all the CSAs out.  Then I worked liaisons 
with the national guard and reserve folks that were 
coming into help build the northwest field facility.  
Then, while I was there I deployed out with the 
[omitted] to Kandahar, Afghanistan.  While I was 
in Kandahar I was the superintendent of the tactical 
ops center.  We got the mail, we tracked convoys, 
we did damage control.  If there were any attacks, 
we did accountability.  We did what we could. The 
biggest thing was we did a lot of computer support.  
We made sure the SWA hut we were in, which was 
the HQ, had all the comm in it and then tried to 
extend it out.  We worked with comm and army 
and laid some fiber optics and set up comm and 
repaired computers as well. 
maintenance, QAE 
 
Served as EM  
 
Served as CSA for 
unit 
 
Deployed and 
tracked convoys, 
got mail, and a lot 
of computer 
support, laid fiber 
optics 
deployments 
So it sounds like you’ve done comm, emergency 
management and EA stuff. 
Yep. And then they also looked at me as a radio 
guy.  I knew a lot of things.  I made sure they knew 
how to use them, programming comsec. 
Radio guy  
Ok. 
And then I went back and ran the UCC and then 
came here to be the [omitted]. 
  
Ok, we’ll keep moving.  So this is a big question 
for what I’m looking at. What is in your 
definition, what do you know about asset 
management?  
An ok idea of asset 
management 
 
Focused on 
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Umm…my thought process of asset management is 
whatever, whether is a piece of equipment or a 
facility, you’re following it, making sure it’s 
working correctly, it’s repaired correctly, if you 
have an RWP set up on it, you forecast when you 
need the parts for it.  That’s what is consider asset 
management. 
equipment 
How do you see that you fit in as an ops 
manager?  
I fit in the process…I see myself as the person that 
collects all the data that would go into the process 
of managing the asset.  When a customer says it’s 
broken, I’ll gather data and submit it to the 
craftsmen to get it fixed.  They’ll send it back to me 
if there’s any parts material or labor.  Then I would 
track that where it needs to go, put the project on 
hold if need be, and then again do what’s needed to 
manage the asset. 
 Good understanding 
of asset 
management 
Ok, so you said it was 12.5 years ago that you 
went to tech school, correct?  
Yeah. Now a lot has changed. 
  
What your educational background?  What 
other training or academic degrees have you 
done?  
I’ve done an AFS from CCAF in fire fighting tech, 
an AFS in CCAF in maintenance production 
management. I’m in the process of finishing my 
bachelors in science and computer technology. I’ve 
got background in building databases.  With fire, 
good grief, the whole list of fire fighting stuff. 
CCAF maintenance 
production 
management, fire 
fighting 
 
Bachelor’s science 
and computer tech 
Plenty secondary 
education 
Ok. 
I have some medical background training as well. 
Did medical work 
as well 
 
I hadn’t heard of the maintenance management 
degree. 
Yeah it’s the CCAF for ops management. 
  
Right. 
It’s with three other career fields. 
  
So that’s the advanced training you’ve got?  
Have you got anything that’s specifically ops 
management advanced training?  
No.  We had a 7-level school and it pretty much 
gave us the same info we’d get at basic operations 
school. 
Used to have 7 
level school, 
though it wasn’t 
much good 
7-level course 
stopped 
So where was that school at?  
It was at Sheppard. It was the 7-level course they 
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used to have up until about 5 years ago. 
So it doesn’t exist anymore?  
Correct. 
  
Cool, so do you feel like you’re being used in a 
capacity in which you were trained?  
Not really and I guess looking at my career, it’s a 
very small amount that’s been utilized like that. 
Not used how they 
were trained 
Not used how they 
were trained 
Ok, so maybe you weren’t trained in it, but do 
you feel like you have clear guidance for the job 
that you’re currently in?  
Not really. There’s some days that I really 
understand, being the [omitted], I understand where 
I’m going. But it seems like the next day I get new 
information.  I guess it changes day by day.  The 
interpretation of what a person expects changes. 
No guidance on 
current job 
No guidance on 
current job 
So what percentage do you think of your current 
job tasks are something that you learned in tech 
school? 
 25% 
Uses 25% of what 
they were trained to 
do 
Not used how they 
were trained 
OK, so even if you weren’t trained…wait, that’s 
a repeat question. What training do you want, 
do you think you need?  
Ok, all ops mangers should go to the Alice 
Anderson course because…there’s a lot of people 
that get the basic information [at tech school] and 
go out. They know how to do the basic data input 
but beyond that, they don’t know how to get deep 
into IWIMS and feel comfortable in running it.  
Also IWIMS administration has gone by the way 
side where it’s just civilians either doing it or 
masters or older folks that have gotten that training 
are retiring.  I know where trying to go the next gen 
but it’s not here yet, so I feel like everybody needs 
to go into that process to get a full good grasp of 
what a data base is, the IWIMS database.  They can 
go into it, they can feel really comfortable using it. 
Likes Alice 
Anderson course on 
IWIMS 
 
Expertise is retiring 
 
 
No advanced 
training offered by 
Air Force 
 
Expertise is retiring 
 
What is the Alice Anderson course?  
She was an ops manager back in the day and she 
was really good at the program. She’s since got out 
and has become a multi-millionaire on training 
people how to use IWIMS. 
Alice Anderson is 
an outside 
consultant for 
IWIMS 
Relies on civilian 
training 
Ok I think I took a course with her. I went to a 
finance management course here at Wright-Patt 
and we brought in a lady that was apparently 
the last living person that knew what IWIMS 
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did. That was probably her.  And she’s out of Las 
Vegas usually and she’s gone around the world 
training people but lately she’s been kind of 
holding things off. 
In your career field, do you feel that there is a 
normal path that traditionally ops managers 
follow?  
There’s a normal path of just staying in CE and just 
working in customer service like regular.  They can 
just stay there their whole time.   
Normal path = 
staying in customer 
service 
No growth 
Do you feel that there are enough senior leaders 
in your career field?  If you have a question for 
someone that is an ops manager, do you feel like 
you have mentors to turn to?  
No.  If I could say it bluntly, hellllll no. 
Hell no senior 
leaders 
No senior leaders 
Ok, do you think that members of your career 
field have an equal or fair chance of promotion?  
I think we have a fair chance among ourselves, but 
once we get into senior or chief level, I don’t think 
we’re fair. 
Not fair promoted 
to senior or chief 
Promotion hard at 
higher ranks 
 
Less representation 
So you mean among CE career fields or Air 
Force wide? 
I mean among CE.  I think in the Air Force it’s fair. 
Having the smaller number of people, it’s kind of 
difficult.  The percentages for career field are 
decent at lower levels but we get stuck at senior. 
  
Have you had opportunities to work other areas 
within the ops flight or even other areas within 
the squadron outside of customer service?  
I have not .  Everything I’ve done as CE was in 
customer service accept my extra duties. 
Just customer 
service or 
additional duties 
No growth 
Moving towards just your day to day 
performance, what do you think are the top 
issues that hinder your daily job?  
I think people not having enough people and time 
crunches and all the stuff they throw at us.  The 
biggest thing I look at is people because over the 
last ten years or 12, there’s the ebb and flow of 
folks and if it had been left the way it was there 
wouldn’t be the wrong number of folks we have.  
Personnel, time and looking at money is one thing.  
Because all people want these jobs done and they 
get the top 10 projects and they’re on the lists, 
there’s always a backlog of work to get done.  The 
pile gets higher and higher so you don’t have, you 
Problems:  not 
having enough 
people, time 
crunches, not 
enough money to 
do work and 
therefore managing 
backlogs 
Manning low 
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keep going back to the work orders to make sure 
they’re valid and if we had enough money we 
could just continue on and fix them.  Things like 
quality of life items or IWP items or saber projects, 
larger projects below MILCON that needs to get 
done. 
So you’re saying that you’re managing the 
backlog of work orders? That makes sense. 
One of the things I feel hinders us day to day is the 
fact that no one takes us seriously in a sense.  
Where you can say to a shop, “hey this stuff needs 
to get done. We’re going to be delinquent.” It just 
gets pushed off.  By them just pushing it off, it 
gives us more work to do.  I just feel like people 
don’t take us seriously. 
No one takes us 
seriously 
 
They push off work 
and increases our 
workload 
Not taken seriously 
 
Extra work results 
from unawareness 
of role 
What part are you asking them to do?  Are you 
asking them to get you info or are you asking 
them to do the actual work?  
You say you have a work order that is urgent that is 
becoming delinquent and you say “hey we need to 
get some hours on this or we need to pause it for 
labor or materials.” Just the whole aspect of “hey 
do your part to make sure your part of the work 
order is paused so then we don’t have to call you 
out on the carpet in the ops flight meetings.”  Just 
calling folks out on the table because the work 
orders are delinquent and then they say “well we 
did this and that” and we say “well you didn’t tell 
us, [expletive].” Sorry. 
Differing stories in 
ops meetings 
Strained teamwork 
shows in meetings 
Well that makes sense.  Alright, one thing I want 
to touch on because I want to give you the 
chance to comment, do you have any issues with 
ACES or IWIMS?  
I don’t have any issues with ACES or IWIMS. 
Sometimes they are slow but I think that the 
amount of training that people get on those for ops 
managers isn’t as much as it should as we talked 
about earlier. 
No real problems 
with IWIMS or 
ACES 
 
They are slow but 
more of a problem 
with training 
Needs more training 
on IWIMS 
That’s actually good to know because a lot of 
times the systems are getting blamed.  
Right I think that if people had more familiarity 
with them, they could pull the reports out, they 
could just breeze through it and run it really well. 
Training is problem 
rather than ACES 
or IWIMS alone 
Needs more training 
on IWIMS 
Cool now well move to some stuff that you’ve 
already kind of touched on, how you feel the 
People don’t know 
what we do 
Unawareness of role 
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other people in the squadron respect you or at 
least interact with you. First, do you think that 
the other element chiefs and the ops chief, do 
you think that they fully understand what your 
role is?  
No. 
And are they not interested in the things that 
you’re willing to do?  Are you able to do 
everything that they want you to do?  
They are and you got to the point correct. We’re 
willing to do things that they’re not interested in.  
We could bring so much more to the fight, if you 
call it, and make sure that we’re doing things 
proactively, but it just seem like their interest is 
into either HVAC, structures, or dirt boys. 
Were willing to do 
so much more but 
they just don’t want 
it. 
 
We could be 
proactive and bring 
more to the table 
Not being fully 
utilized 
So then that leads into do you feel like you’re a 
part of the ops flight team? 
Not really.  We’re there to run the programs and 
we’re mostly just off to the side. 
Pushed to the side Not part of team 
Ok, then expanding to the programs flight or 
environmental or whatever, do you think other 
people in the squadron understand your role?  
On that side, no. 
No understanding 
at the squadron 
level 
Not part of team 
Bonus question—when you were in customer 
service, how was your relationship with the 
programs flight?  
You mean more the asset management or the 
engineer’s systems? 
  
More the engineers.  I came from being deputy 
flight commander of the engineering flight and 
was referring to whenever a job got created or 
got kicked up to us, that kind of stuff.  How is 
that relationship? 
It didn’t seem like it was that good of relationship.  
A lot of time we get a 1391 back saying “hey we 
need a job for this.”  Kind of seemed like we were 
working backwards.  It just seemed a lot of times 
like we were a second thought when we should be 
the first thought to make sure everything was going 
right. 
Relationship with 
programs flight 
strained 
 
Just a second 
thought rather than 
the first 
No clear 
relationship with 
programs flight 
Do you feel like you’re a part of the team as far 
as the squadron is involved?  
Not really. 
Not part of 
squadron team 
Not part of team 
So there’s feeling like a part of the team, but do 
you feel like you are respected by the squadron?  
No respect for 
younger members 
Unawareness of role 
leads to low respect  
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The people that are E5s and below, no, I don’t 
think so.  They think we’re just folks sitting in the 
office doing nothing.  There’s a little more respect 
for those above but it always seems like they were 
like “we really don’t know what you’re supposed to 
be doing or we don’t know if you’re really doing 
your job what you’re supposed to be 
accomplishing.” 
 
Stems from having 
no idea of what 
they’re supposed to 
be doing 
Have you ever worked for an ops manager, 
where he was your element superintendent?  
Like the ops support element super?  
Well that has come up recently. The NCOIC of 
ops…we used to be under...when I was in the 
[omitted], our section was under the deputy ops 
flight commander, so it was mainly a young captain 
overseeing the flight that had material acquisition 
and maintenance engineering. 
Doesn’t work for a 
controller 
No senior leaders 
Do you feel like ops managers are competitive 
for quarterly and yearly awards?  
No, no. 
Can’t compete  
Why do you think that? 
I don’t think we are that able to, our justifications 
on things aren’t adequately captured or they’re not 
big enough like, for instance, the dirt boys working 
in REDHORSE or the fire department and EOD.  
Sure, fire department and EOD are big things 
among everyone else, but it seems like they look at 
us like “you’re just paper pushers” unless you’re 
saving somebody. 
Weak justifications 
for awards 
 
Just paper pushers 
Unawareness of role 
when looked at for 
awards 
How often are you asked to do things that have 
nothing to do with your job skills? 
 I’d say a lot.  About 70% of our duties. 
70%  additional 
duties 
Mostly additional 
duties 
Do you feel like it’s the way the Air Force is 
moving, like everyone’s doing additional duties 
or do you think it’s a somewhat unique problem 
for ops managers?  
I think it’s a kind of a little of both, mainly an air 
force problem but they look at us like “you’re in 
the office, so you can just pick these things up.” 
Proximity to front 
office brings extra 
work 
Extra work because 
of location 
In your current unit, are all the 3e6s, are they 
doing ops management related jobs?  
Where I am now, they are.  
  
You touched on this a little earlier but we’ll 
touch on it a little more in detail.  What are your 
typical roles while deployed?  
Duties include: 
QAE 
tactical support 
Mostly extra duties 
outside of primary 
job while deployed 
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Quality assurance evaluation.  Looking at repair 
maintenance and sustainability for facilities on a 
base.  Tactical ops support, communications, 
setting up data links between one point wherever 
we’re at such that we’re going forward operating.  
Some of things we’ve also been tasked with have 
been convoy duties and then damage control. 
computers 
convoys and 
damage control 
Do you receive any training on QAE?  
A little bit.  The basic stuff you get form 
contracting. 
Contracting 
provided QAE 
training 
 
So I mean during tech school, is that even 
covered?  
During tech school there’s no QA. 
No QA training in 
tech school 
No training in QAE 
from CE 
And obviously not comm. 
It’s just how to push the button the radio. That’s 
about it. 
  
So how much of your time is doing things that 
resemble home station duties?  
I’d say it varies base to base but I’d say 55%. 
55% resembles 
home station duties 
 
And so at the bases you’ve been at where you’re 
not doing that job, who to your knowledge is 
doing that work?  
As in like?? 
  
Like keeping up with facilities and the actual 
work production, scheduling.  
It’s usually us or a contractor. And if you’re 
looking back home it’s whoever is left back. 
Contractors doing 
“ops management” 
while deployed 
Contractors doing 
ops management 
while deployed 
Do you think that the deployments, either the 
tempo or what you do while you’re there, do you 
think that it’s had an impact on your career 
field?  
Yeah I think so, especially since were so small.  
People heard that word on the street is that we’re 
good at multitasking, we can do a lot so we’ve been 
picked up for a lot of JET taskings.  And because 
we’re willing to do the job in those JET taskings, 
we’ve been tasked quite a bit.  For instance, having 
a supply background, or a comm background or the 
tracking background, the Army has asked us to do a 
lot and asked us to go out on multiple things.  It’s 
good in the sense that we’re the ones who they 
want to go out there and fulfill the military mission, 
but there are those folks that continuously get 
called up over and over and we don’t have a whole 
lot of folks to send out. 
Getting high tempo 
JET taskings 
because of 
versatility 
Not used in primary 
job 
 
High tempo 
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So what options do you think are available to 
relieve some of that stress?  
More personnel is one.  Getting the correct training 
to do what were asked to do.  Starting at the basic 
course, looking at what people ask us to do, that 
would help some people to say “hey, I know what 
I’m doing when I get there” rather than trying to 
figure it out once they get there and kind of soft 
shoe dance if you call it. 
More personnel 
needed 
 
Training for 
deployment jobs so 
you’re not shocked 
when you show 
up—QA training 
Manning low 
 
Training for QAE 
About retention, do you feel that you have 
trouble retaining people?  
I don’t know.  It’s kind of mixed.  I don’t know 
why people don’t want to stay in the career field 
since it’s relatively easy, but in a sense that people 
look at us and don’t take us seriously; people don’t 
want to stay in the career field.  A lot of folks, they 
come in and they don’t know what they’re getting 
into.  Some get into ops and their recruiters lied to 
them, and then some are retrained into ops and they 
don’t want to do it.  I’ve seen so many 
pararescuemen and gung ho young men come in 
and they’re like “this is the last thing I wanted to 
do. I wanted to do something else and here I am in 
this ops career field.”  They immediately find what 
they can do to make it good or get out of it. 
Retention not really 
a problem 
 
Often people get in 
career field and 
don’t realize what it 
is 
Unawareness of role 
 
Leads to retention 
So not necessarily getting out of the AF but 
trying to cross-train into something different?  
Correct. 
Many cross-train  
How long are you staying?  I guess you’re sitting 
at 20 years.  So you’re getting out next week?  
Yeah, yeah I am.  I fully retire in February 2012. 
  
So I guess you’re separating because its 20 
years…  
Well yeah but based on my last base, I wasn’t taken 
seriously.  I came with a lot of great ideas.  I had a 
great deployment background, knowledge. The EM 
thing, so much background knowledge that could 
help my unit out, but yet I was pushed to the side 
and told “just sit behind the glass and whenever we 
need you to set up the UCC, we’ll break it and let 
you out.”  So I felt led to change my DEROS and 
allow me to come here.  It was kinda frustrating 
cuz I felt like I was getting squelched. I had all this 
to provide yet you want me to do nothing until you 
ask me to do it. 
Vectored away 
from base level in 
order to retire 
 
Not taken seriously 
Not taken seriously 
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And so do you think that’s the leading cause for 
people wanting to get out?  
I’ve talked to a lot of masters and techs in the 
career field and they feel the same way. 
Shared feelings 
throughout career 
field 
 
So you’re seeing people are coming in like 
“whoa this is not a job I want to do”?  
Right. 
  
That’s all the questions I had written but I’ll 
give you the chance to clarify any points or 
touch on any other areas.  Feel free to open up.  
One thing you didn’t ask was “do you feel like 
you’re being used at capacity?”  I say no, I don’t 
think so.  Like at tech school we get the tracking 
stuff, the database stuff and then we go out and 
sometimes the database were using is either 
IWIMS or maximo like in Guam since we were 
with the navy for joint basing. So instead of just 
teaching IWIMS we should teach how to use 
databases in general to understand the process of 
how one works to feel comfortable using any 
database you go to. A lot of times we have guard or 
reserves that go to training and they use IMES or 
BEAMS or something else on that side.  I know the 
NexGen program that comes out is supposed to 
squelch all that, but if everyone understood how a 
database works, it’d be a lot easier to come into and 
say “it’s a database and I know how it works.  I just 
need to get used to it.”  Whether it needs to be 
access training or excel or whatever, visual basic.  
Stuff like that would help out.  I know it sounds 
like it’s beyond what they want us to do, but if you 
don’t understand how a database works you’re not 
going to be able to adjust whatever database comes 
at you, there’s no way to trouble shoot it. 
Really needs 
generic database 
training 
Needs more training 
Do you think there’s stuff that you did get 
trained for that you’re not using at all?  
No I think we utilize it in one sense or another.  I’m 
thinking of going to the tech school.  I think there’s 
a lack of training for the things that should go into 
it.  We get out there and we get trained on say 15% 
of the things that we should be doing.  Maybe it’s a 
core thing from the folks that are training.  We got 
so many things going on we can’t get people proper 
training to make them understand what’s going on.  
Like database type things.  We get a little bit of 
Training covers 
maybe 15% of what 
were asked to do 
 
People use 
cumbersome 
techniques to 
generate reports 
Needs more 
database and 
IWIMS training 
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IWIMS here then they go to the CE squadron and 
don’t get a whole lot.  All we get is how to input 
stuff into the database and we get good at that but if 
you don’t go to an Alice Anderson class, you don’t 
know how to set up an RWP cycle or adjust the 
whole RWP to make sure the database is running 
well.  Or setting up the…there’s a way to get a 
report.  Most people just transfer the file to excel 
and then play with it there rather than utilizing the 
program itself. 
I’m thinking about some points I’m trying to 
answer with these interviews and so two areas I 
guess that I need to go in a little harder.  For 
one, what do you think the quality of the data is 
that is getting entered in?  If you went into 
IWIMS and you had to make a decision based 
just on what you saw there, how confident 
would you be that the info is good and up to date 
and complete? 
 I’d say not very good; garbage in and garbage out.  
It’d depend on the airman entering in there, what 
the base emphasizes on how much info you put in 
there.  Then you have the integrity of the individual 
putting it in.  I don’t think…don’t know if it’s the 
individual putting it in or what’s emphasized, 
making sure you get all the info in there.  Beyond 
that, it goes to the shop, what info they should be 
putting in there, why they can’t perform the job or 
what material or if there’s an issue with the delay 
of material.  More info needs to be put into IWIMS 
so people can get into that work order to find out 
what’s going on. 
Data quality is 
suspect 
 
Based on what is 
emphasized by base 
 
Shops don’t enter 
much 
 
Could make 
tracking down 
issues so much 
easier 
Data is unreliable  
 
No standardized 
level of data entry 
 
Dependent on local 
emphasis/motivation 
 
Shops don’t help 
much 
When you said that part of it is what the base 
emphasizes, do you only put info in based on the 
reports that they’re going to want?  
It’s mainly based on the info you’re given; either 
the customer or the shop foremen or craftsmen 
that’s working on the job.  That’s where you get the 
information.  It’d be better if the foremen put the 
info in themselves and that way they’d have 
firsthand information instead of using us as a 
funnel to get into it.  A lot of times we’re used 
which is a good thing, for us to be accountable for 
the info, but if they’re not giving us the information 
that something’s going on good, bad, or ugly, then 
Often only uses 
whatever is initially 
given with little 
follow-up 
Data is incomplete 
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the info doesn’t get into IWIMS. 
So if you don’t get it from them initially, is there 
any effort to try to go back and complete all the 
files, like going back to the shop to get missing 
info?  
Yes, and depending on what kind of job it is and 
what additional info needs to be put into it, but on 
an everyday job, it just is minimal info put in.  
Again, it really depends on the individual’s esprit 
de corps on how much gets in there.  You can have 
a gung ho firewall 5 guy that puts in all kinds of 
information, but then you have an airman that just 
doesn’t care who’s doing it for some college money 
or a get out of jail free card.  They’re going to put 
in the minimal info.  If their supervisor doesn’t 
emphasize it, the info won’t get in. 
Quality still based 
on individual which 
is based on the way 
they feel 
Data dependent on 
local situations 
That leads into the other part I wanted to ask.  
We’ve talked about you not feeling like you’re 
part of the team, not taken seriously.  Do you 
think that then has an effect on job 
performance?  
Yes, especially when folks say “you’re just playing 
video games during the day or just zooming 
YouTube, or something.”  A lot of times, people 
are screwing around, but the supervisor needs to be 
on them, again integrity.  It’s great to have the 
ability to be on the internet, but perhaps the Air 
Force has let the door open a little too much, 
allowed too much in that people may get distracted.  
But in a whole, people look at us as just sitting in 
front of a computer not doing anything, answering 
phones.  People think “if that’s all you think I’m 
doing, then that’s all I’m going to do.” 
When people think 
we don’t do 
anything, we start 
to believe them 
 
Too many 
distractions online 
Unawareness of role 
leads to behaviors 
that resemble wrong 
impressions 
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Appendix B 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject B 
Have you always been a 3E6? 
Yes sir, I came in as a 555 back in 1991. 
  
Ok cool and then if you could give an 
explanation of your duty history.  I know 
it’s been a long career, so if you just wan to 
highlight what positions you held and what 
you did in those jobs. 
I came in 1991 to [omitted] as an airman in 
training and deployed to Operation Restore 
Hope in 92-93 for 60 days.  We built their 
base in Egypt.  I did some training in data then 
moved on to [omitted] and did customer 
service airman work.  Moved from there to 
[omitted]. Again just basic customer service, 
calls, no deployments.  From there went to 
[omitted]. There I had several positions 
starting in zoning work then going to the self 
help store and from there to the facility 
manager monitor in charge of the facility 
management program for all of [omitted] for a 
year and a half.  From there I was NCOIC of 
scheduling and programming.  During those 
six years, I had a deployment to Kuwait and 
one TDY to an Alice Anderson course for 
work control which was two weeks long.  
Then I had a TDY to the 7-level course where 
I was a DG.  After that, I went to [omitted] as 
a brand new tech sergeant.  Had a lot of good 
experience there, NCO of the quarter.  I 
learned many aspects of supervision before 
going to the academy.  I had two personnel 
that had article 15s and had two that were 
below the zone, one airman of the year.  So I 
had the full spectrum of subordinates from 
some that were insubordinate to some super 
stars.  I learned the whole gamut of 
supervision.  I went to the academy after I 
learned all that stuff.  Also had a deployment 
to Al Dahfra.  After there, I moved to 
Spent his whole 
career in 
traditional Ops 
management roles 
Used in primary 
job 
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[omitted].  There I made master sergeant.  I 
was section chief for planning, the 3E6s ops 
management, and a small material acquisition 
section.  Also deployed to Kosovo for four 
months.  After [omitted], I went to the job I’m 
currently holding as [omitted] and from here I 
had one deployment to Afghanistan.  I was 
awarded [omitted] this year for work with 
[omitted].  That’s my career in a nutshell. 
Sounds like you were doing customer 
service most the time doing that job. 
Well at [omitted], but from there I dispersed 
out to facility management as a specialized 
area.  Scheduling and planning is specialized 
area.  At [omitted], I was NCOIC over all 
operations as far as experience with 
supervising civilians. 
Also facility 
management 
 
That’s stark contrast to a gentlemen I 
talked with previously.  He was hardly in 
any typical 3E6 jobs.  He was all over the 
place.  What is your academic background 
as far as other degrees? 
Of course I hold my CCAF in my current 
career field and associates for University of 
Maryland University Colleges in business 
administration.  I hold a business certificate 
from University of Maryland. 
CCAF and some 
bachelor’s work 
 
Did you find that the maintenance 
production course helped you with your 
actual job? 
It could be a little bit better and is something 
they should probably look at because it’s 
come up over the last year.  A lot of others in 
the career field have brought it up since then. 
CCAF degree not 
very useful 
CCAF not useful 
What other training have you received 
specific to your career field?  You said Alice 
Anderson and 7-level? 
Alice Anderson course kind of brought the 
light bulb on because before that it was OJT 
so you picked up whatever your supervisor 
told you. The Alice Anderson course tied 
everything, all those little tid bits you learn 
over time together so you understand how 
they go together.  Its two weeks and definitely 
an excellent course. 
Took the Alice 
Anderson class—
made all the 
difference 
 
OJT otherwise 
Relies on outside 
courses and OJT 
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How do you go to that course?  Who offers 
it and how many people get to go to it? 
It’s a contracted course so it’s up to your 
commander or organization if you have money 
for it.  There’s no set pot of money at HAF or 
MAJCOM for it.  ACC manages their money 
better for offering courses.  [Omitted] setup 
some courses for his 3E6s, got all his people 
in the command two positions and then got his 
folks to those and funded them. 
Attending course 
is based on money  
 
Some senior 
NCOs schedule it 
for their command 
Outside courses 
need money 
 
Money spent if 
importance is seen 
What about the 7-level course?  I’ve heard 
it’s gone away.  How useful was that when 
you took it? 
I don’t think it was too useful for 3E6s 
because the first week was an overview of 
IWIMS.  More beneficial to the craftsmen 
because it dove into areas that they needed to 
know how they use and go in and make 
comments.  Pretty much all 3E6s could take 
the first week test and pass with flying colors.  
So as far as the 7-level course going away, for 
the most part, it hasn’t impacted the career 
field.  Saying that, I’ve been trying to work 
and advanced course and [omitted] has kind of 
been working that material.  What we as 3E6s 
want to see is an advanced course for the 
career field.  Hard because if it looks like a 7-
level they say “how does it contribute to the 
war effort?”  Money is a big thing.  Over the 
last few years it’s been even worse.  We’ve 
talked it up but I’ve been kept at bay on that as 
far as getting anything solid.  It kind of just 
gets mentioned later down the road.  We’ve 
been kicking the can for a while. 
7-level course was 
opportunity for 
other shops to 
learn ops 
management 
 
No real benefit for 
3E6 
 
Can’t justify 
course if no clear 
connection to war 
effort 
No 7-level course 
because no 
importance seen 
by leaders 
Do you feel like you’ve been trained to do 
what you’ve been asked to do? 
I think as an airman coming up, whatever 
tasks I was given I was provided guidance on 
what I needed to do it, but once you get past 
those initial things like scheduling and 
programming you pretty much depend on 
what I learned in the Alice Anderson course 
and taught myself.  There’s no real course to 
teach that what you should look at when you 
become a 7-level.  There’s no specific 
No training after 
tech school 
 
Alice Anderson 
class is key 
 
Volunteered for 
current job 
because of 
opportunity  to 
make changes 
No advanced 
training 
 
Reliance on 
outside course 
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guidance.  That’s why when I was a tech 
sergeant leaving [omitted], I said if I were in a 
position to help change it I would, so I 
[omitted] because we do need an advanced 
course.  What we should do, looking at 7-
level.  At every base, everyone’s different, 
different MAJCOMs, some are better than 
others at providing guidance and mentorship. 
So what other training do you think would 
benefit? 
We need to look.  I’ve been working with 
USAFE. Kind of took what Alice Anderson 
was providing as a template and kind of built 
more upon that as far as what we need to have 
in a course.  She provides fundamental work 
control course but also has more advanced 
courses in IWP, RWP and those type areas.  
We need to have a two week course and kind 
of hit all those areas.   
Developing a 
model for a 7-level 
course 
Work is being 
done to get a 7-
level course 
As far as career goes, is there a normal 
career progression or typical path for a 
3E6? 
Yeah, I mean if you look at the tree, pyramid, 
airmen come in, then 3-level, 5-level upgrade 
training.   Then were trying to train the 5-level 
in the advanced course. 7-levels need just a 
few QTPs and core tasks, a few things.  Other 
than that, there’s no advanced course, just wait 
your time.  Pretty limited number of 
superintendents of positions, usually saved for 
infrastructure, horizontal, vertical, or your dirt 
boys.  They have a lot more numbers, so they 
tend to hold those positions.  So as a master 
sergeant, you’ll be the section chief or 
NCOIC, unless you make senior master 
sergeant.  But based on our numbers, most of 
those 12 positions, they’re at AFISR, a couple 
at Kadena and Ramstein, probably one at 
Colorado. The rest are more special position 
duties created for senior master sergeants. 
Only a few senior 
master sergeants 
doing regular 
controller work 
No senior leaders 
in key positions 
So do you feel that there are ample senior 
members in your career field for when all 
levels of career field need guidance?  Are 
there ample levels of mentors at the senior 
level? 
Really lacking 
knowledge at the 
tech and master 
level 
 
Experience void at 
top 
 
No senior leaders 
available to 
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Right now tech to master is really hurting as 
far as manning numbers, so within a squadron, 
there’s not enough of that leadership.  A lot 
are being filled by cross-trained tech sergeants 
like from AGE or other career fields.  And 
now we’re trying to recover since they cut too 
much, trying to rebuild those positions and get 
numbers up.  We do have ACC and material 
command and I’m sure places at other 
MAJCOMS, that have FAMS for 3E6 that I 
do provide info to or ask questions to if I get a 
tasker down that I feel like I shouldn’t answer 
for the whole career field.  I ask them “what’s 
your command’s feedback on this or what’s 
your feel?”  Young airmen get feedback, but 
it’s feedback from the field where there NCO 
is deployed and they’re by themselves, so they 
go on about their business and when the NCO 
comes home, they leave then.  We have master 
sergeants that are water/waste management or 
from other shops because there’s no other tech 
or master.  They’re filling in where there’s a 
void.  We only have 52% masters on the 
books.  They’re not giving 3E6 mentorship.  If 
anything, they’re asking the senior airman for 
a report they need for the boss.  If they’ve had 
the training or not, they can provide something 
to that master.  If the tech and masters aren’t 
there, it’s really missing. 
Many are cross-
trainees 
 
Relies on input 
from MAJCOMs 
 
Too many young 
members are left at 
home without any 
guidance 
 
52% master 
manning 
mentor 
Do you feel members of your career field 
have a fair chance at promotions? 
At senior airman, staff, tech, percentage wise, 
it’s as good as anyone else.  Once you meet 
master, if you’re a 2SOX1, you have better 
numbers to get promoted.  If you’re a really 
super troop, we only get usually two slots for 
senior master sergeant.  Are the other 
candidates better than the master sergeants in 
other career fields?  Perhaps maybe they are, 
but you know based on the numbers that we 
have we don’t have the numbers.  That 
happens in other career fields.  There are more 
seniors and chiefs in 2SOX1 career field than 
in my total career field. There are only 431 
authorized active duty. 
It is fair but 
unfortunate—due 
to size 
Small size 
decreases senior 
leaders available 
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So I guess fair is a relative term because it 
is fair based on percentage.  It’s just 
unfortunate that there’s not that much 
room at the top. 
Yeah, the smaller the career field is, the more 
cut-throat it is to get promoted.  It goes back 
to master sergeants.  If you want to make 
senior—do I want to mentor my airmen or do 
I look out for myself?  You need to do top 
three, you need to deploy, get recognized, to 
get annual, quarterly awards.  Do you spend 
less time with your airmen mentoring them 
because you’re doing those things to make 
senior?  Then yes.   
There is a tradeoff 
between 
mentorship and 
getting promoted 
Mentorship 
strained because of 
few positions to 
compete for 
What are your top issues that hinder your 
day to day job performance? 
Well here at [omitted], I have three big 
projects, but people keep you from getting 
them done.  Seems like we daily get 
redirected. Financial constraints lead to work 
to prioritize TDYs which takes a lot of extra 
stuff. 
  
Well if you look back to the last time you 
were at base level… 
Well it’s been a while, four years.  I think the 
biggest thing I hear from airmen and I 
remember myself. A lot of the folks want to 
deploy because they do so many extraneous 
tasks at home.  Commander’s calls, extra 
duties, guard the gate.  So they tend to want to 
deploy so they can concentrate on their duty, 
do my mission and come back. 
Too many 
extraneous jobs 
make people want 
to deploy 
Extra duties are 
focus at home 
That’s interesting because I was under the 
impression that people weren’t doing their 
duties while deployed, that they were 
getting deployed out of their normal tasks. 
When I went as an airman to Egypt and then 
Kuwait and Al Dahfra, I always did the core 
prime beef duties, work control, command and 
control, the stuff we train for ORIs and ORE.  
Maybe not airfield recovery since we haven’t 
worried about that kind of enemy, which is a 
good thing.  When I went to Kosovo I did 
more facility management, was in charge of 
quarters.  So yeah, I was still doing my job.  
20 years ago, 
prime beef jobs 
were more 
expected than 
recent 
engagements  
 
Some jobs are 
coded for 3E6 but 
could be done by 
any CE 
Deployment jobs 
could be done by 
others 
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The last time with the Corps of Engineers, I 
was supposed to be QAE of projects, but they 
wanted us more to be NCOIC of operations. 
Some did contract prep, but myself was 
mostly first sergeant, facility management, did 
movements, getting my folks from one place 
to another which is kind of what 3E6s do, but 
any 3EX could have done.  A dirt boy could 
do that job.  I wrote 20 pages of continuity of 
tasks that weren’t QAE type stuff.  Just doing 
odd jobs.  My earlier deployments were in line 
with training, but the latest, not so much. 
How much of the time in the career field 
have you used what you learned in tech 
school?  Are there things you learned that 
you don’t use or stuff you do that you were 
never trained for? 
Well tech school was so long ago back in ‘91.  
Some of the things that stick out in my mind, 
there were a lot of dirt boys cross-training to 
3E6.  I don’t remember working in IWIMS.  
We did a little in DSWs, but I just remember a 
lot of organization—who is prime beef? What 
are the different sections?  The different shops 
and more of those kinds of aspects.  I think the 
courses have gotten better, though they still 
need improvement.  The course now, we have 
an actual UCC mock up that we didn’t have in 
‘91.  There wasn’t that kind of training.  I 
think I got most of my training at [omitted].  
Most of UCC stuff was at home station.  
Service call type stuff, computer, stuff like 
that you hit a little at tech school.  Most 
training was OJT.  But it’s definitely changed 
since then. 
Learned most 
everything from 
OJT including 
IWIMS and UCC 
ops 
Heavy reliance on 
OJT 
Do you feel like there are things you were 
trained in or things you are able to do that 
you aren’t getting to do?  Stuff that you 
could offer that people don’t necessarily 
want?  You ever feel like that?  Did you say 
“hey I could do this” but no one really 
listened to your offerings? 
When I was in [omitted] which was my last 
assignment as a traditional 3E6, to the captain, 
I said “hey I can run reports for you guys, for 
Offered new 
abilities to shops  
and they were 
receptive 
 
NCOs from 
different shops 
made make-shift 
7-level course 
NCOs can work 
together to fill 
awareness gaps 
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EPRs or what you’ve done.  We have stuff we 
can do for your shop to show or prioritize your 
requests.”  We even gave classes, built our 
own enhancement classes where part of the 
3E6s showed the craftsmen that you can do 
these yourselves or we could offer this.  I 
think more than anything they were positive to 
what I knew or learned over the years between 
OJT and teaching myself, Alice Anderson.  I 
don’t think they knew that.  Maybe it’s 
because the 7-level school went away and the 
craftsmen weren’t learning that anymore.  It 
was up to us as NCOs to offer that course to 
CE to other craftsmen since we knew they 
were lacking it.  We as senior NCOs realize 
that it’s been dropped.  Are other bases doing 
that?  Perhaps not.  When I showed them what 
I could do they were impressed. 
That leads into the next question.  Do you 
feel the other members of the ops flight or 
the ops chief himself fully understands your 
role and abilities? 
I think it depends on where you go.  My ops 
commander was a captain that came from the 
support group, so she was pretty much new to 
that role, so she asked questions.  She was 
smart, she asked the senior NCOs and I pretty 
much mentored her on what we could do for 
her, what are capabilities were, what we were 
supposed to do.  As far as other senior NCOs, 
the chief, I guess maybe I’ve been lucky to 
have the good ones where they knew what we 
could do or they asked.  I’m sure there’s 
plenty people out there that are working with 
folks that don’t know, especially with the 7-
level course gone.  You have younger NCOs 
becoming seniors and getting in charge and 
don’t have that background and don’t know 
what we can provide them. You might have 
airmen that are NCO s now that don’t 
understand what they can do because they 
haven’t had the Alice Anderson course or that 
tech or master there to mentor them.  
Deployed and undermanned. When there’s no 
one there, the airman doesn’t know what 
Controllers not 
knowing what they 
are doing leads to 
other shops not 
knowing what they 
do 
Unawareness of 
role by controllers 
and others 
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they’re supposed to tell the ops chief that they 
can provide this to you.  There’s no standard 
to provide them. 
Do you feel like a part of the team in the 
ops flight? 
When I was working it?  With the captain or 
with the other senior NCOs I’d say yes, but 
with some senior NCOs and in the shop level, 
you get that feeling that you’re not, more 
looked at as CSS or administrative red tape 
that they have to do.  They don’t understand 
what’s required or why it’s really necessary.  
You’re more of a hindrance than helping, but 
for me, I saw it more at the lower level. 
Seen as more of a 
hindrance than a 
help 
 
Seen as CSS or 
admin—red tape 
Not part of team 
Unawareness of 
role 
What about throughout the rest of the 
squadron in the other flights? 
That’s a good question.  I would say the 
people we work directly with in programs or 
asset management know what we’re doing 
since we interact with them, dropping work 
orders off or updates to real property.  I’m 
interacting and talking with them, we have 
that relationship, but generally your 3E5s, 
civilians, some officers don’t know.  Maybe 
the 3E5s know more if they’re working 
deployments with you.  There’s probably 
some disconnect in the programs flight. 
Not many strong 
relationships 
between flights 
Not many strong 
relationships 
between flights 
Do you feel that you’re respected by the 
other members of the squadron? 
Respected?….never really had any issues as 
far as the squadron.  More just craftsmen 
always thinking that maybe we’re more of a 
hindrance than a help, but that goes to the 
3E6s needing to explain themselves to the 
shop leads to educate them.  It’s all about 
networking and communicating.  If you 
actually bring something to the fight and show 
what you can do for them or how it impacts 
them, you get that respect.  It goes that way 
with any job. 
Maybe respect 
lacks at younger 
levels 
 
You get respect 
when you offer 
them something 
Respect hard to 
earn 
 
Branches from 
unawareness of 
role 
Do you feel like retention is an issue for ops 
managers? 
For sure because I see the numbers the last 
three years.  Retention is a huge thing.  I see 
the surveys.  Maybe it’s AFPC cutting so 
Retention is huge 
issue 
Retention is huge 
issue 
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much.  We had an airman at Ramstein that got 
cross-trained out of 3E6 into 3E6.  It made no 
sense at all because they cut too much. 
Wow! 
It just seems like AFPC is riding the wave or 
the wrong part of the wave.  By the time 
they’re into their cuts, we’re in the down slope 
and they’re cutting too much.  I saw that back 
in 2000 in [omitted].  We had 20 brand new 
airmen but only had slots for a quarter of them 
but the Air Force was plus-ing up.  Of course 
then we start cutting again in 2005-6.  Right 
before I left [omitted], they were trying to fix 
the deep cuts.  Now we’re kind of hurting.  
That’s led to one to one, especially in 7-levels 
at 52% master sergeants, 70% techs.  But the 
one to one deployments they get tasked and 
we still have special duty assignments that 
staff, techs, and masters get pulled out to be 
facility managers at intel squadrons and other 
areas.  We addressed this several years ago but 
maybe to the wrong people.  We said we’d 
keep them filled even though they’re outside 
the prime beef mission.  I heard a story of an 
airman that was a single mom, went to Korea, 
came back and did a year deployment, and in 
six months deployed.  They told her, “by the 
way, when you get back, you’re going back to 
Korea.”  She got out at 15 years because over 
five, years she’d see her kid for only one year. 
Deployments and 
short tours are 
stressing 
undermanned 
areas 
Manning low 
 
Affecting retention 
Do you think that’s the main reason for 
retention issues?  You talk about manning 
getting cut, but the people you do have, can 
you keep them? 
I’d have to look at my numbers and get that 
answer to you later.  We have so many people 
cross-training in and still have problems.  
We’ve got a bunch of new airmen getting 
filled in.  In our year groups from 13-17, 
there’s only two or three people when there’s 
supposed to be 10.  When the older ones 
retire, there won’t be much left at the top. 
You’ll have less and less seasoned guys.  They 
will be more robots than actual people that 
know their jobs. 
Lack of experience 
at the top 
Experience gaps at 
top 
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That makes sense that just because people 
have been around for a long time doesn’t 
mean they’ve matured at that same rate. 
You’re correct.  When I came in, it took 
forever to make staff and tech. Nowadays, it’s 
like boom, boom.  You can be a staff or tech 
in a leadership position, but how much 
experience did you really get because you got 
there so quick?  As far as that stick time or 
time with airmen.  You could be a master with 
only a few years actually in charge of people.  
What kind of leader are you going to be? 
Rank doesn’t 
imply maturity or 
experience 
 
Techs and masters 
promoted very 
early because of 
voids above them 
Experience gaps at 
top 
So another area of my research, what is 
your definition of asset management? 
You want the book answer? 
  
Well how do you see yourself fitting into it? 
I think 3E6s are important because we’re 
working a lot of those metrics as far as 
capturing or managing those between RWP, 
work orders and requests.  Me being here and 
not in a squadron, I’ve found it hard to know 
or learn from anyone the answer I’m really 
looking for.  What are we doing at the 
squadron level to provide that info?  The 
feedback I’m getting is that mainly them 
looking at RWP as far as asset management.  
Do you need to replace stuff or does it need to 
be in the program?  Is asset management a 
program?  I’ve heard it’s a tool. 
Understands they 
contribute though 
not clear on the 
point 
 
I think it’s more of a mindset that can be 
applied to everything from people to 
facilities.  Would you be confident making a 
decision based on IWIMS data alone? 
Alone?  I guess it would matter what base I’m 
at, how much training the airman has had 
because…let’s break it down.  With work 
requests—I take a request and of course some 
come in that have RAC codes.  Now is my 
airman trained enough to know to put those 
into the system?  When it goes to planning and 
goes to the board, I’m the ops chief looking at 
requirements.  Am I getting the whole picture?  
But there are a lot of places in the process that 
can get fouled out. 
Data quality 
depends on the 
experience of the 
airman that 
entered it 
Data quality low 
What problems have we discussed today No intricacies are Training 
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that affect data entry?  It sounds like 
you’ve said mostly that the lack of 
mentorship and training is suspect.  What 
the airman knows determines what they put 
in.  Am I saying that right? 
Well I went to the school house last year.  I 
said “you’re showing them how to enter data 
but you’re not giving them the fine intricacies 
of why you’re entering some things or what 
the correct data is.”  If you have the trainer 
explain that, they’ll know why they’re doing 
stuff.  But if they came out of tech school a 
year ago and their supervisor didn’t teach 
them, then maybe it gets overlooked and the 
problem perpetuates.  Really it’s left to 
whoever is left to do the teaching.  Once we 
hit that 18-19 year mark, we have a big gap in 
experience. 
being passed on at 
school house 
 
Perpetuating 
problem 
insufficient 
Do you see any kind of critical failure 
points in the future?  Anything completely 
broken? 
Well the young techs and masters getting 
promoted now that haven’t had the mentorship 
and training.  It’s hard to quantify without 
surveying or talking to each one of them.  But 
that little bubble I mentioned, the young techs 
and masters that got promoted quick because 
there’s less in front of them.  Do they have the 
knowledge and leadership experience to fill 
those positions?  We complain we’re always 
stuck as a section chief, but if the people were 
promoting don’t know that much, they won’t 
be able to advance themselves.  It’s a good 
question—how do we quantify what’s going 
to happen?  Have we trained them enough 
thorough OJT? 
It’s hard to 
quantify 
 
Lack of core 
knowledge may be 
affecting 
promotions 
 
Why be more than 
a section chief if 
you don’t even 
know your own 
job? 
Unawareness of 
role and lack of 
training affects 
promotions and 
advancement 
You’ve mentioned the advanced course a 
lot.  What is the timeline?  Is there support?  
Any roadblocks? 
The biggest roadblock is funding.  Now with 
TDYs getting cut and money being tighter for 
courses, everyone is fighting to justify a 
course.  It’s hard to tie back to wartime 
mission.  My boss has been in communication 
with [o] about a course.  I’m still hopeful 
Just talk with no 
movement on new 
course 
 
Funding is largest 
roadblock 
 
Funding issue for 
7-level course 
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based on what the chief said, but it’s kind of 
been put off until FY12 to look at again.  Still, 
I don’t feel any ownership.  We have to be 
able to let them know the costs and 
consequences. I have some work to do.  This 
will be the third year in a row that’s just talk, 
talk, talk. 
Do you feel like IWIMS or ACES are 
getting in the way? 
Well it’s nice to have a system to help 
organize what you’re doing.  It goes back to 
asset management about figuring out what we 
should do.  IWP is in the system but only a 
few MAJCOMs use it.  It goes back to the AFI 
in dictating what you have to do. When regs 
changed to pamphlets, 85-2 went from 200 
pages to 10 pages in 32-1001.  It lets you do 
whatever you want if you’re not getting 
measured.  There’s no AFI. 
Reductions in regs 
cause shops to run 
amuck  
 
IWIMS works as a 
standardizing tool 
No standardized 
guidance for data 
entry 
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Appendix C 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject C 
Have you always been a 3E6? 
I have, I came in 1989 as a 555, so I’m 
probably one of the only originals left in the 
Air Force.  Not many of us that came in as a 
production control specialist. 
  
If you just want to give me a rundown of 
your duty history including deployments 
and what you did at each one of those jobs. 
My first base was [omitted].  Total of 10 
PCSs and six deployments.  First 10 bases: 
[omitted] here where I’ll finish up.  
Everywhere but here, I worked in the 
customer service, production control office 
pretty much doing 3E6 stuff.  [omitted] I was 
the operations support flight superintendent, 
which customer service and all the functions 
of production control fell under me.  Pretty 
much every base but here at [omitted] I’ve 
done actually traditional 3E6 work to include 
a lot of those deployments except the last two, 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Traditional role as 
3E6 on all 
deployments 
except most recent   
Deployments are 
shifting traditional 
roles 
What did you doing during those two? 
During the Iraq deployment, I was 
superintendent of ops support section at Ali 
air base in Iraq.  I had vehicle maintenance 
under me, I had the computer support folks, 
the engineering assistants, material control, 
PERSCO, had all the nontraditional functions 
under me and then the craftsmen were on the 
other side of the building.  Then in 
Afghanistan, I was the liaison between the 
[omitted].  I let them know what we could do, 
what we couldn’t, get projects for our guys to 
work on, looked at projects across the AOR. 
  
In your current job, what makes it 
different? 
We don’t do any traditional 3E6 stuff.  We do 
a little bit of tracking projects, but not much.  
We don’t have access to IWIMS.  I do a lot of 
Job not traditional 
and really not 
needed 
Extraneous 
position—
controller not 
needed 
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ACES work with our UTCs, trying to manage 
those and make sure we’re good to go for 
deployments and stuff like that.  We do a little 
facility management stuff, not me so much.  I 
monitor it all but we all manage [omitted].  
Other than that, everything else we do is not 
traditionally what 3E6s do.  We have huge 
radio accounts that we manage, CRO 
accounts, personal wireless communication 
accounts that we manage even though we 
have comm folks, we serve as backups to 
those accounts.  Other than that, not a whole 
lot not a real need for 3E6s [here] in my mind. 
How many are there right now? 
Just me.  We have four authorizations and 
I’ve lost everybody but me. 
  
So you attended tech school back when you 
came in… 
No, I never went to tech school. 
  
Never went to tech school? How’d that 
happen? 
I joined in ‘89 back when they had what they 
called direct duty airmen, so I graduated from 
basic training, went on leave and then they 
assigned me right out to my unit in [omitted].  
So I went straight from basic up there as a 1-
level and they stuck me in my CDC 3-level 
upgrade.  I had to kind of learn it from my 
supervisors. 
Didn’t go to tech 
school 
 
Learned 
everything through 
experience 
Shows that all OJT 
can work 
So what other academic background do 
you have? 
High school, CCAF and a little bit of other 
college. 
CCAF and a little 
college 
 
OK, your CCAF, was that in maintenance 
production management?  
Yeah. 
  
Did it actually help in your 3E6 duties? 
No not really.  Most of it you get from your 
military training, basic and your tech schools.  
Then you just take your core classes like 
speech, English, math, history.  Maybe speech 
and English might have helped a little bit.  
But the other ones really didn’t. 
CCAF degree not 
helpful 
CCAF degree not 
helpful 
Have you had any other training since 
then?  Any advanced course or outside 
Tons of Alice 
Anderson courses 
Reliance on 
outside course 
 
141 
 
classes? 
Yeah I’ve had some advanced courses—work 
order, cost management with Alice Anderson.  
She was one of the original people that 
developed IWIMS.  She consults now and 
goes around to different bases and instructs in 
IWIMS and I’ve taken her RWP class, her 
funds class, her work control class, her 
advanced work order cost management class.  
I’ve gone down to the [omitted] and did a 
pretty in depth project management course 
down there and then we have some upcoming 
ACES training I’ll be involved in. 
 
Also involved in 
other courses 
 
Some work done to 
develop courses 
Who’s offering that? 
Were actually bringing a guy up from Gunter, 
Alabama so he can train a bunch of us, you 
know, since budgets are so tight right now.  
It’s more cost effective to bring him here than 
sending 25 of us down there. 
Set up classes to 
get people trained 
in ACES—even 
other shops 
 
When you say a bunch of us you mean 3E6 
and other shops? 
No I’m talking me and some other folks in the 
unit. 
  
I’m amazed by the whole Alice Anderson 
thing.  You’re not the first to mention it.  
The fact that she is our main source of 
training… 
She definitely has a monopoly that’s for sure.  
She’s been doing it for, the first class of hers I 
went to was back in the ‘90s.  Then I went to 
classes of hers from everywhere I’ve been.  
She came to [omitted] as well as gave a bunch 
of classes.  We paid for her to come and travel 
and put her up and then we paid additional for 
each student in the class.  She’s done fairly 
well off the Air Force for sure. 
Alice Anderson 
used everywhere 
 
When you’re working in traditional 3E6 
roles, did you feel that you were trained to 
do all the stuff you were asked to do? 
Yeah if felt like I was trained to do what I was 
asked to do.  Of course we do a lot of things 
that are outside of our career field since a lot 
of folks don’t know exactly what we’re 
supposed to do I guess.  And that’s been a 
sore spot for a lot of 3E6s over the years.  
Extra jobs a way 
of life 
Unawareness of 
role causes extra 
work 
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“Why do we have to do that, it’s not our job?”  
So you kind of gotta nip it in the bud and you 
know, suck it up and do it, I guess. 
Do you think there’s any training that 
would benefit you all that you’re not 
getting?  Something that would help? 
Yes, as a matter of fact, with the new material 
control portion that was added to our CEFTP 
for the career field.  It would have been nice if 
some sort of training would have been 
established before they dropped that bomb on 
us.  What happened is that they updated the 
CFETP but didn’t offer any type of training to 
say “ok were going to put these 15 new tasks 
in your rating plan but here’s a class you can 
send your folks to in order to get them signed 
off.”  For instance, here at [omitted], if I have 
a person that comes in that doesn’t have all 
those tasks sign off, I have to find some place 
to send that person because one, we don’t 
have access to IWMS, and two, I could send 
her to the base, but the base material control 
section is contracted out and it’s not in their 
contract to train a military person on material 
control.  The 3E6s at main base that I often 
deal with a lot and sometimes I help them out 
with their training, they’re still not trained on 
all that stuff.  It’s been close to a year since 
that stuff has come out and they still have to 
get their folks to a training course to get them 
signed off.  The last girl [omitted] I had 
working here, she actually PCS’ed without 
having any of it signed off, had to get a 
special letter that the commander signed 
saying we didn’t have the capability to do it to 
get trained in those items.  That would have 
been good if they had said, “Here are 15 new 
items for your plan.  Here’s a course where 
you can send your folks and it’ll be funded by 
your command or Air Force, not your unit.  
It’s not their fault that new tasks got added.”  
But they didn’t, so that was kind of 
disappointing.  A lot of times you don’t have 
the time to do all that research and find out.  I 
called bases in Arizona and Georgia to see if 
Material control 
course should have 
been figured out 
before the CFETP 
was changed 
 
Training is 
sometimes not 
being 
accomplished 
Training not 
available for new 
tasks 
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they had some folks down there to help train 
these guys on material control.  They didn’t 
have time to do it. 
Do you see that there are enough senior 
leaders in your career filed to account for 
all the younger troops, to mentor them? 
No, what I think is if you’re lucky, you might 
come across a 3E6 that’s been a 555 for a 
while and really, really knows the career field.  
We’re critical on master sergeants and we 
only have 12 or 13 seniors.  We’re only about 
400 strong anyway.  The senior master 
sergeants, half of those are working outside 
the career field in different odd jobs.  I just 
think that with master sergeants at 52%, not 
every base has a senior NCO that their airmen 
can look up to or ask for help.  There’s just 
not enough of us to go around.  Nothing 
against the officers, but they’re not trained in 
the production control side of things.  They’ve 
probably been taught a little about it but 
nothing that will help as we go about in our 
training. 
No senior leaders 
 
Most bases don’t 
have a senior NCO 
in their sections 
No senior leaders 
available at base 
level 
I know, I was the ops support chief back at 
Barksdale and yeah, I was learning from 
them.  I didn’t know much.  There was so 
much in it that I learned something new 
every day.  What do you think about the 
expertise and experience base that exists in 
the techs and masters? 
I think it’s a little on the, it could be better.  
There’re a lot of techs and masters that 
haven’t spent a lot of time in the career field.  
You can make rank if you study the books.  
You don’t necessarily have to work in the job, 
all though it does help.  Me, I’ve always 
worked in this career filed since the day I 
came in.  I was the heavy repair controller.  
I’ve known that since day one.  A lot of guys 
are corsstrainees or brand new 3E6s.  They 
don’t really know the career field.  They know 
IWIMS but the deep down bones, I don’t 
think they know.  That’s kind of bothersome.  
For instance, there’s a tech sergeant select 
coming here from [omitted].  I asked what her 
The expertise and 
experience not 
necessarily 
congruent with the 
rank 
 
Many cross-
trainees 
 
Some stay in jobs 
outside of primary 
role for a long 
time 
Experience gaps at 
top 
 
Assignments 
outside of primary 
role prevalent 
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experience was.  She said, “From 2002 to 
2008 I was in a medical logistics office at 
[omitted] med center.  I didn’t have IWMMS 
access, never fired an M16, never had radio 
training, never went to Silver Flag.”  Now 
she’s at [omitted] doing a facility 
management job from 2008 to now.  Still 
hasn’t, she wears civilian clothes, hasn’t fired 
a weapon, no 3E6 training.  Now they want to 
send her here without any training, when she 
really needs to go to a main base so she can 
get all that training.  Never been deployed 
never had contingency training whatsoever.  
Folks like that know the books but don’t 
know the job. 
She was a 3E6 the whole time or cross-
trained? 
Yep, 3E6 the whole time.  Went to tech 
school, got sent to [omitted] and then facility 
management.  There’s another question you’ll 
ask later, but my answer is that there are a lot 
of 3E6s that work outside of the career filed 
on special duty.  I had a girl that worked for 
me at [omitted] that’s now at Fort Meade, 
Maryland that works as a facility manager.  
Not in a CE unit, but working for the army.  
Really anyone can do a facility management 
job, doesn’t have to be a 3E6.  We have one in 
Belgium, a couple others spread out, one in 
Maui.  All these folks could be brought in to 
units that are really stressed right now.  That’s 
been a major concern of the career field.  It’s 
been brought up a few times, reeling these 
guys back into the career field.  Got to beef up 
the units that have two or three with six or 
seven authorizations. 
Controllers used in 
facility manager 
jobs even though it 
can be done by 
anyone 
 
Should pull in 
extra slots and 
return them to 
base 
Positions outside 
of primary job 
Do you feel people in your career field have 
a fair chance at promotions? 
I do.  As long as they study.  Of course our 
career field is the smallest in CE, so 
historically the career field is the toughest to 
get promoted in with EOD, fire, readiness.  
Still over the years, if you look at promotion 
rates, we get what we deserve.  At one point 
we had the highest cutoff in the Air Force 
Promotions are 
fair 
 
Based on studying 
textbooks 
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from senior airman to staff sergeant.  Since 
2003, I’d say, the cutoffs have dropped below 
300 which was never the case when I was 
coming up in the ranks.  It’s getting better I 
think.  Cutoffs are dropping.  If they know the 
job or not, who knows yet.  They know the 
books, but don’t know the job. 
What do you think are the biggest 
hindrances for doing your job? 
[omitted] I guess in the squadron, I’d say all 
the non related 3E6 stuff that we do since 
we’re up in the head shed.  We get tasked 
with the odds and ends.  It can be anything to 
cleaning the building to getting put on base 
cleanup teams, all the additional duty stuff 
usually comes down to the ops center because 
we’re right there.  The commander, first 
sergeant can point at us and say “the 3E6s can 
do it.”  I think that’s the biggest thing over the 
years.  We’re just so close that we get stuck 
with the extra duties.  Base details, urinalysis, 
that kind of stuff. 
Extra duties 
biggest problem 
Extra duties  
Any other big issues? 
I don’t think I’ve had a challenge big enough 
that we couldn’t perform our duties.  I could 
say prime beef, but that’s the main reason 
why we’re here.  So it’s not really a 
hindrance.  Maybe training would be an issue. 
Tech school to me, our tech school should be 
completely rebuilt from the ground up.  It’s 
not doing anything for the airmen going to 
base. 
Thinks tech school 
needs a complete 
overhaul 
Training at tech 
school subpar 
You want to expand on that? 
When I was at [omitted], I had 21 3E6s 
working for me.  We were the largest 3E6 unit 
in the AF, maybe [omitted] rivaled us some.  
Whenever I get new airmen in, you get a 
report card from their tech school that follows 
them.  “He was great, here are his scores.”  
You then go online to fill out a critique and 
what you think about the airman.  How 
they’re doing in your unit after graduating 
tech school.  So I’d sit them down one on one 
and ask “how’s tech school?  Looks like you 
did pretty well in all your areas.”  They’d say 
Airmen not 
impressed with 
quality of tech 
school 
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“the teachers would fall asleep, people texted 
in class, we didn’t learn a whole lot.  I’ve 
learned more here being in your section for 
the last month than I did in all of tech school.”  
I don’t think they really teach the bones in 
tech school.  They teach them how to put in a 
job order and that’s it.  They teach maybe 
how to do a minor report in IWIMS.  Teach 
them some radio discipline and DCC/UCC 
stuff but there is so much more that they need 
to know and learn.  To make them mission 
ready when they come in, to be able to go 
down range, I don’t think it’s happening.  At 
least not back a few years ago when I left 
[omitted]. 
Do you have any issues with ACES or 
IWIMS themselves? 
IWIMS is an old system.  It’s tough to 
navigate around sometimes.  For me I haven’t 
used it in two years.  I have it loaded to look 
at things but don’t have rights to actually go 
in and train anyone.  ACES I use quite a bit.  I 
think it’s a pretty good system.  It’s web 
based so it kind of kicks you out a lot when 
you’re working if a lot of people are working 
at that time of day.  As long as they keep 
ACES updated with the info it needs to have, 
it’s a super system.  I think the upgrades that 
are coming to replace IWIMS sounds like it’s 
going to be a good system.  Then again we 
tried that with ACES-OPS and it kind of 
floundered, so hopefully they get it right this 
time.  But yeah I’ve worked with both 
systems, WIMS then IWIMS, for 22 years. 
No real issues with 
ACES or IWIMS 
other than being 
slow 
IWIMS and ACES 
need updating 
So I guess it works a little bit. 
Yeah, well it’s grown and developed over the 
years.  Now it’s come time to do a windows 
based program where it’ll drop down the 
different stuff you load into IWIMS.  It would 
have been nice to have that.  Would have been 
quicker to help customers.  But nowadays 
these techie guys can throw in a job order in 
30 seconds and move on to the next one. 
Needs windows 
based program 
 
Do you feel like you’ve been used in your 
max capacity?  If you had something to 
Good bosses 
allowed him to 
Awareness of boss 
ket to success 
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offer, they’d listen and take you up on it? 
Yeah I guess when I was in main base my 
first 20 years, I think I was used to the 
capacity I was trained.  I offered stuff up and 
people seemed to be receptive to whatever I 
was saying or giving them.  I think I was used 
based on the training and knowledge I had.  
Fortunately, I had bosses that took me in and 
trained me, took care of me.  That doesn’t 
happen a lot anymore.  The past four years I 
haven’t been used at my capacity because we 
don’t do the traditional stuff.  We don’t have 
the need. 
work at full 
capacity 
If you could put a number to it, back at 
base level, what percentage were you doing 
duties you were trained to do as opposed to 
extra duties? 
When I was younger, probably 90% of the 
time.  Tech and master, maybe 75%.  In 
[omitted], I was the real property liaison job, 
so I traveled a lot around [omitted]. 
  
This is an extra question—whenever you’re 
at a location like that and you’re not doing 
a typical 3E6 job, do you see that someone 
else is though?  Contracted, host nation, 
anyone keeping up with job order data, 
facility maintenance and condition?  Is the 
job being done?  Another group doing your 
normal job? 
When I was at [omitted], I was part of the 
transition team and had to train the civilian 
contractors to do our job.  In 45 days of 
transition, we just monitored the last 15 to see 
them do our jobs.  It was odd to watch how 
they did things differently.  When I was in 
[omitted], I was a liaison between [omitted]. 
When there was any construction on the 
collocated base, I would go down and 
capitalize those in order to get them put on the 
real property records.  On those little bases, 
they didn’t have 3E6s, the Air Force guys just 
worked as QAs watching the [omitted], 
managing facilities.  They did a great job 
monitoring those things, but there was nobody 
assigned to the bases that really owned the 
At some places, 
the ops 
management job 
isn’t necessarily 
done 
Ops management 
not necessarily 
done in some 
places 
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process.  There weren’t many 3E6s out there 
other than on bases. 
Ok, so in an ops flight do you think other 
members and to go as far as the actual ops 
chief, do they understand your roles and 
abilities? 
I think yes if you have a seasoned ops chief.  
A lot of times you get a guy that come from 
either readiness or engineering flight.  They 
don’t really get 3E6s. 
Ops chiefs not 
well versed on 
3E6 capabilities 
Low education for 
leaders 
What about the other guys in ops flight? 
Well the other guys, yeah I think they have a 
pretty good knowledge of what we do and 
what were there for because a lot of the older 
guys have seen us when we used to work in 
the shops themselves.  We were part of the 
shops instead of being in the ops flight office.  
We were part of a zone or the HVAC shop.  
We weren’t set apart as a group of 3E6s. 
Awareness good if 
shops leads are 
older 
Awareness of role 
depends on 
experience of shop 
leads 
I didn’t even realize that is how it was. 
Yeah when I came in I was in heavy repair.  I 
worked with heavy repair chief and the 
captain in charge.  Sometimes I’d work in 
snow removal in the missile field with those 
guys, putting their labor in.  Then I moved to 
zones and maintenance engineering.  Since 
some of the guys at a base like that, who 
started the zone concept back in ‘89, they 
stayed in the zone the whole time.  They were 
a part of the group.  All crafts and 3E6s 
managing one sector.  You also knew your 
customers and the buildings. 
Working in zones 
improved 
awareness 
Awareness of role 
increased through 
zone exposure 
I’d heard of zones before but didn’t realize 
that’s how they worked.  So you felt like 
part of the team in the ops flight? 
Yeah I felt like we were.  More so at some 
bases than others, just the mentality they had 
there before I got there.  When I was 
managing customer service, I tried to get us 
engaged in the unit.  I moved guys around to 
the shops so they got HVAC calls, plumbing 
calls.  Then when they came back to customer 
service, they asked better questions.  They 
knew a little more.  I moved them around.  I 
had the ability to do that at [omitted] because 
Exposure to other 
shops allows 
controllers to do a 
better job 
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I had so many 3E6s.  They were crowded in 
customer service, so I stuck them in shops.  I 
tell you what, job orders got put in a lot more 
clear with concise descriptions.  Their 
questions to the customer were better.  “What 
kind of door closure? What type of lock?  
How many urinals and which one is running?”  
They were asking extra questions and it really 
helped the craftsmen.  They could look at the 
order and be able to understand right where 
the problem was, especially if it was an 
emergency. 
How was your relationship with other 
flights in the squadron? 
I think we had a pretty good relationship.  We 
had an asset management flight which was 
new to us in [omitted].  I stuck a few 3E6s in 
there a while so they could learn it and bring 
it back to us.  Were they needed? No.  Could 
they benefit there?  Maybe.  We’re a pretty 
diverse group of individuals.    
Some controllers 
worked in asset 
management flight 
but not really 
needed 
 
Overall, your take on this is more 
optimistic than I’ve heard previously.  It’s 
good to see that there are places where 
things are working more like they’re 
designed. 
I know a lot of 3E6s.  I get a lot of emails 
from those that used to work for me.  Some 
Silver Flag guys, Ellsworth, Alaska, Hickam, 
Fort Meade.  They’re all over and they 
constantly email me with questions and issues 
with customer service.  I try to help them as 
much as I can based on past experiences.  
What I do now in my position, it’s nice that 
they keep me updated on what’s going on.  At 
times there are bases that had four 
authorizations that didn’t have any 3E6s.  If 
you look at the number of people we have in 
the career field, we have more authorizations 
than airmen to fill them.  Something should 
change. 
Mentorship is 
needed 
Experience gaps 
Do you feel like your career field is 
respected then in the squadron? 
When I was in the squadron, yeah, but I think 
it was because we earned it.  I would put in 
Earned respect 
with performance 
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my guys for awards.  There were section that 
when it came for awards or BTZs, they were 
really hesitant to putting anybody in if they 
knew my section was in it.  For the most part 
of my career, the 3E6 section was respected. 
As much as you’re painting a better picture 
than I’ve seen, you’re making a point that 
they’ve made.  It seems that a lot of the 
success you’ve witnessed is because you’re 
a good master sergeant.  In a lot of shops 
you just don’t have a strong master 
sergeant to lead them. 
Yeah there’s not.  I’m not saying the ones out 
there aren’t any good.  I’ve had guys that 
doubt themselves for making rank and I just 
encourage them and put them on the right 
path to get rank on their first tries.  I just try to 
teach them how I was taught so that 
ultimately it will make the career field better. 
Not many master 
sergeants 
No senior leaders 
So your happiness in your career field, did 
that make an impact on you staying for as 
long as you did? 
I like interaction with people and all the 
airmen and training.  Deploying with these 
guys, you really get to know them.  You meet 
a lot of great people.  I’ve been fortunate 
enough to have great supervisors and leaders 
working above me.  It just kept pushing me 
on. When I’m done, I’ll have 24 years.  That 
was always my goal. 
  
Do you feel that retention is a problem 
though? 
Obviously, the Air Force does since they’re 
giving the 6% bonus for zone A.  I don’t think 
there’s a huge retention problem.  Not as long 
as there’s a bonus.  If there wasn’t a bonus, 
there may be a lot that cross-train or get out. 
The trouble makers that everyone has.   
Bonus makes 
retention better 
Retention not a 
problem as long as 
there’s a bonus 
Do deployments have anything to do with 
it?  What impact has that had? 
At one point, well we still get hammered 
pretty hard for deployments.  I think it’s 
because we go so much.  As example, I had a 
buddy master sergeant.  We came in at the 
same time.  He did 11 years out of the career 
Deployment 
tempo still a 
problem 
 
Perceived as not 
equal among 
available 
No equity among 
deployments 
 
Tempo high 
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field and came back, was at [omitted] and just 
went on terminal leave.  He deployed to 
Afghanistan at the same time I did.  I just got 
back in April.  He got back and in august they 
tried to tag him to go to Afghanistan again.  
Really?  We have 60 other master sergeants in 
the career field and you’re going to tag 
someone that got back six months ago?  He 
was gone for seven, home for six and you’re 
going to send him for seven?  He dropped his 
paperwork.  He’s one of the guys that know 
the career field, a 555 like me.  The Air Force 
lost a good one there.  Don’t know if they 
don’t know how to spread the wealth or just 
too lazy to look.  It doesn’t make any since to 
me.  When I retire, they’re going to have to 
fill this slot.  It was advertised online.  It 
retired three master sergeants before it got to 
me.  Three master sergeants were non-voled 
here and dropped paperwork.  I was looking 
to get back to [omitted] since my wife was 
here and they couldn’t believe I wanted the 
job.  I think it goes back to the girl coming 
here with no experience.  They don’t 
scrutinize at all.  That’s what I think bothers 
people and is the ultimate reason to get out. 
personnel 
 
Current job 
undesirable 
I have a few questions about asset 
management.  In your opinion what do you 
know of asset management and how do 
3E6s play a role in it? 
In [omitted], they just stood up that flight.  Is 
that what you’re talking about? 
  
Well if that’s what it means to you.  From 
the officer academic side, it’s huge, so I 
want to know what you think or have 
heard about it. 
When they started that flight, I was getting 
ready to PCS.  We sent some guys there to 
work with them since I didn’t know what it 
was.  I haven’t had a whole lot of interaction 
with asset management.  Is housing under 
them?  Real property? 
Thinks asset 
management is 
just a flight 
Poor idea of asset 
management and 
controller’s role 
Yeah both, and environmental. 
I worked a little with real property.  Making a 
flight maybe was good.  Is it the best thing, I 
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don’t know. 
Do you feel that you fit in with it? 
Well no, we never really did stuff with 
environmental.  3E6s didn’t do stuff with 
housing.  I guess we coordinated 332s with 
environmental. 
Sees no real 
connection 
 
If you had to make a decision based totally 
on the data in IWIMS, how confident 
would you be? 
I’d probably be 85% confident based on my 
experience.  It was one of my pet peeves was 
that we didn’t procrastinate on updating 
IWIMS.  We didn’t go half way when we put 
a DSW in the system.  On 332s, we filled out 
every field in IWIMS and ultimately it helps 
everybody.  We kept it as updated as possible.  
If you asked the status and they said it was 
awaiting material, and then the shop said they 
had already done it, sometimes you see the lag 
with shops entering data after the fact.  All 
around its good data if you have a customer 
service department that makes it a priority and 
shops too.  It’s only as good at the people 
using it. 
Data is unreliable 
unless there is a 
strong leader 
enforcing entry 
standards 
No data 
standardization 
I’ll say it again.  You seem more optimistic 
outlook but that seems its coming from the 
effort you put in it. 
Yeah when I’d get to a base, I’d immediately 
go into IWIMS and look at a few obscure 
places to see if they were keeping stuff 
updated.  If I went to those places and they 
didn’t have data, I knew that we were going to 
have a problem.  I’d sit them down and say “I 
don’t know what you did before hand, but this 
is how we’re going to do it now.”  They let a 
bunch of guys go at 15 years when they 
almost did away with the career field.  Root 
cause of problem is the expertise that left the 
Air Force.  Second problem is the tech school 
and third is people that don’t care enough to 
put data in right. 
Very proactive on 
up keeping data 
Data quality 
directly linked to 
availability of 
senior experience 
leader 
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Appendix D 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject D 
Have you always been a 3E6 and if not, what 
were you prior? 
Before I was a 3E6 I was a 3D, information 
management. 
Cross-trained a year 
ago 
 
What exactly is that? 
I worked for generals and commanders in the 
command section, orderly duties.  That was my 
whole career for 13 years. 
Worked for 
commanders 
 
How long ago was it that you cross-trained? 
I put my package in two years ago and then went to 
cross-training school back in June/ July.  Graduated 
July 20th of last year. 
  
Ok, cross-training school, that’s at Sheppard? 
Yes sir. 
  
Is it a different school than the tech school that 
people straight from basic go to? 
Yes sir. 
  
So it’s an abridged version since they assume 
you already know about the military? 
Actually we did have, we were mixed in with the 
basic trainees.  We had priors and non-priors. 
Attended same 
school as newbies 
 
As far as your duty history, where else have you 
been based and what did you do? 
I was stationed at [omitted] up to ‘98.  Then I 
moved to [omitted].  I worked as an info manager 
for the wing commander.  Then I moved in ‘06 to 
[omitted] and then moved with the wing 
commander at the time.  Usually when you work 
for a commander, if they prefer, they take their 
admin troop with them.  So they pulled me with 
them.  I worked as [omitted] A3O and then A3/5 
after he retired. 
  
What drove that change to cross-train? 
I was on the forced cross-training list. 
Forced out of 
previous career 
field 
 
Hmm it’s funny because when I was at 
Barksdale, we pushed a girl out of 3E6.  In just a 
few years, it swung the other way.  So then tech 
school was a year ago? 
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Yes sir, last July. 
What other academic background do you have?  
Any other training or degrees? 
I graduated with an associate’s in legal assistance, a 
bachelor’s degree in organizational management 
with a minor in legal and I’m working on my 
master’s degree in public health. 
Plenty of academic 
background 
 
Have you done your CCAF? 
I have two, one in information management which 
is computer background and I’m also about to 
graduate with the CCAF for ops management. 
  
Have you gotten any specific 3E6 training since 
tech school?  Maybe not because it’s only been a 
year. 
I’m already a 5-level and already finished all tests 
for my 7-level, so I’ve completed all my hard core 
tasks.  I’ve been trained a little more than the other 
7-levels here because I had the chance when we 
merged into material control, I actually was one of 
the first to go over there.  For six months I was 
trained up on contracting duties and how to do QAE 
duties. 
Within a year, 
almost a 7-level 
Rank and position 
with no 3E6 
experience 
You’re talking OJT stuff? 
Yes sir. 
OJT for all training Reliance on OJT 
So far, do you feel that you’ve been adequately 
trained for the duties you’re being asked to do? 
Yes sir. 
  
Is there anything you wish you had more 
training in?  Any gaps? 
The one I’m kind of missing is because I don’t 
understand it, the IWP and also the WRRB and then 
also what the planners do.  We were pulling guys 
from the shop to be planners and that’s one area of 
training that I’d like to have since you’re putting 
money and costs to the 5 digits.  I’d like to touch on 
that. 
Wishes there was 
more WRRB and 
IWP planning 
Needs more training 
What are your biggest problems day to day?  
Your biggest hindrances? 
I’m a new supervisor, I’ve never supervised.  So 
that’s my biggest hurdle right now.  I’m supervising 
four guys and then there are seven of us and I’m the 
NCOIC of the shop.  So on top of supervision I’m 
also the office manager.  That’s the biggest hurdle. 
Brand new 
supervisor 
 
Are you NCOIC of just customer service or 
whole ops support element? 
Has a full shop  
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Just ops management career field, a total of seven 
of us. 
So yall have seven 3E6s there? 
Yeah. 
  
Wow that must be nice. 
Yeah were all sitting on top of each other, though. 
  
Do you ever send anybody out into the shops? 
Not yet. When the new tech sergeant comes in later 
this month, once she gets here, once everyone gets 
settled in, we’re going to start sending people out to 
the shops.  We do work hand in hand with the 
shops. 
Will start to move 
people into shops 
once they get 
trained up 
Looking for 
chances to increase 
exposure 
Cool I spoke with someone that used his extra 
troops in the shops.  It really helped them with 
better work orders.  Anything else? 
No sir. 
  
Everything else is fine?? So, does the job you’re 
in now, is it what you were told you would do in 
tech school? 
We do a little but more because of where our office 
is.  We get tagged for a lot of the stuff that’s our 
higher ups kind of need.  We end up doing 
SharePoint and other fun stuff.  They can’t really 
get the guys in the shop to do it so they come to us.  
We have most of the additional duties. 
Once again extra 
duties 
 
They can’t get guys 
in shops to do it 
Extra duties from 
other shops not 
cooperating 
Would you like to expand?  What other duties? 
Well one of my troops owns the SharePoint 
website.  He has to update it when the shops won’t.  
We in process all the guys into ACES and out 
process them.  We’ve taken over some of the labor 
and some of the weekly schedule because some of 
the guys don’t know how to input in correctly. 
  
So it’s not extra from squadron but guys in 
shops not knowing stuff that you now pick up? 
Yes sir. 
Doing others’ jobs Extra duties 
Do you have any specific issues with ACES or 
IWIMS? 
I don’t like ACES.  It decides when it wants to 
work and when it doesn’t.  It locks up.  If you go 
into it too quickly and click on something, it just 
locks up. 
ACES locks up ACES needs 
updates 
Do you feel there anything you know how do 
that you’re not being asked to?  Anything your 
shop could offer the squadron that you’re not? 
One thing when I went to Silver Flag and talked 
Wants more 
exposure to what 
shops do 
Needs experience in 
other shops 
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with other 3E6s, one thing we’re missing is going 
out into the shops and learning.  Especially us 
females when we come into this career field.  Like 
who does hot water?  I didn’t realize HVAC did 
that until I talked to them.  Things like that, getting 
hands on experience with what they really do. 
People at Silver Flag said they had the 
opportunity to do that? 
Yeah, a lot have. 
  
What’s driving that missed opportunity? 
I think it’ll take a little bit before we get the airmen 
up to 5-level.  Once we get them trained, we’ll 
move in that direction. 
Manning and 
inexperience is 
limiting factor 
Manning is 
preventing shop 
exchange 
What percentage do you think you spend doing 
your core job as opposed to extra duties? 
About 95%. 
  
Is that case with your airmen as well? 
No probably more like 75%. 
  
So you have a full shop them.  What about 
deployments?  Have you been deployed as a 
3E6? 
No sir and that’s one of the drawbacks here.  As 
soon as I got here, one staff sergeant was deployed 
and another about to.  When my bucket came 
around again, we didn’t get taskings.  They went to 
the utility shop.  He ended up taking a 3E6 job.  I’m 
just, that’s frustrating because I came in to this 
career field and one of the biggest draws was to 
deploy and now I’m not getting the opportunity. 
Upset about no 
deployments 
Entered career field 
based on promises 
of deploying 
Little deployments 
as opposed to “too 
high tempo” 
 
Shows disparity in 
deployments 
Wow this is why I need a wide range of people 
because that’s opposite of what I’ve heard. 
Yeah I’ve been here a year and three months and no 
taskings. 
  
Do you have any senior leaders or guidance in 
your career field that you can turn to? 
Not really, since I’ve been here, we’ve had three 
master sergeants in the ops support superintendent 
position so far and they keep changing out.  We’ll 
see what happens, when the new tech sergeant gets 
here, maybe I’ll move into that position. 
No senior leaders 
 
Other career fields 
used as element 
chiefs 
No senior leaders 
 
Led by non 
controllers 
What AFSCs were they? 
A plumber, utilities and electric 
  
Do you feel that the other people in the shops 
understand what you do? 
They do, they come and ask us and were more than 
Orderly duties base 
on prior experience  
 
Extra duties 
 
Good relationships 
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willing to help them.  Since I’ve been here, all the 
shop leads have come over.  I think I’ve had a 
personal touch with them.  They pulled me for 
orderly room duties as well.  I’m filling that 
position as well as supervisor.  I think that has 
opened the door for the shops.  When I first got 
here, I don’t think they had that work environment 
where they worked with the shops that close.  Now 
they have that. 
Exposure has made 
way for better 
relationship with 
shops 
key to getting stuff 
done 
Do you think the ops chief knows what you do? 
Yes, I think he does.   
  
Does he ask interesting 3E6 questions or do you 
just feed him stuff he’s already asking for?  If 
that makes sense… 
I know what you’re asking. Yeah he does.  He 
comes in here, he’s already asked to change 
scheduler meeting slides to get changed.  We’re 
revamping the facility manager program since our 
commander and other squadrons have been asking 
about it. 
Proactive ops chief 
seems more 
knowledgeable of 
the 3E6 shop 
Good boss helps 
significantly 
Do you feel like you’re part of the team? 
Yes sir. 
  
Between yall and the shops, any “us versus 
them” in meetings? 
No, like I said, when I first got here and they found 
I did orderly room duties, they pulled me for that 
job.  Ever since then, I think the guys have started 
to meet all the guys here and we know all the shops 
now since they all come in if not for 3E6 duties, 
they come in for orderly room stuff.  So we’ve built 
a pretty good relationship with them. 
Good relationships 
and exposure helps 
shop run better 
Good relationships 
key 
What about with the rest of the squadron?  Do 
the other flights understand what you do? 
I don’t think so, not the fire department or EOD. 
Other flights 
unaware 
Unawareness of 
role 
What about programs? 
Yes, we work closely with programs. 
  
And that relationship is good? 
Yes sir. 
  
So overall, you feel respected by the rest of the 
squadron? 
Yes sir. 
  
What about quarterly awards and yearly 
awards?  Do you have a fair shot? 
Yeah we do.  One of our staff sergeants actually 
made it to the group for quarterly awards.  We had 
Can compete for 
awards 
Competitive 
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an airman with a BTZ and were putting in another.  
We’ve had an opportunity to compete. 
What about promotions being fair? 
Not sure yet, I haven’t tested in our career field.  
I’m still exempt.  I only test PEG this coming year. 
  
Do you feel that there are any retention issues in 
your career field now? 
Talking to new airmen and even me as a cross-
trainee, when the job is advertised as a critical 
career field and then we come here and there’s no 
deployments, and it’s not how it’s written in the 
AFSC guide, it kind of blows you away.  My 
airmen are already thinking about cross-training.  
One’s thinking of OTS.  It’s obviously too late for 
me to cross-train since I only have a couple more 
years before retirement. 
Advertised as 
something it’s not 
 
Leads to desire to 
cross-train 
Unawareness of Air 
Force of what job 
entails 
 
No senior leaders 
available to educate 
When you say they’re not written correctly in 
the guide, what do you mean? 
The job sounds more like you’re not just sitting 
behind a desk.  It sounds like you’re a part of the 
shops or outside working and really getting 
involved.  As opposed to sitting behind a computer, 
which this job should be listed as an administrative 
job.  I understand that we hold the shops together 
and make sure work gets done.  But at the same 
time they should probably advertise it a little 
different. 
  
So you’re planning on staying in for your full 
20? 
Yeah hoping to retire as a senior or chief. 
  
And how many years is that? 
About five. 
  
Does your current career field have any bearing 
on that decision? 
No not really.  I think this career field might be 
good for me as soon as I make master.  What might 
hurt me is the whole person concept since I don’t 
have a deployment.  I hope deployments start 
picking up for us.  I’ve actually put in for a 365. 
No real attachment 
to career field 
 
Have you had anyone in the shop deploy over the 
last year? 
Just one staff sergeant but he was our last one. 
  
So wrapping up with asset management 
questions, what does asset management mean to 
you when you hear that term? 
Perception revolves 
around money 
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Everything on the base money wise that we might 
work on.  I also think that goes into resources.  
Right now is a bad time for it.  To me its money 
and materials. 
So how do you see 3E6s fitting into that? 
I’d say on this base right now, I don’t see it.  The 
only thing that we may do is how we get into 
IWIMS to put in work orders, maybe the Top 20.  I 
really don’t see us touching more than that. 
Doesn’t see that 
3E6 fits into asset 
management 
Sees no role in asset 
management 
If you were a decision maker and were looking 
at IWIMS data alone, how confident would you 
be using that data alone? 
I wouldn’t.  IWIMS is great on some terms but not 
always.  Sometimes the data can be wrong if it’s 
pulling the rejects or it’s not talking to the history, 
just the active and it doesn’t compare.  When 
you’re pulling data, you have to actually pull the 
history. 
IWIMS loses data 
 
Hard to use 
correctly 
IWIMS needs 
updates 
So it can be done, so the issue is how it’s being 
used or the data itself? 
If someone else were to walk in and want it all in 
one, I’d rather pull it all at once than doing it two 
different times.  As far as how they use it, they get 
numbers and see how the shops are doing. 
IWIMS data may 
be pulled out 
incorrectly 
Needs more training 
in IWIMS 
Lastly, do you see any big problems on the 
horizon?  Anything for your career field that 
might be a problem? 
Nope. 
  
 
  
 
160 
 
Appendix E 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject E 
Have you always been a 3E6? 
Yes sir, since 1991. 
  
Please go through your duty history—
where you’ve been and what jobs you did 
while there. 
I started off at [omitted] working the service 
call desk as an airman basic.  While I was 
there, we went from doing it in paper and 
BEAMS to implementation of the WIMS 
system and also the zonal concept initiative.  
So I went from service call desk to a zonal 
customer service section.  Stayed there for 
two years, then went to [omitted], where I was 
also assigned to a zone for the first year and a 
half.  After that was moved over to the self 
help store.  I processed all the work orders 
and did some planning and also took care of 
replenishing the store shelves while I was 
there.  Then in 1996, I went to [omitted].  I 
was in customer service doing scheduling as 
well as answering phones and processing 
work orders.  Then in 1999, I was picked up 
as [omitted].  From there, I went back to 
[omitted] on a special duty assignment as the 
facility manger for [omitted] and I spent a 
year and half doing that job.  When I made 
master, I was taken above the line and put in 
[omitted] on the A7 staff.  I did that for five 
years and then during my last year, I went 
down to [omitted] to help them transition 
[omitted].  After that last year, I’m now at 
[omitted] working in ops support.   
Mostly traditional 
roles 
 
One tour as facility 
manager 
One job outside of 
primary role 
Did you go to tech school? 
Yes I did.  When I was there, they taught us 
how to do everything three ways—on paper, 
in BEAMS, and then WIMS. 
  
What other academic background do you 
have? 
My concentration on my bachelor’s is in 
Other secondary 
education 
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information systems.   
What about your CCAF?  
I have three.  I have one in military instruction 
and also production management. 
  
That production management course, was 
it any help? 
It’s more just a qualification based on your 
training experience. 
CCAF no help CCAF no help 
What other training either inside the Air 
Force or not have you got? 
I’ve gone through PMP courses, the PMI 
course offered, the prep courses for 
certification.  I’ve also done quite a lot of IT 
type classes.  I’m also pretty skilled with the 
office suite, especially Excel and Access.  
I’ve taken a lot of courses on those. 
Management 
certification 
classes 
 
Cool, a lot of people don’t know Access.  
They just use Excel. 
Yeah you don’t have to tell me that.  Yeah it’s 
always misused. 
  
Did you feel you were adequately trained in 
the jobs you had? 
Yeah absolutely.  I think growing up coming 
in when I did and going to tech school. 
Having the chance to work with NCOs of the 
‘90s era brought me a long way.  They shared 
a lot of knowledge with me that you don’t 
find published anywhere today. 
Main knowledge 
imparted by 
supervisors 
 
Knowledge not 
published 
Reliance on OJT 
 
No published 
guidance 
If you could get any other training, is there 
anything you wish you would get trained 
in? 
At this point in my career I think I’m fully 
qualified in my career field.  Don’t think 
there’s anything else out there for me. 
  
What do you think are the top roadblocks 
for 3E6s in general?  What hinders day to 
day performance? 
I think it goes back to ‘93 when they did away 
with Air Force regulations and went to AFIs.  
A lot of the processes that apply to doing 
work in IWIMS, they were outlined in those 
publications.  Then in the AFIS, they were 
just so thin.  For reference for future 
generations to develop training using AFIs or 
if they were trying to pick up extra skills with 
Main problem was 
regulation cuts 
 
No standardized 
guidance 
No standardized 
guidance 
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no one to help them it was impossible.  Plain 
and simple, good old fashion guidance—
standardized guidance. 
It’s funny to hear this.  The master 
sergeants I interview say there’s a 
knowledge gap but the younger troops say 
they know everything. 
Well they do for the generation because there 
aren’t really a lot of things they can go out 
there and read and know.  The master 
sergeants are right when they say there’s a 
void of knowledge.  When they had the early 
out, they drew down the career field and a lot 
of smart 3E6s got out and the knowledge went 
with them.  You went through a phase where 
you had to cross-train into the 3E6 career field 
again.  It was ‘95 or ‘96 when they basically 
turned off the pipeline for the career field.  So 
you had to be a prior CE staff sergeant to get 
cross-trained into it.  So they were bringing in 
craftsmen in the lower management levels 
with no experience and all the people that 
would have been around to teach them were 
gone because they had dumped a bunch of the 
3E6s back in the civilian world.  So you had 
this void of knowledge.  There are very few 
3E6s that came in at the tail end, the early 
‘90s and were the people to get exposed to the 
people that knew their job really well and had 
rock solid guidance.  
Newer SSgts and 
cross-trainees are 
under the 
impression they 
know everything 
because there’s not 
much written. 
 
Draw down in 94 
cut most 
experience  
Experience gaps at 
top 
Anything else?  Other challenges? 
Yeah, career progression for 3E6s right now.  
The way that we have to compete with the 
blue collar work force for chief slots.  What 
you wind up having is very few 3E6 chiefs 
who are able to affect the future of career 
field and have enough clout to make sure that 
things are progressing in the career field, 
guidance being published, CFETPs, training 
in place.  You just don’t have it anymore.  
Ever since they moved the promotions to 
chief together, you don’t have a lot of 3E6 
chiefs out there. 
Lack of chief 
prevents anyone 
from advocating 
change. 
No senior leaders 
to advocate 
changes 
What about deployments?  Is that a 
problem or not? 
Being used and 
abused on 
Extraneous 
deployments 
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When I went on plenty of JET taskings with 
the Army, I didn’t work as a 3E6 downrange.  
From what I’ve seen, a lot of tech sergeants 
and staff sergeants were deployed to jobs that 
anybody could have done.  As a result we 
were losing a lot of tech sergeants that then 
lead to the shortage of master sergeants.  You 
get used and abused and you end up getting 
out.  And there’s not a chance in the 
promotion pool.  That’s why we’re at 60% 
right now. 
deployments make 
people leave 
As far as the job you’re in, or last base 
level job, do you feel like you were used in 
the capacity that you could be used? 
Yes, at my last base I was fortunate to work 
with a commander and ops chief that were 
willing to listen.  They understood when it 
came to getting info out of the computer, 
putting it into a format that meant something 
to them, they’d let me do that.  They weren’t 
just telling me what slides they wanted to see.  
They left it up to me to gather info that meant 
something.  I was allowed to make the 
decision to help them make good decision.  At 
some bases, I’ve seen ops chiefs that tell them 
what they want to see without really 
understanding what they’re looking at.  Like 
“let me see the 10 oldest work orders.”  It’s 
useless information.  You need to break it 
down by shops, take a look at the entire 
backlog, how long it’s been there, how long to 
get materials, how long it takes the shops to 
get materials on order—you know, 
meaningful information, not just scratching 
the surface.  I’ve also seen bases where 
there’s the tendency to misinterpret the data.  
For example, I’ve seen bases where they try 
to hold the shop accountable for availability 
rates—how productive versus not productive.  
The problem is it’s a direct measured time—
just time cost accounting.  If the availability 
time is low, it’s not the shops fault but maybe 
leadership’s for not streamlining ancillary 
duties and training along with the jobs.  
That’s done on a daily basis.  In my 
Commander and 
ops chief left 
decision of what to 
show up to 3E6 
 
Sometimes, ops 
chiefs ask for data 
that is actually 
pointless 
 
Another problem is 
that data requested 
is misinterpreted. 
Data often taken 
out of context or 
misinterpreted 
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experience, the majority of ops chiefs that 
I’ve worked for have been very willing to 
listen to the information and willing to allow 
us to explain what it means rather than them 
drawing conclusions.   
As far as extra duties, what percentage of 
your time is spent on core duties? 
At base level, my last experience I would say 
90% of my time.  I was in the ops support 
super position.  With all that was going on 
they turned me loose and let me focus on the 
ops support side to keep things going through 
the transition.   
  
Were other ops managers that were around 
you doing ops management jobs? 
Yep they were gainfully employed. 
  
As far as deployments… 
We were always at 50% manned—three here, 
three downrange. 
50% manned 
considering 
deployments 
Manning low 
And they weren’t necessarily doing 3E6 
jobs? 
The ones from my office were, but I meant 
mostly the senior NCOs were filling JET 
taskings. 
  
Whenever you’re at a place not doing ops 
management, did you see that other people 
were doing it?  Facility maintenance being 
tracked and work going into different 
facilities being tracked? 
Not particularly, when we’re stifled or there’s 
no one there, it’s pretty much by the seat of 
your pants.  It’s really kind of ad hoc and not 
done very well.  I’ve never seen it run 
smoothly at all.  Like any business, you have 
blue collar employees and white collar.  
White collars have done administrative for 
years and blue fixing equipment and 
managing their schedules.  But when they’re 
forced into the situations, they don’t like it 
and they don’t or understand everything that 
needs to be done. 
Doesn’t see ops 
management at 
many deployed 
locations  
Ops management 
poor in AOR 
Do you feel like there are ample senior 
leaders in your career field to mentor? 
No, there’s only 11 seniors. 
  
But even at base levels, are there masters in Senior leaders No senior leaders 
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the shops? 
Well only 60% will have a master sergeant in 
the shop.  It’s just going to take a lot of time 
to grown master sergeants.  You can’t just 
cross-train them in.  You can’t cross-train 
experience.  You got to let it grow up. 
lacking 
Do you feel like the other people in the 
shops, flight know what you do? 
No they don’t.  Most of the people you talk to 
think all you do is answer the telephone.  
That’s your whole job. 
Flight doesn’t 
understand them 
Unawareness of 
role 
What about ops chiefs? 
Ops chiefs?  I don’t think they get taught 
much of anything at the ops chief course.  I 
saw the curriculum once and it was basically 
just talking about base appearance and ride 
arounds.  Didn’t really talk about day to day 
operation, maintenance functions.  It’s like the 
industrial engineers do a little input. 
Needs to look at 
ops chiefs’ course 
to add some 3E6 
knowledge 
Unawareness of 
role by boss 
Yeah, I’m actually going to talk to a few 
ops chiefs.  Did you feel like you a part of 
the team? 
Yeah I’ve been lucky every place where I’ve 
been I’ve been with good people.  And a good 
team of people.  I was an appreciated part of 
the squadron.  You’ll see some of the 3E6s 
have the wrong approach.  Instead of trying to 
help the shops, they get focused on pointing 
out the problems, finger pointing all the 
shops.  You just can’t do that.  When you 
show a problem or issue, you got to present it 
not as a shop supervisor issue but as a 
problem for the ops flight that needs to be 
resolved.  You got to say, “Here’s the issue.  
You got a backlog.  But why do you have a 
backlog? Is it because of the time they’re 
spending doing honey-do’s this quarter?  Is 
that why there a backlog?”  That’s what you 
got to do.  You can’t point out that there are 
500 job backlogs.  You’ve got to find out why 
so you can help. 
Some problems are 
brought on from 
3E6 not 
approaching 
problems right 
 
Controllers need 
more ops focus 
than individual 
flights 
Controllers need 
mentorship in 
handling conflicts 
within flight 
What about the other flights in the 
squadron? 
No, nope, not even the EAs.  I don’t know 
what they do every day and I doubt they know 
 Unawareness of 
role 
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what I do. 
What about programs? 
Naa we don’t really work with them. 
Doesn’t consider 
that they work with 
programs 
 
Really?  I think that they should be linked 
a little more.  Are yall competitive for 
quarterly awards? 
I’d have to say no. 
  
Is it the blue collar/white collar thing 
again? 
Yep that’s exactly what it is.  All the glory is 
in the shops.  Typically, the 3E6s are hard to 
write a package on administrative 
accomplishments that can be comparable to 
the shops “responded to in flight 
emergencies” or “mission critical facility.”  
It’s like apples and oranges.  There shouldn’t 
be, how do you compare those two totally 
different functions? 
Lacks justification 
for awards 
Unawareness of 
role in awards 
You kind of touched on promotions 
earlier… 
In a small career field like this, it’s very 
difficult to get promoted.  It took me seven 
years to make staff sergeant.  I had a 324.  I 
got that the last year I didn’t get selected.  My 
friend in the other shop only had to get a 200 
something to get staff.  That’s the disparity 
we have between small and large career fields 
because they work off of percentages.  So that 
year—this is not a lie—I was the highest 
scoring non-selectee in the United States Air 
Force that year. 
Promotion rules 
are tough for small 
career field 
Tough to promote 
to high levels 
So do you feel that retention is an issue for 
you? 
I think it is.  I think that at the 7-level, techs 
and masters it is a problem.   
Retention 
problems at top 
Experience gap at 
top 
So what do you think is driving that 
problem? 
Ops tempo, lack of manning.  You have a lot 
of tech sergeants put in a position where they 
know their job, they want to do the right 
thing, but because we’re so light in master 
sergeants, they want a master sergeant in the 
shop.  They put an outside craftsman in as 
NCOIC.  While there may some that can do it, 
Retention an issue 
since they aren’t 
led by 3E6s 
 
Sees a ceiling in 
rank 
No senior leaders 
available to lead 
shops 
 
Small room for 
growth 
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a majority of them don’t know what they’re 
doing and they butt heads with that tech 
sergeant who knows what needs to be done 
but can’t do it. 
Obviously you’re at 20 or over.  Did your 
happiness in the career field have anything 
to do with that? 
With me? I’m a type A sir.  I like frustration.  
I like a challenge, so that’s not an issue for 
me.  I don’t want to be bored. 
  
Are there any ideas you could suggest to 
relieve some of the tempo problems? 
We had some guys that got deployed and did 
nothing.  Just across the board they need to 
get a grasp on what they actually need down 
range.  The problem is that most positions, 
once they’re on the books, they never come 
off.  Even if the function goes away, the slot 
doesn’t get turned off.  Well there has been 
some progress because a lot of Iraq stuff has 
gone and the Air Force has put the brakes on 
the stuff going on in Afghanistan.  They’re 
getting a little more critical with what they 
need. 
Deployed positions 
unneeded 
Wasted 
deployment 
taskings 
What is asset management to you? 
The way I understand it is identifying your 
assets, assigning mission critical, then 
managing risk.  It’s tied into programming, 
what level are you going to maintain this?  
How long do you want it to last?  How much 
risk do you accept?  Being more effective 
with managing your resources.   
Good asset 
management 
definition 
 
So how do you feel that 3E6s fit in with 
that? 
That’s a good question.  I was trying to think 
what really do we do.  I guess for us, I right 
now primarily support A4/7A with 
information.  I’ve seen other people try to 
produce products out of IWIMS in order to 
develop asset management plans.  They’ll do 
some analysis and the stuff they’ve been 
getting is suspect.  So I’m pulling info out and 
sharing it.  Doing what we do, being data 
managers and analysts, being able to pull info 
and change the context for what you’re 
Data is misused by 
asset management 
Misused data 
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presenting to asset management is what our 
role is really. 
Well that’s a good answer.  I think yall are 
a critical piece of that that’s getting lost in 
that. 
Well that’s what I’ve been doing for the two 
months here is getting asset management 
information. 
Just gets data for 
asset management 
 
If you had to make a decision based on 
IWIMS data alone, how confident would 
you be? 
Well if you know what you’re doing and you 
know the base.  Well first you have to know 
the base and how well they’re managing their 
info.  Then how much do you understand 
about IWIMS and how it’s stored and 
processed.  If you know both of those, then 
nine times out of 10, you’ll get good stuff.  
Maybe one of the bases not doing it well 
could drop to 60%.  The base quality goes 
back to the lack of standardized guidance on 
the procedures on how to directly input the 
data.  Like how do you account for people 
while they’re deployed?  It took AFCESA 
nearly two years to figure that out.  That 
answer used to be out there.  The thing is you 
won’t find the answers written down 
anywhere—you just have to know it.  I’m not 
talking about playbook.  I’m talking good old 
fashioned instruction manuals. 
Data quality 
dependent on base 
emphasis 
No standards for 
data 
So last question, do you see any critical 
problems coming down the pipeline? 
Well with the money the way it is, you’ll have 
to look at how to be more efficient.  One of 
things that I think needs to happen is more 
centralization and standardization.  For ops 
managers, we work in ops support.  Well what 
is that?  Its planning, materials, service 
contracts, data analysis.  The 3E6s aren’t 
being used in all those sections.  What makes 
sense to me is to take the experience and 
knowledge of these functions and centralize 
them into one office.  If you don’t do that, 
move them to one spot, you’ll never build up 
an experienced work force than understands 
Proposes 
interesting idea 
that 3E6s should 
work in an ops 
support office that 
centralizes all 
aspects of ops 
support. 
 
Uses utilities/LFM 
and 
exterior/interior 
electric as 
examples. 
Ops support needs 
realignment to 
function more 
efficiently 
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all these things.  All the functions.  Not only 
that, I always equate it to the merging of the 
multi-skilled craftsmen—fuels and utilities or 
exterior and interior electrics—you merged 
the shops to share knowledge and experience 
to do better at both.  Right now where at the 
same situation where were being asked to do 
the material control job as well.  A lot of 
places they’re just sticking a 3E6 over there in 
the material control office for 3-6 months and 
then bringing them back.  Then you still have 
“them versus us” when it’s really just “us.”  
You need to merge the administrative pieces 
into one office that’s the ops support office 
God forbid.  If you have one office, it just 
makes sense.  Good for the career field and 
good for the squadron because they’ll realize 
more efficiency.   
I guess service contracts as well. 
Well if you have COCESS, then the 3E6s 
would have experience as QAEs of that 
contract.  You wouldn’t have to take it out of 
hide.  You could do more than one job.  
That’s how the whole Air Force is.  We all 
wear more than one hat.  I see the same need 
for the 3E6 career field and material control.  
There’s no reason someone can’t answer the 
phone and then go back to ordering materials.   
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Appendix F 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject F 
If you could give a brief duty history as far 
as when you came in, started tech school, 
bases you’ve been at, deployments, what 
you did at each. 
Sure.  I came in in September of ‘90 and basic 
training until November. It was about six 
weeks, longer for holidays.  My first base was 
[omitted] in the service call section.  I stayed 
there for about three years.  Then I went to 
[omitted] where I did more customer service 
for about two years.  While I was there at 
[omitted], went to [omitted] for four months.  
Then at [omitted], I went to [omitted] for my 
second deployment for four months.  [omitted] 
was going through a closure, so I left early 
and went to [omitted], where I worked outside 
of career field as a facility manager for 
[MAJCOM].  I stayed there for two years then 
was assigned to [omitted].  It was a two year 
assignment and was mostly customer service 
aspect, not getting too much into work orders 
or the different aspects of the job.  From there, 
I went to [omitted] for about four years.  After 
that, I went back to [omitted] where I worked 
in housing as a dorm manager for officers.  
After [omitted], I went to [omitted] for two 
years.  After that, I went back to [omitted] for 
almost five years.  Now I’m here at [omitted]. 
Traditional roles  
So tech school in ‘90?  What other 
academic education have you had since 
then? 
Got my CCAF back in 2000-2001.  I just 
recently finished my bachelor’s in education 
and development. 
  
Did you feet the CCAF helped you with 3E6 
work? 
A little bit in the manner that I had more of a 
background and expanse of knowledge to pull 
on dealing with other aspects, communicating 
CCAF helped with 
leadership 
CCAF useful 
 
171 
 
requirements, dealing with leadership.  As for 
dealing with building and production 
management, no. 
What other training job specific have you 
received? 
There’s not that many classes out there for the 
career field specifically.  There are some 
popular ones through a consultant Alice 
Anderson.  She offers classes specific to us.  
She does RWP, IWP, report writing and some 
others.  I attended one or two of those. 
Alice Anderson 
courses 
Reliance of outside 
courses 
In the jobs you’ve been in, did you feel you 
were adequately trained? 
I do for a majority of the aspects of the job.  
The hands on training when I first got there 
was very good, a lot of depth back then.  As 
folks started thinning out thru VSI of the ‘90s, 
the people weren’t available and the pool of 
knowledge started to shrink in the career field.  
As the most part, I’d say yes due to hands on 
training.  There are still holes out there in my 
knowledge. 
Got most training 
from supervisors 
 
Early ‘90s VSI 
pushed out 
experience 
Reliance on OJT 
 
Experience gaps 
after VSI 
What other training do you think would be 
beneficial?  If someone would train you, it 
would be a big help? 
I think I’ve actually been out of the career 
field since I’ve been a master for five years.  I 
think the younger guys would definitely 
benefit from more project management side, 
IWP is kind of a lost art, not many people 
know how to do it.  A piece I seldom do is life 
cycle cost analysis piece, kind of a lost art as 
well. 
IWP and life cycle 
costing is a lost art 
Certain skill sets 
lost 
Well we’ll get to that later.  Back at base 
level, what do you think were the top issues 
for the career field?  What keeps you from 
doing your day to day job? 
Not for me, but for others in the career field it 
is definitely the manning.  It seems to be 
excruciatingly low here.  Leadership still asks 
the same things from us in the career field, but 
they just don’t have the manning to 
accomplish it all.  Work orders, area 
programs, doing in depth analysis of RWP, 
guys are not there to do it.  Simple things, 
Some jobs just 
aren’t being done 
Not used at full 
capacity 
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customer feedback and survey programs, no 
time for that either.   
What other problems other than manning?  
Other big problems? 
IWIMS is extremely antiquated.  It did what it 
was designed to but that’s changed.  It’s not 
very user friendly. 
IWIMS outdated IWIMS needs 
updates 
Any specific problems with ACES or 
IWIMS? 
If folks knew how to manipulate the data, it 
would be a very good tool to use.  But because 
of the shortage of manning and the loss of 
knowledge, we kind of lean on the shops to 
input labor and sometimes work order stuff.  
We’ve turned it into a junk in junk out 
problem.  It’s not the most reliable stuff out 
there.  From a connectivity issue, it’s a pain to 
use.  From what I saw, it wasn’t user friendly 
either.  Seemed like there was a steep learning 
curve for it. 
3E6 work is being 
pushed out to the 
shops 
Bad data from 
shops 
As far as what you’ve been trained to do, 
did you feel like you were being used at 
your full capacity, that you were doing 
what you had been taught? 
Oh, very limited. 
Not used in full 
capacity 
Not used in full 
capacity 
How so?  What else could you offer? 
A lot of times back then it was just customer 
service when there was so much about IWP, 
Top 10 programs, actually programming a 
project.  We were looking at data, that life 
cycle analysis, trend analysis, looking at data 
out there to develop management tools.   
Plenty to offer that 
wasn’t used 
 
As far as extra duties, how much are you 
doing core duties? 
Now or back in the squadron?  Because today 
it’s never. 
  
No, I guess back in the squadron. 
I guess about 75% of the time with 25% in 
additional duties. 
Extra duties Extra duties 
Are there other 3E6s in your job right 
now? 
Well I’m the ops flight super, so we have four 
military and two civilian. 
  
All in traditional roles? 
Yes they are. 
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You touched on deployments earlier.  Were 
you doing typical 3E6 jobs while deployed? 
Yes. 
  
Do you see that your career field has ample 
leadership at the top to fight for you and to 
mentor you? 
Well I guess I am the guy they go to now.  As 
far as people above me, I don’t even know 
who’s left out there. 
  
Well looking the other way where you are 
that guy, are there enough of “you” out 
there? 
Nope , I don’t think they’re distributed around 
out there where the young guys can pick those 
minds.  There’s not actually a master sergeant 
slot here.  I got here on my wife’s orders.  
There was only a tech sergeant slot here.  
There weren’t any 3E6s above staff sergeant 
here when I came, so there was quite a bit of 
knowledge gap to be made up. 
Not senior NCOs 
at each base 
No senior leaders 
Are people coming to you to get that 
mentorship?  Are previous workers coming 
to you with questions? 
Definitely.  We have two tech sergeants that 
are leaving us with just a senior airman and a 
one striper, so yeah, they do come up 
frequently. 
Experience and 
mentorship in high 
demand 
No senior leaders 
What about other guys in the ops flight?  
Do these shops know what you do? 
Absolutely not.  They think they do.  They 
know about the piece they see every day, 
customer service, taking calls, putting in labor.  
Outside of that, their view is pretty limited. 
Shops unaware of 
what they do 
Unawareness of 
role 
What about the Ops chief? 
Yeah I believe so. 
  
Do you feel then that you’re a part of the 
team in the ops flight? 
Yes, but I don’t know if that applies to the 
guys down in the ops section. 
Service section not 
part of team 
Not part of team 
Do you notice any problems between 
customer service section and the other 
shops?  Any disagreeing in meetings where 
there’s animosity? 
Continually yes. 
Strained 
relationships 
between shops 
 
What do you think is driving that?  Not Continuous Bad relationships 
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knowing what they do? 
It’s a combination of things.  Personality 
differences of course.  Then the piece of not 
being knowledgeable of what we do.  There’s 
distrust at the perceived lack of training.  
Certain sections will question data no matter 
what. 
animosity brought 
on my many 
things 
because of lack of 
training 
What about the other flights in the 
squadron?  Asset management and 
programs? Do they know what you do? 
In a limited fashion.  A lot of the retired guys 
grew up in CE and know what’s going on. 
  
Are those relationships good? 
In some case I guess so.  There’s still some 
juggling between real property and us and 
asset management folks. 
  
So then overall, do you feel that you’re 
respected in the squadron? 
Yeah, I think so. 
  
Do you feel like you’re competitive for 
quarterly awards and yearly awards? 
The folks in the career field have a hard time 
with it because they don’t have the hands on 
impact other guys do.  They’re the funnel.  It’s 
harder for them to build up the duty bullets.  
They aren’t always as strong like fire or EOD.  
Other bullets are on them.   
Hard time showing 
impact on awards 
Hard to compete 
What about promotions?  Does your career 
field have a fair shot at those? 
Yeah, how the system is set up, I don’t think 
that’s a problem. 
  
So you’re obviously in over 20 years.  Do 
you think retention is an issue for you?   
I do.  In recent years I’ve seen a lot of young 
folks that want to get out the door.  They’ve 
articulated that the skills they’ve learn aren’t 
going to be that beneficial in the future and 
they’re overall not that interested in the job.  
In a lot of cases, these guys came in and didn’t 
really get to choose what they wanted.  The 
Air Force threw them into a slot.  The 
deployment rate is pretty high for the younger 
guys.  Yeah, it’s an issue. 
New guys coming 
in don’t care for 
the career field 
Low identity 
within career field 
Well you’re staying in for 20.  How much 
did your happiness with the career field 
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have to do with that? 
It was a portion but it was more establishing a 
family and providing for them.  I knew I’d 
eventually promote out of day to day stuff. 
You mentioned deployments having an 
impact with younger guys. 
Yeah we had one airman here that before she 
even went into her duty section, she was 
immediately assigned to honor guard.  She 
stayed there for four months.  Immediately 
upon return to the squadron, she was tasked to 
deploy.  That was a huge factor for her 
decision to separate.  She’s on her way out. 
Deployments 
affect retention 
 
Any of those deployment related issues you 
have an answer for? 
Not really at my level.  Maybe if we did a 
better job of managing our people so that we 
didn’t throw people into awful situations. 
Deployments need 
to be managed 
more 
Wasted 
deployment 
taskings 
How do you see asset management and how 
do 3E6s play into it? 
When I think of the term, I think of the new 
concept that we’re moving towards.  It’s 
having a better grasp of knowing what the 
infrastructure systems are on base.  One way 
we fit in is a firm oversight of the RWP 
program would be one.  A few years ago there 
was a call where they asked bases to beef up 
their RWP program to what it was back in the 
mid ‘90s when we had the huge strength.  
That’s a piece of it, to go in and manage that 
program, how it should be and identify all the 
pieces that play in it.  Making sure the data is 
accurate so that life cycles could be analyzed.  
At one point, they wanted programs to load 
everything in ACES that was identified out 
there. They wanted that from ops as well.  So 
getting that in there, identifying options, 
providing a picture for them to look at.   
Good definition  
So my biggest question is if you had to 
make a decision based on IWIMS data 
alone, how confident would you be? 
No very.  Not very.  There would be certain 
pieces I’d be confident in and others not. 
Not confident in 
data 
Bad data 
Explain a little about which parts are good 
and not. 
Data from shops is 
unreliable 
Bad data 
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I’m relatively confident in the status of the 
current RWP program.  The labor reporting 
has been farmed out to the shops, so I know 
there are gigantic holes in that.  The manner 
we go about doing that isn’t good.  There’s 
probably better ways to do that. 
As kind of an overall opportunity, do you 
see anything critical on the horizon?  Big 
issues? 
I think it’s the huge knowledge gap where 
folks don’t know all the aspects of the job.  
Due to all the things we’ve mentioned, 
manning is bad.  We can’t provide the services 
to leadership that I think we should—IWP, 
Top 10 programs—so we don’t have knee jerk 
reactions to work orders. 
Manning limits 
what shop can 
offer leadership 
Manning low 
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Appendix G 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject G 
Please give me a background on your 
career, where you’ve been based, deployed 
and what you did at those jobs. 
I was stationed at [omitted] at the beginning.  I 
was a supply troop that eventually cross-
trained into 3E6.  Then I moved to [omitted] 
where I was stationed for four years and 
deployed to Afghanistan for six months out of 
there.  Then I was at [omitted] and deployed 
to Kosovo from there.  Now I’m here at 
[omitted] and deployed to Oman and getting 
ready to deploy again to Kuwait.  During my 
time at [omitted], I did labor, RWP, work 
orders.  At [omitted], I did the same things.  In 
Afghanistan, I actually was not able to do ops 
management.  I just ran the CQ there.  In 
[omitted], I was able to do resources.  I did 
everything for the ops flight.  It was a small 
GSU with only nine military, so I was highly 
involved in everything for the entire ops 
flight.  I even stood in as ops flight chief for a 
period of time.  I was deployed to Kosovo 
where I was a facility manager for all the 
dorms, so I didn’t do a lot of the ops 
management stuff, just managed all the 
maintenance work orders for the dorms.  At 
[omitted], I’ve been the NCOIC for customer 
service doing report analysis, running all the 
programs for ops management.  I deployed to 
Oman where I was able to do the full ops 
management job, resource advisor, admin, 
UDM, every aspect of our career field.  I was 
able to do that while deployed to Oman 
because of the commander I was with.  
Returning from Oman, I’ve been down at the 
UDM position for the past year. 
Did traditional 
roles and a lot of 
other stuff 
Many jobs outside 
of primary duties 
How long ago did you go to texh school? 
I went in 2002 when I was a senior airman as 
a cross-trainee. 
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What academic background do you have? 
I finished both of my CCAFs, but prior to that, 
I graduated high school and joined the 
military. 
  
The CCAF in maintenance production? 
Yes. 
  
How helpful was that as far as helping with 
ops management? 
I don’t believe it was helpful at all.  We have 
to have it but all the stuff I’ve learned about 
ops management has been from being thrown 
in the fire, figuring it out and asking 
questions. 
CCAF not helpful CCAF not helpful 
Did you have someone in your shop that 
was responsible for that or did you learn it 
on your own? 
There was a lot of learning on my own at 
[omitted].  When I went to [omitted] there was 
a few NCOs there.  Master sergeant [omitted] 
who is now [omitted], he helped a lot.  I was 
moved to UDM in [omitted].  This is my third 
base doing UDM rather than ops management. 
Mostly learn on 
your own, not 
even OJT 
OJT not organized 
Have you had any training since tech 
school? 
I went three different Alice Anderson classes.  
I did report writing, an RWP class and also a 
work control class. 
Alice Anderson 
courses 
Reliance on 
outside courses 
And those were good? 
They gave you a basis but not an in depth 
look.  Just “here this is what’s possible and 
here’s how you figure the rest out.” 
  
You already spoke to this, but do you feel 
you were adequately trained to do the jobs 
you were asked to do? 
No. 
  
The stuff you’re doing now, how does it 
compare to what you thought the career 
field would be when you came out of tech 
school? 
I don’t think tech school prepares people for 
what you will be doing.  Tech school teaches 
you a lot of labor and gives you a background.  
Doesn’t give you any IWIMS experience 
because it is usually down.  Everything you’re 
going to learn is going to be on the job.  They 
Tech school 
doesn’t prepare 
you 
Reliance on OJT  
 
Poor training at 
tech school 
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say, “this is stuff you could be doing.  Go to 
your base and figure it out.”  That’s how I felt 
when I graduated. 
What other areas do you wish you had 
more training in? 
Most of the items that we deal with are in 
IWIMS and work orders.  They don’t touch on 
work orders because most won’t deal with 
them until the NCO level.  But since we don’t 
have that many NCOs, many airmen are 
dealing with them as soon as they get to a 
base.  There was no training whatsoever on 
work orders. 
Needs more 
training on work 
orders 
Needs more 
advanced training 
Anything else? 
Well the career field as a whole.  When I went 
to tech school, I didn’t learn anything actually.  
There was a lot of background but since I had 
already been a part of CE, I knew how they 
ran already.  I didn’t learn anything.  So I 
know what I should have learned since I’d 
been in a squadron for three years. 
Didn’t learn much 
at tech school 
Tech school 
training poor 
So you were an LRS troop assigned to CE? 
Correct. 
  
What do you think are the top issues that 
hinder your day to day performance? 
I think it’s a lot of the mind frame of civil 
engineers.  I don’t think that most understand 
what we have the capability to do and what 
we could do for them.  That and the training 
aspect of it.  A lot of things are being thrown 
our way with no training.  Supply came into 
the career field recently.  I’m lucky because I 
was a former supply troop, so I had the back 
ground.  Unfortunately, most of the troops 
will just learn on their own by sending them 
down there to figure it out on their own.  I 
think the leadership of the whole engineering 
world in the Air Force doesn’t really utilize us 
the way they could.  When I was in [omitted], 
they utilized me because I was the only one 
there.  We had a craftsman master sergeant 
that had never dealt with the management 
portion of it.  He had just run heavy 
equipment his whole career.  He was like, “I 
don’t know what to do.  Tell me what needs to 
Rest of squadron 
doesn’t understand 
what we do 
 
Supply was added 
without any 
training 
 
Underutilized by 
leadership 
Unawareness of 
roles in squadron 
 
Not used to 
capacity 
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be done.”  I was able to do a lot of stuff, but 
that’s not because he knew what I could do for 
him but because we were both helping each 
other out, if that makes sense. 
Do you want to expand on any of the stuff 
you think you could do that you’re not 
being used to do at full capacity? 
I think we could do more management portion 
of it. Right now, they just come to us and ask 
for a report and we give them a report.  They 
ask us for information and we give it to them.  
There’s no decision making process on our 
end even though we have the ability, 
especially at the NCO level.  We have the 
ability to give them the information, give them 
the best guess based on what we see.  We’re 
never asked those questions.  We’re never 
given the opportunity to give our input.  
We’re just data entry and data collection for 
the civil engineers.  
Not in the decision 
process but rather 
information 
providers 
Not taken 
seriously as 
experts 
 
Unawareness of 
abilities 
Yep, that’s the overwhelming response I’m 
getting.  As far as extra duties, how much 
time do you spend that is not ops 
management? 
Throughout my career, most of the time.  Like 
I said, it’s my third out of fourth assignment 
that I’ve been the UDM.  I’ve been on three 
deployments and only one of them I have 
actually been able to do my job.  Therefore, 
it’s usually a lot of extra stuff.  I know my ops 
managers here do the commander’s calls.  
They set up all the multimedia for the 
commander’s calls.  We do a lot of slides 
shows for the ops chiefs for their meetings and 
stuff like that.  You have safety.  Right now 
we have three ops managers at this base not 
doing ops management.  Myself as UDM, 
another NCO down here in the Prime BEEF 
section doing logistics, and we have a senior 
airman over in EOD doing their logistics.  
That’s what’s happening.  When I was in 
[omitted], I was the UCI monitor, safety NCO, 
vehicle NCO, I was everything.  When I was 
at [omitted], we had three to four of the 23 
triple nickels farmed out to extra duties.   
Often works 
outside of primary 
role as UDM 
 
Worked as safety 
NCO, vehicle 
NCO, UCI 
monitor 
 
Other controllers 
working outside of 
main duties 
Works outside 
primary role 
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Do you have any issues with ACES or 
IWIMS? 
Both actually.  IWIMS, if you know how to 
use it, you have the experience in it, it’s a 
good system because it will give you the data 
that you need.  Running those reports—if you 
know how to run those reports you can do 
miracles just about.  Unfortunately, it’s an 
archaic system form the ‘80s.  It doesn’t allow 
us a lot of things we could do.  It doesn’t 
allow us to put in more information so that we 
can pull the data better.  Does that make 
sense? 
IWIMS outdated 
and only works if 
you are very 
experienced with it 
IWIMS needs 
updates 
 
Inexperience key 
reason for poor 
data 
Yeah. 
The only time I’ve dealt with ACES is down 
here in Prime BEEF with personnel and 
readiness.  It’s great if it works. 
  
Yeah that’s been my experience with it as 
well. 
IWIMS isn’t a horrible system.  You could 
still do your stuff.  Unfortunately 90% of civil 
engineers don’t understand IWIMS therefore 
they don’t use it.  The data being input, there’s 
not a lot being input because they don’t like 
using it.  They want to use emails and Excel.  
Word documents instead of using the system 
for what it’s for. 
Most CE doesn’t 
know how to use 
IWIMS so they 
don’t 
 
Use other systems 
like Excel 
Needs training for 
controllers and 
other users in 
squadron 
That’s a good point.  I haven’t quite 
thought of it that way. 
Yeah down range we use Excel sheets and I 
love it.  I have everything on one document 
that I know I can always pull it up on my 
desktop or a disc and can filter it.  I love 
Excel.  When I go down range, I look forward 
to using the Excel spreadsheet so I can get my 
info right then and there. 
Uses Excel in 
AOR because it’s 
easier 
 
You said you weren’t necessarily doing ops 
management stuff at deployments.  The 
times you weren’t, did you see another 
group doing that work?  Was anyone doing 
it? 
Well I’ve never actually tracked labor while 
deployed.  Never seen that myself.  They 
don’t see how many hours are spent on a 
building.  They pretty much just track whether 
Had wasted 
deployments 
 
Never tracked 
labor in AOR 
Wasted 
deployments 
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work orders are open or closed.  When I was 
in Afghanistan, the senior NCOs took control 
of all that and I spent six months watching 
Oprah.  In Kosovo, we didn’t do any of that 
because a contractor kept track of the work 
orders.  When the contractors called us, we 
did our part but that was the only time.  In 
Oman, I was able to track work orders but not 
labor. They don’t track labor in the AOR from 
what I’ve seen.  
Do you feel like you’ve had senior mentors 
in your career field to mentor you? 
One in the past 15 years.  When I was at 
[omitted], I had a supervisor retired on active 
duty.  He was a good guy but he was on his 
way out.  I had a two in [omitted].  In 
[omitted], I was the only one and here I’m the 
senior 3E6, so I too reach out and get answers 
on the COP.  It’s mostly just sink or swim. 
Not many mentors 
available 
No senior leaders 
Do you feel like other people in ops flight 
know what you do? 
No, not at all. 
Ops flight doesn’t 
know their job 
Unawareness of 
role 
What about the ops chief? 
It depends on which one you get.  That sounds 
bad but some of them use us fully.  Before I 
deployed, I was only here four months.  Ours 
was fully engaged in the ops management, she 
used us fully, asked us for information, 
allowed us to give our input on how to build 
the work order priority program.  That was 
great.  Other bases, they didn’t deal with us at 
all.  Other than telling us, “run this report, run 
that report.”  That’s all we were utilized for. 
Had good boss that 
let them make 
decisions 
 
Other bosses just 
ask for data 
Misused data 
Do you feel like you’re a part of the team in 
the ops flight? 
Not so much.  Like I said, people look at us 
like we’re their admin troops.  I had a master 
sergeant say, “here’s a deployment for admin. 
Would you like to go?”  I said, “I’m not 
admin.”  He said, “then what are you?”  I said, 
“I’m a 3E6 in the CE career field.”  That 
pretty much spoke to my whole career.  We’re 
more or less treated as admin troops than 
actual civil engineers like structures, utilities, 
those guys. 
CE thinks they are 
admin troops 
Not a part of team 
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Do you feel that there’s any friction 
between your shop and the other shops? 
I don’t believe its animosity because most of 
them just do what they have to do.  They give 
us their labor and such.  I don’t think its 
animosity.  I know the 3E6s hate that other 
guys are getting the glory while we do all the 
paperwork for them to let them do their jobs, 
but I don’t think its animosity. 
No intentional bad 
feelings, but 
friction because 
controller’s impact 
isn’t seen 
 
What about other flights in the squadron 
like asset management or programs? 
Mostly what they feel is that we’re just 
keeping track of work orders.  That’s the 
extent of what they believe that we do. 
Other flights don’t 
know what they do 
Unawareness of 
role 
Do you feel that you’re respected in the 
squadron? 
I don’t feel the career field is respected in the 
squadron.  I don’t think that it is respected Air 
Force wide. 
No respect in 
squadron or Air 
Force 
No respect 
What about awards?  Do you feel that 
you’re competitive? 
I believe we are.  Unfortunately, when you’re 
building a million dollar building rather than 
doing the parts that go into it, you don’t get as 
much credit as the craftsmen with the action.  
Therefore, when they sit on the boards, it 
looks like the guys are doing more of the 
work.  That’s why I try to sit on boards so I 
can make them understand.  So I don’t feel 
that we are competitive.  We have to fight a 
lot harder than the craftsmen do. 
Hard to win 
awards because of 
justification 
Hard to compete 
What about promotions?  Are they fair? 
I feel like there are more opportunity for 
promotions in other CE career fields than us 
because they are larger.  They have more 
positions.  We don’t have many leadership 
positions to go in to.  The only way to go 
further in your career is to do a headquarters 
job, go be an instructor.  But sitting at base 
level doing customer service, you’re not going 
to go that far. 
Few opportunities 
to go to other jobs 
in order to 
promote better 
Small room for 
growth 
What about retention?  Is that an issue? 
Absolutely.  I even thought of changing 
myself.  I love my career field, but as I said 
earlier, there’s no room from growth.  I know 
Retention is an 
issue because of 
being 
underutilized  
Retention from 
unawareness of 
capabilities 
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a lot of things I can’t do, I’m not being 
utilized and I wanted to get out.  But I can’t do 
anything.  I can’t even apply for a special 
duty.  But I’m not even doing my job. 
How long do you have until 20? 
I have five years and three months left. 
  
How much is your satisfaction with your 
career field play into that decision? 
It didn’t play into it at all.  I’m finishing my 
five years because I love wearing my uniform.  
But if it was based totally on my career field, I 
wouldn’t have stayed in.   
No connection to 
career field 
 
Do you think deployments have a direct on 
retention? 
The deployments are extremely aggravating.  
It’s a tossup of whether you’re going to do 
your job or be bored for six months.  That and 
a lot of the deployments are looking for E6 
minimums.  I’m the only one here, so I know 
I’m going to go every single time.  I’m not 
sure about other bases, but I see a lot of under 
utilization in the AOR for the 3E6s.  They ask, 
“why I am here?”  We’re sitting over in the 
AOR being looked at like “why are you even 
here?  Someone else is doing your job.”  But I 
still have to be away from my family.  So I 
feel like they’re deploying a lot of us.  They 
have two or three of us at one location when 
there’s only enough work for one. 
Disparity between 
useful and 
wasteful taskings 
Wasted 
deployments 
What do you think could help some of that 
stress? 
They need to really pay attention to the 
manning over there, what’s actually needed 
versus what they’d like to have to do all their 
admin and extra duties. 
Wasted manning 
for deployments 
 
So what’s your definition of asset 
management? 
I don’t have a lot of understanding of asset 
management.  It’s more managing all the 
assets on the base.  Whether it is the buildings, 
the roads, the grounds, those types of things.  
Taking care of making sure that the base is 
managed properly and the utilization of the 
buildings and stuff. 
Weak idea of asset 
management 
 
How do you see that 3E6s fit into that? Believes they  
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I think that because we deal with the roads, 
grounds, buildings, pretty much everything.  I 
think that we would fit very well into asset 
management portion of CE.  We could do so 
much more than just cutting work orders and 
taking service calls. 
could have a role 
in asset 
management 
So if you had to make a decision based 
solely on IWIMS data, how confident 
would you be? 
Not at all because unless you’re a 3E6, you’re 
not using IWIMS.  The craftsmen don’t use it 
because they don’t like it.  Therefore the data 
is not being input correctly.  Sometimes it just 
dumps stuff as well.  Things I know I put in 
that I go and look for later and it’s not there. 
Poor data quality 
because of other 
shops that enter 
work 
Bad data 
Well for the data that does go in, does 
anything we’ve talked about affect the 
quality of it? 
Yeah, like I said, the craftsmen want to do 
their job and get on with it.  They don’t want 
to deal with this archaic system, so they don’t.  
Remarks aren’t being put in so there’s a lot of 
research.  If someone calls me about a work 
order, I should be able to look into IWIMS 
and find everything I need to know about that 
work order but I can’t.  I have to research, find 
out who was on the job, all the craftsmen, talk 
to other people.  It takes me what should have 
taken five minutes takes me a few hours in a 
day to get the proper data for that work order. 
Incomplete data is 
entered because 
shops don’t want 
to do it 
Incomplete data 
Do you see that you’re career field is in 
trouble?  Anything critical coming over the 
horizon? 
The new airmen aren’t going to stay in this 
career field.  They’re going to see it as the 
guys in CE that are pretty much the stepchild 
of CE.  That’s what they’re going to feel like 
and they won’t stay in.  I’ve had conversations 
with a lot of the young airmen.  I had a staff 
sergeant tell me that one of his airmen said 
that a monkey could do our job and that he’s 
not staying in.  He’s still here.  We had a lot of 
conversations while deployed to help him see 
the bigger picture.  But we don’t have 
leadership telling us the capabilities that we 
Retention will 
suffer as 
controllers are 
seen as 
unimportant 
 
Leaders aren’t 
telling them they 
are important 
 
 
186 
 
have are important to the squadron therefore 
you have this sense of not belonging, not 
being understood.  What’s the point of staying 
if I could make more of a difference 
somewhere else?  The airmen don’t see the 
difference we make in CE. 
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Appendix H 
 
Question and Response Open Codes Selective Codes 
Subject H 
Could you please give me an idea of your 
background?  Where were you based and 
what did you do in those jobs? 
First base was [omitted].  I was there from 
2002 to 2006.  From there, I PCS’ed to 
[omitted] and did the standard one year 
remote tour there.  I had my follow on to 
[omitted].  I was there for the past four years 
and I was transferred over here to [omitted] 
where I’m currently stationed. 
Traditional roles  
What kind of jobs did you do at those other 
places? 
I’ve always done 3E6s duties.  The only 
exception was at [omitted]. I was actually 
assigned to [omitted].  I was the UDM there.  
I did that for the whole year I was there.  
Basically that was my only time out of the 
3E6 realm.  Just did mobility training and 
equipment and then also preparing logistics.  
That was the last year [omitted]. 
Did UDM job Job outside 
primary role 
What about deployments? 
So far I have two deployments.  One to 
Kuwait back in 2005 to Ali Al Salem air base.  
I did 3E6 duties there.  My second 
deployment was to Kyrgyzstan or the transit 
city of Manas.  On my second deployment, I 
was still in customer service, but I was only 
doing QA duties versus actually traditional 
duties.  Now currently, I’m tasked to deploy 
again in March and this time headed to Africa. 
Traditional jobs 
while deployed 
 
I hear it’s up heating up there. 
The place I’m going has been there since 
2001, so it’s pretty established. 
  
So what year was tech school? 
In 2002. 
  
What other academic background do you 
have? 
Some college, basically three credits shy of 
the CCAF for my AFSC. 
No CCAF yet  
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How useful have you found that to be for 
3E6 duties? 
Leadership and management, I thought it was 
pretty useful.  Without taking those classes, 
I’m not sure how effective a leader or mentor 
I’d be without those skills. 
CCAF helps 
leadership 
 
Have you received any other career specific 
training since tech school? 
The only training I’ve received was the QA 
training I had to knock out before I deployed 
to Kyrgyzstan. 
Only extra training 
was for QA 
 
Yeah I thought it was odd that QA was in 
the job description thought no one knows 
much about it. 
Well yeah they changed the CFETP but it’s 
not actually a core task. 
QA an extra duty 
but no training for 
it 
Needs more 
training 
Well that’s tough if they update one 
document but not the other.  Have you 
heard of the Alice Anderson courses?  
Looking to go to one of them? 
Yeah for sure.  I’ve seen some she has 
available.  We’ve sent a few individuals from 
this base to go get whatever she’s offered.   
Wants to go to 
Alice Anderson 
Reliance on 
outside course 
Do you feel that you’ve been adequately 
trained for the stuff you’ve been asked to 
do? 
When I first came in, tech school was 
supposed to provide a foundation for our 
training.  I feel they could have hit on a couple 
things a little more effectively. 
Wanted more from 
tech school 
 
Like what? 
Like how to run certain programs.  How RWP 
and IWP play into things, how to manage 
labor, how to basically command and control 
a customer service shop basically. 
Wants more 
training in running 
a customer service 
shop 
Needs more 
training 
That leads into my next question.  Are 
there any areas you wish you had another 
course for? 
I’d probably say IWP.  Some bases I’ve seen 
don’t do it, some do it halfway.  It’s a good 
tool if used to its full potential.  Obviously if 
people aren’t trained adequately, they’ll cut 
corners and just tailor it to accommodate 
whatever location they’re working out of. 
Wants more 
training on IWP 
Needs more 
training 
What would you say are your top problems Not enough Experience gaps at 
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with day to day performance? 
I’d probably say being taken away to do 
upgrade training.  I understand we have to 
provide some more training at home station 
than what they learn at tech school.  Granted, I 
realize that every situation is unique.  When I 
came into here, they didn’t have a trainer slash 
certifier.  Everyone they had here was a cross-
trainee that needed to get upgraded to become 
a trainer or certifier.  Without a trainer slash 
certifier, they’re basically just at a stand still 
waiting for someone to come here and sign off 
on a task.  Once we catch up to that, I don’t 
think it’ll be a factor anymore, but that’s what 
I’m dealing with now. 
qualified people in 
shop to sign off on 
training tasks 
top 
Cool, I haven’t quite heard that aspect 
before. 
Yeah they’re given the military rank, put in 
key positions but they’re still learning the job 
and what not.  It’s hard to learn to train and 
understand what to do in that position if you 
don’t know what to do in the first place. 
Supervisors are 
still learning the 
jobs themselves 
Experience gaps at 
top 
Anything else?  Big problems? 
I’d probably say our training could be better.  
I understand that LRS pulled the 2Ss out of 
the 3E6 realm, so naturally we had to 
incorporate that workload.  Our CDCs were 
redone, but our TTPs were released 
immediately but some were delayed.  Without 
having those TTPs, that may hinder people 
getting upgraded and trained on time 
successfully. 
Poor introduction 
of supply tasks 
Needs more 
training 
Do you have any big issues with ACES or 
IWIMS? 
ACES intermittingly works when it wants to.  
It does what it’s supposed to do. 
  
Do you feel there are things you can 
provide that you’re not being used for?  
Are you working at full capacity of your 
abilities? 
No. 
  
What is it that you think you could offer? 
Coming from [omitted], I was fairly busy.  
There was a joint mission.  Being in the 
positions I was in, I was the section chief 
Not being used at 
full capacity—just 
training 
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more or less.  Back here, I’m just a trainer.  
My main goal is just to train.  I know that’s 
where we’re lacking, but still I feel I could be 
utilized in other programs our section is 
responsible for. 
How much time to do spend doing 
additional duties? 
Probably maybe 2-4 hours. 
  
Cool, so mostly 3E6 duties.  Are all the 
3E6s there actually in 3E6 jobs? 
Yes, the only exception is one position we’re 
doing.  We call it a floater.  They go to the 
individual shops and do the controller duties 
for that respective shop. 
One controller 
floats between 
shops 
Extra effort to 
increase exposure 
in shops 
How many do yall have there? 
Currently we have 10 with one in bound from 
tech school.  I guess when I first came in there 
were too many so they started kicking people 
out.  A few years went by and then they said, 
“wait, there’s not enough.”  I think we’re 
starting to get fat again. 
Full shop  
Do you feel like you have senior leaders to 
lean on and mentor you in your career 
field? 
It’s been hit or miss.  I’ve had leadership that 
hides behind a computer and don’t do face to 
face. 
  
Do you feel like other guys in the ops flight 
know what you do? 
Yes, yes.  And if they don’t I like to make it 
known that without ops support you pretty 
much won’t have ops.  
Good relationship 
with rest of flight 
Relationships key 
to working well 
What about the ops chief? 
The ops chief is behind us 100%.  If we need 
something he’ll give an extra 50%.  He’ll give 
us what we need because we all play our role 
and if we don’t get the proper support we 
need, he’s there to back us up. Everywhere 
I’ve been has had good ops chiefs. 
  
Is there ever any friction between you and 
the other shops? 
The only friction we get is in the update 
meetings.  We run our reports and show the 
trend analysis, Top 10.  Naturally, whenever a 
shop gets called out, they’ll respond, “oh we 
Some 
disagreements at 
meetings  
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had an issue trying to close it.”  No one 
identified it to us, so how could we help?  We 
can’t know what’s wrong if you don’t tell us. 
What about the other flights?  Programs?  
Asset management? 
Is hit or miss.  There’s a disconnect here.  
From what I see, they program something into 
ACES.  Then when it comes to funding, they 
ask for a 322.  If they followed the process, 
they wouldn’t have to backtrack or jump 
through hoops at the end.  At other bases, I’ve 
seen a fairly good relationship.  I’ve tried to 
work with asset management so that we can 
get good data in.  If we don’t, then we can’t 
accurately account for the true maintenance 
costs for a facility. 
Project process out 
of order between 
flights 
Unawareness of 
where controllers 
fit in process 
Do you feel like you’re competitive for 
awards? 
Oh yeah.  We had a guy get the group.  Not 
the wing yet, but we keep trying. 
Competitive  
What about promotions?  Do you have a 
fair chance at those? 
Yeah definitely.  I haven’t had any issues with 
that. 
Promotable  
So what are your intentions as far as 
staying in until 20? 
You know, I’m continuing to make a 
difference.  I’ve been training everyone 
beneath me to replace me for whenever I 
leave and someday retire.  I think I’ll stay in 
as long as I can.  I don’t have a problem with 
taskings or deployments.  I think it’s 
something we have to do just part of the job. 
Very happy with 
job 
 
So your satisfaction with the career field 
plays into that? 
Yeah I’m happy with what I do.  I feel I have 
a pretty specific role in the work of the Air 
Force.  As far as how things get done and 
making sure the mission stays good to go.  
Being able to keep the planes in the air and 
the infrastructure running. 
  
So what’s your definition of asset 
management? 
Managing all your assets on base whether is 
facility or RPIE, making sure you have the 
Great definition  
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correct date installed, making sure you have 
the appropriate preventative maintenance 
program to keep the RPIE meeting or 
exceeding the life expectancy, being able to 
capture and show all of that to higher 
headquarters.  That’s my definition of asset 
management. 
Where’d you learn that? 
Just working in IWIMS, different bases, just 
seeing the whole big picture. 
Learned asset 
management from 
doing job 
Asset management 
obvious if job is 
done correctly 
Well that’s the best answer I’ve got so far. 
Yeah if we don’t have the correct customer 
account codes or the wrong user for the 
facility, it’s a waste of time.  If we don’t have 
the right data in, then we won’t get the right 
data out. 
  
So if you had to decide something based 
solely on IWIMS, how confident would you 
be? 
ID probably be 80% for the fact that there’s a 
chance that a lot could be wrong. 
A good chance 
data can be wrong 
Suspect data 
Do you think there are any problems 
coming? 
I’d say the training.  With budget cuts coming, 
we need to be able to filter some of the 
requests. 
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